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ABSTRACT 
 
A model to quantify the temporal failure probability for a nuclear power station’s fleet of 
multiple, redundant, emergency diesel generators (EDGs) is developed and demonstrated in 
this thesis. The initiating event for this problem is Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). This model 
calculates the probability that the load on the system overcomes (LOOP duration) the capacity 
of the system (time until the EDGs fail), as a means to quantify system safety margin; this 
concept comes from The United States Department of Energy (DOE), the Idaho National 
Laboratory (INL) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) collaboration on the “Risk-
Informed Safety Margin Characterization” (RISMC) approach. The ultimate application of this 
model is to quantify improved safety margin for an originally two-EDG system that has been 
upgraded with an additional, reinforced, FLEX diesel generator (DG). Some unique features of 
the Non-Recovery Integral (NRI) (main model of this thesis) are that it can account for dynamic 
timing of the EDG failures, model both hot and cold standby EDG arrangements, and accept 
time-dependent hazard function inputs for hot standby cases (when the hazard functions meet 
certain conditions). Nuclear industry and Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model data 
are used as inputs to the NRI to create six specific system model cases. The results from these 
cases are compared to see how different EDG arrangements affect the overall system 
reliability. The three main conclusions drawn from the various result comparisons are the 
following: (1) adding a FLEX DG to an originally two-EDG system makes the system three times 
less likely to fail for LOOP durations of 24 hours (further improvement in system reliability is 
seen for longer LOOP durations); (2) the specific model of load placed on the system has a 
major impact on the system failure probability quantification; and (3) the most effective way to 
increase safety margin (for the most likely LOOP duration scenarios) is to reduce the likelihood 
of common-cause failure events. 
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CHAPTER I  
     INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will introduce the thesis model, point towards the application of the model, 
and describe features of the model that are relevant to the progression of system reliability 
quantification. The objective of this thesis and a description of how the thesis model can meet 
these objectives are given in Section 1.1. Motivation for the model from a historical sense is 
given in Section 1.2; this section also highlights some recent risk assessment challenges as well 
as a relevant application for the model due to the new FLEX [1] program. A high level problem 
overview is given in Section I.3; information about redundancy types, emergency diesel 
generator (EDG) system operation, nuclear industry risk assessment practices, and an overview 
of the thesis model features are presented there. Section 1.4 provides an outline of the 
remaining chapters in this thesis. 
I.1 Objective 
The objective of this thesis is to develop and demonstrate a model to quantify the temporal 
failure probability for a fleet of multiple, redundant EDGs, given a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) 
initiating event at a nuclear power station. The general system models are developed in 
Chapter II and then applied to specific case studies in Chapter IV using data that are introduced 
in Chapter III. The results from the case studies in Chapter IV will show how an overall system 
failure probability varies with different EDG arrangements and operation modes. The ultimate 
model application is to quantify improved safety margin for an originally two-EDG system that 
has been upgraded with an additional, reinforced, FLEX [1] EDG. (The term FLEX here refers to 
an initiative created by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) called “Flexible and Diverse Coping 
Strategies” and is discussed in more detail in Section I.2.3.) 
The primary probability model for this thesis is based on a previously developed Non-
Recovery Integral (NRI) [2], [3] and has adopted the same name here. The NRI models 
developed in Chapter II and demonstrated in Chapter IV are the primary models used to 
accomplish the thesis objective; the Markov models of Chapters II and IV are used to verify the 
accuracy of the NRI. As with the previous NRIs, the offsite power recovery time distribution is 
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assumed to be statistically independent from the distribution of EDG system failure time. The 
probability density functions (PDFs) for these two distributions are multiplied and integrated in 
order to compute the probability that the load (offsite power recovery time) overcomes the 
capacity of the system (EDG system failure time), as a way to quantify the failure probability of 
the system. The concepts of load and capacity are developed in the context of the Risk-
Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) pathway of the U.S. DOE Light-water Reactor 
Sustainability program [4], [5] in Sections II.1 and II.1.1. 
As part of the primary objective, another goal of this thesis is to add new modeling 
capabilities and reduce over-conservatism in relation to current probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) techniques. This goal is concerned with the development of failure time PDFs for EDG 
systems; PDFs are generated for different operational modes of both two- and three-EDG 
systems in Chapter II. The EDG system failure time PDFs for the various NRI cases are created 
using the generalized hazard rate formulation of Shaked and Shanthikumar [6], as it permits 
systematic development of the distribution of failure times for the emergency power system. 
Another advantage of this approach is that it accounts for stochastic ordering of the EDG failure 
times and does not assume that these random variables (EDG failure times) are statistically 
independent. The thesis model can account for both component-caused and externally-caused 
common-cause failures (CCFs), a concept which is explored in Section III.3.3. The thesis NRI can 
model both hot and cold standby EDG operation under certain conditions; hot and cold standby 
operation are defined in Section I.3.1 while details for how to modify the NRI to account for 
cold standby is described in Section II.5.1. The NRI model does not currently account for the 
repair of failed EDGs. This limitation is discussed more in Section I.3.4 and in the second 
introductory paragraph of Chapter II. An additional model is introduced in Chapter V that can 
account for this phenomenon.  
I.2 Motivation 
Motivation for this EDG system model comes from past PRA experiences as well as recent 
events. Since their early use in the nuclear industry, PRAs have recognized that complete loss of 
AC power, termed station blackout (SBO), is a large risk contributor to total core damage 
frequency [7]. The recent nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi has brought to light the dire 
consequences of an extended SBO. This led the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) to develop 
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guidance [1] for the FLEX plan that is expected to add defense in depth (DID) in order to 
mitigate extended SBO consequences. One of the suggestions offered by the FLEX plan is for 
plants to add a diesel generator (DG) housed separately from their standard EDG fleet. The 
main application of the methodology developed in this thesis is to quantify potential improved 
safety margin against SBO as a function of the reliability of the FLEX DG. The accident also led 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to document [8] current PRA technology issues; and 
the models in this thesis offer improvements for some of these issues. 
The motivation and main objective of this thesis are important for understanding potential 
SBO risk and the effectiveness of the recent improvements thorough FLEX DG, especially 
considering the fact that nuclear station PRAs were not used as an input to the FLEX strategy 
development process. The insights and techniques developed in this study could help improve 
current PRA models to more accurately quantify safety margin at nuclear power plants. 
I.2.1 Historical Background 
Nuclear reactor safety and some of its current principles originated during the Manhattan 
Project. Chemical engineers from the Du Pont Corporation brought with them chemical plant 
safety principles, as they led the effort to build nuclear reactors at the Hanford, WA site. The 
reactor design began by splitting the system into mostly independent subsystems whose design 
was frozen early such that additional dependent sub-systems could be incorporated later [9]. 
“This created the notion of functional independence, and later gave rise to the concept of 
‘defense-in-depth’, which promoted layers of independent ‘barriers’ realizing safety functions 
to prevent, protect and/or to mitigate release of radioactive substances into the environment” 
[9]. The use of defense-in-depth (DID) by the Hanford engineers was necessary due to the large 
safety margin uncertainty. 
One of the biggest milestones in PRA occurred in 1975 when the newly developed NRC 
published its first probabilistic reactor safety study [7]. This controversial WASH-1400 report 
was eventually embraced and marked some of the first industry acceptance of PRA 
methodology. This report also recognized that SBO could be a significant contributor to overall 
risk at a plant [7]. 
The use of PRA by the NRC continued to grow and in 1988 the NRC issued Generic Letter 
88-20 [10]. The overall purpose of this letter was to discuss with the industry what a PRA is and 
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how to use it in the future. The letter recognized that each plant is different and may be subject 
to specific vulnerabilities [10]. This letter from the NRC urged each plant to perform individual 
plant examinations in order to understand their specific risks better [10]. This year was also 
when the NRC added 10 CFR 50.63, the Station Blackout (SBO) rule, which required each plant 
to be able to cope and recover from a SBO for a specified duration of time [6]. The time 
duration was plant specific, but generally only about 4 to 8 hours was required. 
The next major move by the NRC occurred in 1995 with their PRA policy statement [11]. 
The policy statement directed that “the use of PRA technology should be increased in all 
regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data, 
and in a manner that complements the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) 
deterministic approach and supports the NRC’s traditional defense-in-depth philosophy” [11]. 
This policy statement eventually led to the current implementation plan by the NRC, the Risk-
Informed and Performance-Based Plan [12]. 
I.2.2 Fukushima Daiichi 
The 2011 tsunami in Japan placed the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in an 
extended SBO condition which eventually led to partial core melt and radioactive release. The 
sea wall surrounding the plant would have prevented any damage due to a design-base 
tsunami; however, this natural disaster was most certainly beyond the design basis of the plant. 
This event has highlighted some weak points in the safety culture of the nuclear industry. One 
lessoned learned is that even though a plant can be perfectly protected against its Design Basis 
Accidents (DBAs), there is always the possibility of low probability, high consequence events 
that are outside the scope of DBAs [1]. The NRC defines a DBA as “a postulated accident that a 
nuclear facility must be designed and built to withstand without loss to the systems, structures, 
and components necessary to ensure public health and safety” [13]. It should also be noted 
that, in the U.S., DBAs for a specific plant must be spelled out in the license agreement, with 
proper justifications. 
I.2.3 FLEX 
Due to these events at Fukushima Daiichi, on March 12, 2012 the NRC issued a Mitigation 
Strategies Order urging all U.S. nuclear power plants to begin implementing strategies that will 
allow them to cope with extended SBOs [14]. This order is a precursor to the Station Blackout 
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Mitigating Strategies Final Rule, which is due by the end of 2016. This final rule will place 
requirements on plants such that if a plant loses power, it should have sufficient procedures, 
strategies, and equipment to enable “mitigation for an indefinite time period” [14]. 
One response to this order has been industry collaboration through NEI to develop the 
“Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide”. This guidance document 
outlines a plan to increase DID for Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBAs), specifically a 
simultaneous Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) and Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink (LUHS) [1]. 
FLEX is planned to provide additional equipment for emergency power and cooling 
situations. The equipment will be portable so that it can be stored in a secure location and then 
moved into position as needed. Some of the equipment will be stored onsite, but provisions 
will be made for offsite equipment to be transported to the plant for longer-term scenarios [1]. 
The FLEX plan is meant to increase DID an unknown amount by extending and improving 
the SBO coping capability of the plant, as illustrated in Figure 1. It is important to note that 
current plant PRA model input (which could help better identify the plant vulnerabilities) was 
not a part of the FLEX plan development. The FLEX plan does not affect plant emergency plans 
or Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – FLEX Increases Defense-in-Depth (reprinted with permission from [1]). 
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The FLEX guide provides prescriptive coping strategies, but makes no attempt at 
quantifying their potential risk reduction [1]. However, the NEI is aware that there is a need to 
quantify the increased safety margin due to FLEX, and there are new efforts to begin looking at 
FLEX from a probabilistic viewpoint. There is no literature on probabilistic analysis of the FLEX 
plan that is publicly available at this time. However, contact was made with Mr. Michael Powell, 
a nuclear industry professional who is very knowledge of the FLEX program. He is the Director 
of Fukushima Daiichi Initiatives for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station and is 
responsible for implementation of all the Fukushima Daiichi issues including the FLEX program. 
He is also a member of the NEI/Industry Core FLEX Team and assisted in the development of 
NEI 12-06 [1]. Mr. Powell provided the following insight into the status of probabilistic analysis 
of the FLEX plan [15]: 
“The US Utilities are currently focused on implementing the Mitigating Strategies NRC 
Order and the development of PRA techniques for crediting the use of the FLEX equipment is 
lagging behind implementation. The Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group (PWROG) issued 
a report in March 2015, PWROG-14003 –P (Revision 1), ‘Implementation of FLEX Equipment in 
Plant-Specific PRA Models’ which identifies issues with crediting FLEX equipment in a PRA. This 
guide provides some approaches for resolving issues but not all issues are addressed.” 
Mr. Powell then went on to list some of the major PRA data and modeling considerations 
that need to be addressed, as suggested by the above mentioned PWROG report (which is 
currently proprietary information). It is appropriate to note here that these issues are not 
stopping plants from crediting FLEX equipment in their PRA; however, these are some 
important issues to address to obtain more realistic (and less conservative) credit for FLEX. 
They are listed here as follows: 
 Time window for installing the FLEX equipment and getting the equipment 
operational 
 Application specific failure-to-start, failure-to-run 
 Booster pump (if needed) – Application specific failure-to-start, failure-to-run 
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 Suction and Discharge Piping – Application specific failure to deliver flow due to 
clogging of lines or filters/strainers, air leaks, FLEX piping damage, rupture or 
excessive leakage 
 System unavailability time for refueling of FLEX pumps, cleaning clogs in piping, or 
cleaning filters/ strainers. These items need to be considered on a site-specific basis 
due to differences in installed piping, use and redundancy of filters/ strainers, and 
the source of the alternate water supply. 
This thesis makes no attempt at addressing any of the above issues, but recognizes their 
importance for practical PRA applications. Instead this thesis is focused on a simplified SBO 
problem and only models the behavior of the power-producing components (the EDGs and 
FLEX DG). While a detailed PRA analysis for FLEX may become necessary, this thesis aims to use 
the simplified problem model to gain a possible first-look insight into the effects of an 
additional FLEX DG. The main phenomenon under consideration is common-cause failure (CCF). 
The FLEX DG will be housed separately from the EDGs and will have its own separate electrical 
connections and support systems, thus lowering the frequency of a CCF that fails all onsite 
power sources. The FLEX DG will also be called into action only after the failure of the standard 
onsite EDGs, thus the FLEX DG can be modeled as a cold standby component (the difference 
between hot and cold standby redundancy is discussed in Section II.5). The culminating analysis 
will be for a backup power system composed of two EDGs and one FLEX DG. The 3-out-of-3 CCF 
parameter (for the three diesels) will be adjusted to assess how it affects the probability of 
system failure.  
I.2.4 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Challenges 
In addition to motivating the deterministic FLEX strategy, the Fukushima Daiichi accident 
prompted the industry to examine weak points in current PRA technology. The probability 
model of this thesis attempts to quantify the benefits of an additional FLEX DG, while trying to 
advance a few PRA practices. This section briefly highlights some of these current PRA issues 
and points to how the proposed thesis model could offer enhancement. 
The accident at Fukushima Daiichi did more than just highlight the need for additional 
barriers and mitigation strategies against BDBAs. It also called attention to technical issues with 
certain PRA methods. The 2013 NRC report [8] says that while the disaster was due to an 
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extremely rare initiating event, we should not limit “our [Probabilistic Safety Assessment] PSA 
technology improvement efforts on the assessment of the likelihood of severe natural 
hazards”, or we might “miss other useful lessons that could lead to improvements in how we 
assess the risk of future accidents, which, should they occur, may or may not look like the 
events following the Tōhoku earthquake” [8]. The purpose of the NRC report [8] is to document 
results from an on-going review of the Fukushima Daiichi accident with a focus on improving 
PRA technology. The report lists many “potential PSA technology challenges and reminders”, 
and a few of these are addressed by this thesis.  
One of the challenges recognized by the report was to reconsider ‘Game Over’ modeling 
and intentional conservatism. The term ‘Game Over’ refers to, “modeling [which] relies on 
conservative simplifying assumptions to terminate PSA accident scenarios early” [8]. The report 
goes on to give the following example: “typical PSA treatments of scenarios involving complete 
loss of power lead to predictions of core melt much quicker than the times reported for 
Fukushima Daiichi Units 2 and 3”. Such treatments, “miss the opportunity to identify and assess 
potentially effective accident management improvements” [8]. The premise of this example is 
that well-meaning conservatism in certain PRA areas can potentially skew results so “that truly 
risk-significant scenarios may be masked” [8]. Another challenging topic recognized by the 
above mentioned NRC report was treating long duration scenarios. By modeling accident 
progressions more realistically, simplifying assumptions might be removed thus leading to a 
long duration scenario. The NRI methodology, as extended in this thesis, can also explicitly 
credit the possibility of offsite power recovery (given a distribution of the offsite power 
recovery time), and this allows long duration scenarios to be easily analyzed.  
The thesis model (NRI) was conceived with intentions to model, more robustly than 
traditional PRA means, the failure probability of an EDG system after a LOOP event by 
accounting for the dynamic timing of successive EDG failures (while differentiating between hot 
and cold standby EDGs), accepting time-dependent EDG failure rate inputs, and considering 
both component-caused and externally-caused CCFs (as well as their implications to conditional 
hazard functions). Throughout the thesis research it became apparent that not all of these 
model features could be captured accurately with confidence by using the joint failure time 
distribution developed by Shaked and Shanthikumar. However, this research has provided 
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greater insight into assumptions, features, and limitations of both the NRI model of this thesis 
and current nuclear PRA practices; this is discussed in conjunction with a problem overview in 
the following Section I.3. The possibility of creating a model based on a semi-Markov process 
(with more feature capabilities) is discussed as future work in Chapter V. 
I.3 Problem Overview 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a temporal probability model for an emergency 
power system composed of multiple, redundant EDGs. The goal of this model is to calculate the 
probability that the EDG system fails and offsite power is not restored by some time of interest. 
The NRI model can account for these redundant EDGs to be operated either in cold or hot 
standby; Sections II.2 and II.3 develop the NRI for hot standby systems and Section II.5.1 shows 
how to modify the NRI model to account for cold standby arrangements. The main goal of the 
case studies presented in Chapter IV is to examine how different numbers of EDGs, and how 
they are operated, affect the system failure probability.  
I.3.1 Cold and Hot Standby Redundancy 
A cold standby system is defined in [16] (p. 24) as follows: “In the cold standby redundancy 
arrangement, the redundant components are sequentially used in the system at component 
failure times. Each redundant component in the cold standby arrangement can operate only 
when it is switched on. When the component in operation fails, one of the redundant ones [a 
cold spare] is switched on to continue the operation.” This standby mode is contrasted in [16] 
with the hot standby mode which is characterized by all the redundant components becoming 
active at the beginning of the system lifetime. Each of these arrangements has their own 
advantages. A cold standby system “improves system life more effectively” [16], since the spare 
components are not receiving unnecessary wear. A hot standby system however has the 
advantage of decreased downtime due to switching between the failed component and the 
next hot spare that is put into operation. The appropriate mode of redundancy for a system is 
based on the specific details of operation. Hot and cold standby as defined above are on 
opposite ends of the spectrum for all possible redundancy types. 
I.3.2 EDG System Operation 
All U.S. nuclear power plants are required to have redundant onsite emergency AC power 
sources in case the offsite power source is lost [17]. These onsite redundant power sources 
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come in the form of EDG trains, which include a diesel engine, generator, cooling system, 
breaker, and everything else necessary to turn diesel fuel into plant useable AC power. The EDG 
trains are simply referred to as EDGs for the remainder of this thesis; a more detailed 
description of the components included in a train can be found in Section III.1. Generally, each 
EDG is a completely redundant form of onsite AC power. Thus a single EDG can carry the entire 
plant load for the essential shutdown, safety, and decay heat removal systems; each plant is 
required to have at least one level of redundancy, one EDG can fail and the emergency power 
system can still operate. At South Texas Project (STP) Nuclear Operating Company, the standby 
AC power system is composed of three separate and independent EDG trains, “supplying power 
to three associated load groups designated Train A, Train B, and Train C” [18]. While each train 
is independent it “is not totally redundant; two trains are necessary to mitigate the 
consequences of a design basis accident (DBA)” [18]. These standby EDGs are housed in 
permanent locations and when a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event occurs the necessary plant 
load can be quickly picked up by them. When a LOOP event occurs at STP, all three EDGs are 
started and loaded with some amount of the 4.16KV AC Class 1E Power System load [18]. While 
STP operates in this manner, many other U.S. nuclear power plants have either two or three 
EDGs and only require a single EDG to carry the entire plant load; as such, the EDG system 
models presented in this thesis have either a 1-out-of-2 or a 1-out-of-3 success criterion. It is 
also believed that most U.S. nuclear plants operate their onsite emergency power system in a 
hot standby arrangement. The new FLEX program intends to equip plants with a separately 
housed EDG which is called into action once it is needed; these FLEX DGs are treated as both 
hot and cold standby components in Sections IV.5.1 and IV.5.2, respectively. This thesis does 
not claim to actually know or understand the standby operation of either the standard onsite or 
FLEX DGs; it does however provide models that can account for either of the two extremes, hot 
or cold standby. 
I.3.3 Current PRA Modeling Practices 
I.3.3.1 Safety Margin and the RISMC Approach 
The concept of safety margins emerged early on in the development of commercial nuclear 
power “as a part of the defense-in-depth approach to ensuring nuclear safety” [4]. Safety 
margin is defined as the minimum distance between the ‘loading’ and ‘capacity’ of the system. 
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“Due to limited knowledge, large (i.e., conservatively specified) safety margins are applied to 
compensate for approximations used in (the phenomenological or deterministic) models and 
associated computer codes which estimate the “loads” and the “capacity” in the reactor 
systems that occur during the complex accident sequences that are analyzed” [4]. 
The United States Department of Energy (DOE), the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and the 
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) have collaborated to create “a Risk-Informed Safety 
Margin Characterization (RISMC) approach to evaluate and manage changes in plant safety 
margins over long time horizons” [4]. In the past framework, “the concept of safety margin is 
limited to characterizing the ‘load’ as a known quantity with the margin given by the distance 
from this load to the defined safety limit” [4]. “In this concept, uncertainties only are addressed 
implicitly, i.e., the assessment of the ‘load’ is conducted using conservative assumptions and 
analysis methods” [4]. However, as Figure 2 illustrates, load and capacity are not discrete 
values but instead have distributions. Treating the load and capacity as discrete values has 
several issues. “First, the current generation of physics-based models are capable of only 
providing approximate results of the real ‘load’ representing the actual plant condition. Second, 
the application of conservatisms (in assumptions and modeling) can lead to non-conservative 
predictions of the load. In the current approach, the use of a safety limit as a surrogate for the 
‘capacity’ serves as an additional conservatism; however, because the degree to which the 
safety limit is conservative is unknown, this approach prescribes significant operational 
limitations on the plant. The intent of a risk-informed approach to characterization of safety 
margins is to integrate the information from both deterministic and probabilistic safety 
analyses to obtain a complete picture” [4]. 
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Figure 2 – Schematic of Safety Margin. 
 
 
 
In this abstract formulation the natures of “capacity” and “load” have been consciously left 
unspecified, and indeed quite different instances are both possible, and appropriate to 
different circumstances. For an example from [19], consider an initiating event (for a BWR) to 
be LOOP plus station blackout, (effectively) employ clad failure temperature as capacity, with 
randomness introduced by a triangular distribution having mode at the 2200 °F regulatory 
limit, and fuel temperature calculated from RELAP-5 as load, with random variation induced by 
treating certain input parameters as stochastic, with assumed known distributions. See also 
[20] and [21] for additional examples of load and capacity. 
I.3.3.2 SPAR 
In the past, Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models and industry both relied on 
static fault tree models, which resulted in over-conservative total system failure probabilities 
due to incorrect timing dependencies. More recently, some industry models began trying to 
address these simplifications from excessive assumptions through improved modeling 
techniques. Currently, the accepted industry approach to account for the timing issues (due to 
consecutive individual EDG failures) is through the use of a convoluted distribution method 
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[22]. The convoluted distribution technique used in SPAR for LOOP/SBO modeling is for a 
system of EDGs in hot standby and can only accept constant failure rate inputs [22]. This 
convoluted distribution method and how it relates to the NRI are explored further in Section 
II.2.4. 
I.3.4 Thesis Model Features, Limitations, and Insights 
Chapter II presents two different ways to model the probability of EDG failure sequences; 
the primary way is the above-mentioned NRI and a standard Markov state transition model was 
used to verify the NRI results. The main model (NRI) of this thesis can account for dynamic 
timing of the EDG failures. The NRI is best suited for hot standby system cases, and can accept 
time-dependent hazard function inputs for hot standby cases (when the hazard functions meet 
certain conditions, as described in Section V.3.1). The NRI can be modified for cold standby 
cases when constant hazard rate inputs are used, and this is verified against a Markov and 
Convoluted Distribution model in Section II.5. The NRI in this thesis does not account for the 
possibility of a repair following an EDG failure; while this limitation may add unnecessary over-
conservatism to the results in Chapter IV, it does not affect the ultimate application for the 
model of comparing the improved reliability due to an additional FLEX DG. Previously 
developed NRI models from [2] and [3] do credit the possibility of EDG repair, but only after all 
the EDGs have failed.  
A well-known Markov state transition model was used to verify the correctness of the NRI. 
This model can only accept constant failure rates. The Markov model could also easily handle 
the possibility of constant rate EDG repair, however repair was neglected for all the developed 
models and case studies in this thesis. The Markov model can be written for either hot or cold 
standby cases; the Markov models are first developed for hot standby in Section II.4, while 
Section II.5.2 shows how to set up a Markov model for a simple two-EDG system in cold 
standby. 
Throughout the research required to complete this thesis, it became apparent that a semi-
Markov model may be a more appropriate way to capture some of the important processes 
associated with the LOOP/SBO problem. Chapter V will discuss possible future work by 
presenting the emergency power system problem in terms of a semi-Markov process. A semi-
Markov model can also easily accept time-dependent failure and repair rates, but this limits its 
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applicability to cold standby systems (as explained in Section V.2). A simple system case is 
developed in Chapter V and used to compare results between the NRI model and semi-Markov 
model. This case will use a Weibull hazard function with a shape parameter greater than 1 
because this conveniently represents an increasing failure rate.   
I.4 Thesis Outline 
The outline of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter II is devoted to development of the theory and general models necessary to meet 
the overall thesis objective; specifically, the development of the NRI models for both the two- 
and three-EDG system cases. In addition to this, an analytical solution to Markov models for the 
same two- and three-EDG system cases will be developed there. 
Chapter III is focused on the specific data used in the case studies of Chapter IV. This will 
consist of explaining where the model data come from, why these data sources were chosen, 
and what assumptions have been made for the data. In addition to this some nuclear PRA 
concepts such as basic failure event types, different types of CCF, and how the alpha factor 
model works will be discussed there.  
In Chapter IV, specific models will be applied within the general two- and three-EDG system 
models that were developed in Chapter II. Here, the specific model inputs and assumptions for 
these cases will be discussed in detail. The first few NRI models will be compared against 
identical Markov model cases in order to verify the results and coding of the NRI models. The 
culminating case for this chapter is a system of 2 identical EDGs and one non-identical FLEX DG. 
This case will be used to show how the safety margin of the system changes with respect to the 
reliability of the FLEX DG.  
Potential future work related to this thesis is discussed in Chapter V, with an emphasis on 
possible advantages of modeling the SBO problem with a semi-Markov process. A simple 
problem for a two-EDG system with time-dependent failure rates is presented here and then 
modeled using both a semi-Markov and NRI models. 
Finally, a summary and conclusions will be provided in Chapter VI.   
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CHAPTER II  
     THEORY 
 
In this chapter, underlying theory and the NRI model development is presented. The overall 
thesis objective of quantifying the failure probability for various EDGs system arrangements is 
accomplished in Chapter IV using specific data introduced in Chapter III and the general models 
developed in this chapter. The NRI model can be generalized as calculating the probability that 
some load overcomes the capacity of the system, as a way to quantify the safety margin of the 
system. The integrand for this model is formed by multiplying a PDF for time of onsite power 
system failure by a complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) for time of offsite 
power recovery; the load and capacity of the model are described with this CCDF and PDF, 
respectively. Section II.1 will expand on the idea of load versus capacity and introduce the 
offsite power recovery term. Section II.2 will focus on development of the PDF for time of 
onsite power system failure (for a system of two EDGs). Section II.3 will extend the system 
failure PDF to a case with three redundant EDGs. Section II.4 will build a connection between 
the developed system failure model and a Markov model of the same system, as a means of 
verification. Finally, Section II.5 will show how to modify the EDG system failure time PDF in the 
NRI so that it can also model cold standby systems; the models developed in Sections II.2, II.3, 
and II.4 are all for hot standby systems. 
The NRIs developed in this thesis makes novel use of the joint distribution functions from 
[23], [24], and [6]. The joint PDF models stochastic ordering of the individual EDG failure times 
and thus accounts for dependence among these random variables; this is more general than 
the commonly used PRA assumption that the individual failure times are statistically 
independent. The inputs (and in fact building blocks) of this joint PDF are conditional hazard 
functions. These hazard functions, ( )'t s , are instantaneous failure rates about t dt  as dt  
tends to zero (a generic hazard function is described more fully in Equations (I-1)-(I-2)). Use of 
hazard functions in the joint PDF is important because they allow component failure 
propensities to change all the way up to the time of failure. If constant failure rates are used in 
this joint PDF, the hazard functions will be constant with respect to time, however the values of 
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the hazard functions are still conditional on which specific components are still operating in the 
system. For example, in a two-EDG system, the hazard function for an individual failure event of 
a specific EDG depends on whether the other EDG in the system is still operating. 
The joint distribution function from Shaked and Shanthikumar [6] is written such that once 
one of the components fails it cannot be repaired and returned to operation. This detail 
introduces unnecessary over-conservatism in the NRIs in this thesis. Current industry PRA 
LOOP/SBO models already credit the possibility of a failed EDG being repaired before CSBO is 
reached, which makes the NRI seem inferior in this regard. However, accounting for EDG repair 
is not an objective of this thesis; instead, the main focus of the overall objective is on 
developing a more accurate EDG failure time distribution. The application for this thesis model 
(NRI) is to quantify improved safety margin from adding a FLEX DG and this quantification can 
be captured without dealing with EDG repair; looking at the relative risk between a system of 
two EDGs and a similar system with an additional FLEX DG can provide useful insight into 
system behavior without accounting for EDG repair. It may be possible to modify the NRI 
formulation or add a correction factor to account for EDG repair, but this work has not yet 
begun.  
The two- and three-EDG system NRI models developed in this chapter are written showing 
time dependence of the hazard function inputs. The actual case studies performed and 
presented in the Chapter IV however all use constant failure rates for three reasons; time-
dependent EDG failure data are not currently available from the NRC, the Markov model used 
to verify the NRI has been restricted to constant failure rates (in order to simplify its solution), 
and use of time-dependent rates limits the applicability of the NRI to hot standby systems.  
II.1 Load and Capacity 
It is worth acknowledging that the viewpoint developed in this section, especially the 
notion of time to cessation of process demand as “load” and time to failure of safety system to 
be able to meet that demand as “capacity,” owes much to the notions developed within the 
Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) pathway of the U.S. DOE Light-water 
Reactor Sustainability program [4], [5]. 
Much of the following terminology is adapted from Chapter 10 of [25]. Suppose a 
hazardous system imposes a process demand (i.e., an initiating event occurs) at time t = 0, and 
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that this demand is characterized by a load comprising a random time TL at which this demand 
ends. Further take the load as distributed according to the cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) FL, so that 
   Pr ( ).L L L LT t F t  (II-1) 
It is supposed that TL is positive with probability 1, so that 
  
 
 
   
0
(0) (0 ) lim ( ) 0.L L L
t
F F F t   (II-2) 
(And of course FL(tL) = 0 for tL < 0.) 
The system under consideration is designed so that this load is intended to be met by a 
primary system that is characterized by its capacity, defined as the random time TC after which 
the primary safety system no longer is capable of meeting the process demand.  Let this 
capacity be distributed as the CDF FC. It is assumed that load and capacity are statistically 
independent, so that their joint distribution factors as 
     ( , ): Pr  and ( ) ( ).L C L L C C L L C CF t t T t T t F t F t  (II-3) 
In general terms, the safety system has the capacity to meet the load imposed on it if, and 
only if,   crit ,L CT T T where Tcrit is some deterministically specified time. In terms of the EDG 
problem, Tcrit is taken as the (deterministic) amount of time it takes for the primary coolant to 
boil down to a level lower than the top of the active fuel, with due consideration for the 
effectiveness of the various coping measures (such as batteries) installed to deal with situations 
in which the load exceeds the capacity of the primary safety system. The criterion for success, 
which is to say the safety system having the capacity to successfully meet the load imposed 
upon it, is therefore  L C critT T T . The probability of such success is 
  
0 0 0
Pr ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
C critt T
L C crit L L C C L C crit C CT T T dF t dF t F t T dF t
 
 
         (II-4) 
The quantity in Equation (II-5) is termed as the temporal margin of safety.  A slightly more 
convenient measure to work with is the probability that the safety system will fail, in the sense 
that the load imposed upon it exceeds its capacity. The probability of such failure is 
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  
0 0
Pr 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),LL C crit L C crit C C C crit C CT T T F t T dF t F t T dF t
 
          (II-6) 
where F  is the generic notation for 1-G, the CCDF associated to the CDF G.  
The “NRI” on the right-hand side of Equation (II-6) can be evaluated as 
 
0
Probability of Failure ( ) ( ) ,f L C crit C C CP F t T f t dt


     (II-7) 
where Cf  is the PDF for the capacity. 
II.1.1 Models of Load 
Any application of Equation (II-7), for the temporal probability of failure, requires some 
quantitative model of the statistical distribution of the load and capacity associated to the 
problem under consideration. Sections II.2 and II.3 will develop PDFs for capacity, specifically 
the failure times for an EDG system. Both the mission-time model of load and a more realistic 
model of load are presented in this section. These load models are employed in the case 
studies performed using NRIs (Chapter IV). 
A particularly simple and widely used model of load is based on the concept of “mission 
time”. Under such a model the safety subsystem is deemed to perform successfully if it 
operates for a time  ,C MT T  where MT  is some designated “mission time.” This corresponds to 
a load that has value MT  with (almost) certainty, and hence CDF 
 

 

0, ,
( ) .
1,
L M
L L
L M
t T
F t
t T
  (II-8) 
The value   24 hoursMT  often is used in probabilistic risk analysis, and indeed is endorsed 
by the ASME standard for PRA [26]. 
For a mission-time load, Equation (II-7) for the temporal probability of failure simplifies as 
 


   
0
Probability of Failure ( ) ( ).
M critT T
f C C C C M critP f t dt F T T   (II-9) 
A somewhat more realistic model of the distribution of times of recovery of offsite power, 
following a LOOP event, is the lognormal distribution with mean of the natural logarithm of the 
recovery time =  0.3  and standard deviation of that quantity = σ = 1.064. This distribution 
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corresponds to grid-related LOOP events, which were found to occasion slightly over half of all 
LOOP events occurring in the US from 1986 to 2004; cf. p. v and Table 4.1, pp. 27-28, of Vol. 1 
of NUREG/CR-6890 [27]. Data used to fit this distribution are for a LOOP duration of up to 24 
hours and therefore is not necessarily valid for longer duration events. LOOP durations do not 
generally last longer than 24 hours. In fact, the longest LOOP duration category in NUREG/CR-
6890 [27] was from “Severe and Extreme” events, and these durations had a mean time of only 
14.2 hours. While most actual LOOP duration do not exceed 24 hours, it is the rare long 
duration LOOP events that have the highest potential for core damage. 
While the NRI could easily handle accounting for this lognormal distribution of recovery 
times, the Markov models used to verify the NRI could not; in order to simplify the 
development of the Markov models, rate parameters were restricted to constant values only. 
As such, to account for recovery of offsite power for the “recovery” cases in Chapter IV 
(Sections IV.2 and IV.4), following a LOOP event, an exponential distribution with a constant 
recovery rate of 10.04 hour .  
The realistic (lognormal) model of load is compared in Figure 3 against two exponential 
distribution models and the mission-time model (with the canonical 24-hour mission time). Use 
of the mission-time model often is justified on the basis of conservatism. Indeed Figure 3 shows 
that while the mission-time load takes no credit for recovery of offsite power during the first 24 
hours, the realistic load suggests that in fact recovery occurs with 95% probability within about 
the first 7.5 hours, and has occurred with graphical certainty by 24 hours. Figure 3 also 
compares these to the exponential CDF with a constant recovery rate of 10.04 hour . This 
constant recovery rate is over-conservative in estimating the probability of CSBO, compared to 
the more realistic lognormal model of load. Developing the NRI so that it reduces over-
conservatism compared to current PRA practices is part of the objective in this thesis; however, 
using this exponential load distribution for the recovery cases in Chapter IV is completely 
justifiable. The main purpose of these recovery cases (Sections IV.2 and IV.4) is to see how the 
system failure probability changes when an EDG is added to the system. A more realistic 
lognormal distribution of load could be used in future NRI developments, if less conservative 
results are desired. 
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Figure 3 – Cumulative Distribution Functions for the Deterministic Mission-Time Load 
(purple) and the Realistic Load (blue). 
 
 
 
For example consider the highly hypothetical case of an emergency power system that is 
very narrowly tailored to the 24-hour mission time, so that it would always fail at precisely 25 
hours. This corresponds to a capacity distribution (where δ  is the Dirac delta function), 
  ( ) ( 25).Cf t t  (II-10) 
For  0critT and any load distribution, (II-7) then gives   
  (25).f LP F  (II-11) 
 For the 24-hour mission-time load this would give  0,fP so that the emergency power 
system would perform perfectly, as evaluated by the 24-hour mission-time load, presumably as 
designed. But the more realistic load would lead to 
 1- (25;.3,1.064)».00304,f TP F  (II-12) 
which could well be deemed an unacceptably high degree of risk (per initiating event). 
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Of course one would (and could) never in practice employ such a knife-edge emergency 
power system. Nonetheless, this simple example does illustrate the potential for conclusions 
drawn from mission-time models of load to depend sensitively upon the precise choice of 
mission time. 
II.2 System Failure Model (Two EDGs)
 
 
Consider a safety system composed of two hot standby redundant EDGs, indexed as i = 1, 2, 
with respective random individual failure times 1 2,T T ; the EDGs operate in parallel (are 
redundant) so the system fails when both EDGs are failed. In the current Section II.2, a 
probability model for the failure time of the EDG system is developed; however, the model can 
easily be generalized to other types of systems composed of multiple redundant components. 
The specific model developed here accepts data similar to that of a standard SPAR model for 
EDG failure. (This is further discussed in Chapter III.) Following the same basic failure event 
model as prescribed by the NRC, each EDG is subject to demand failures at t=0 (given data are 
probabilities) or continuous-time failures for t>0 (given data are used as rates); these are 
termed individual failures because each event affects a single EDG. Thus the random variables 
for the EDG failure times are both discrete (t=0) and continuous (t>0). The EDGs are also 
subject to common root-cause failure events (with random failure time T12), and probability or 
rate parameters are used to describe the frequency of single events that fail both EDGs at the 
same time (here termed a coincident failure). Again, system failure occurs when all (both) EDGs 
have failed; the corresponding basic event sequences that result in system failure are the 
following: 
1. The first failure occurs while running, then the second failure occurs while 
running (2 individual, continuous failures) 
2. A single coincident failure while running event occurs, thus both EDGs fail 
simultaneously 
3. The first failure occurs at start (on demand), and then the second failure 
occurs while running 
4. The EDGs experience a coincident failure at start (on demand) 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
Two individual failure to start events is not considered a possibility, thus the above list 
comprises an exhaustive list of system failure sequences. 
The main input parameters and building blocks of the probability model are hazard 
functions, which are essentially instantaneous rates for their respective failure events and 
conditions. Although well-known outside this thesis, the concept of a hazard function is defined 
here since it is used often for the remainder of this chapter. The following definitions are from 
basic survival analysis probability theory (page 9 and 10 of [24]). 
The hazard function is an instantaneous failure rate as t  tends to zero, as defined: 
  
0
Pr{ }
( ) lim .
Pr{ }t
t T t t
t
t T t

 
   

  
 (II-13) 
This continuous failure rate is related to, ( )F t , the CDF that describes the probability of the 
random failure time ( T ) in the interval  0 T t , 
   Pr{ } ( ),    0.T t F t t   (II-14) 
This CDF is the integral of the failure PDF, ( ),f t  
   
0
( ) ( ) ,
t
F t f d   (II-15) 
and (if f is continuous at t ), 
 ( ) ( ).
d
f t F t
dt
  (II-16) 
In a physical sense, ( )f t dt is the probability of T  falling within the infinitesimal interval 
[t,t dt].   
The hazard function can now be defined in terms of the complementary CDF (also called 
survival function, ( )S t ) and PDF as 
   

( ) ( )
( ) .
1 ( ) ( )
f t f t
t
F t S t
 (II-17) 
The PDF can now be defined as 
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
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   
 (II-18) 
where  is an infinitely small number.dt  
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The hazard functions used for the system failure models developed in this thesis are 
conditional on which specific components are still operating versus which ones have failed. 
These hazard functions and their conditions will be explicitly defined in the following 
subsections.  
In Section II.2.1 the probability model is developed for system failure resulting from 
subsequent, individual, running failures of each EDG. In Section II.2.2, the probability model for 
the coincident failure sequence is developed. Finally in Section II.2.3, basic event sequences 
involving demand failures are addressed. Also, the previously developed models for their 
respective mutually exclusive system failure sequences are combined to create the complete 
PDF and CDF for all the random failure times of the EDG system (the system failure time CDF is 
equivalent to the NRI with a mission-time model of load). The results of Section II.2.1 are taken 
directly from the multivariate joint distribution function developed by Shaked and 
Shanthikumar [6]; the results of Sections II.2.2 and II.2.3 are extensions of the results of [6] to 
accommodate respectively CCFs and failures on demand. 
II.2.1 Continuous Individual Failures 
The model development begins with a simple case of a system composed of two redundant 
components. Each component is subject to continuous individual failures described by designed 
and influenced hazard functions as in Equations (II-19) and (II-20), respectively. Here, the 
subscript numbers 1 and 2 refers to the different components. As first developed in [23], the 
joint distribution is described in terms of the hazard functions      1 2 1 2( ),  ( ),  ( ),  and ( )t t . 
These building blocks of the model are described in the following paragraphs. For the two EDG 
model,  is some failure time for an event where one EDG survives, while t is some failure time 
for an event where no EDGs survive (system failure).  
The designed hazard functions for the two EDGs are given by Equation (II-19). This function 
describes the frequency of individual failure events for a specific EDG given neither EDG has 
failed. 
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The influenced hazard functions for the two EDGs are given by Equation (II-20). This 
function describes the frequency of individual failure events for a specific EDG given the other 
EDG has failed. Note that the absence of coincident failures in this section does not necessarily 
mean the two failure times are statistically independent. To the contrary, the following 
definition explicitly contemplates that failure of one of the two subsystems can influence the 
rate at which the other fails - just not (yet) to the extent that failure of the other occurs 
immediately. The concept makes more sense in the context of component-caused versus 
externally-caused CCF, which is explained more in Section III.3.3. The important point here is 
that the failure of the first EDG influences the hazard function formulation for the second EDG 
failure which then determines the joint pdf in [28]. 
 
  
 
    
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'
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Pr | ,
( ) ( , ) lim ,  1,2,  1' 2,  and 2' 1i i ii i i i
t
t T t t T T t
t t T T t i
t
 (II-20) 
The above hazard functions completely specify the joint distribution of T1 and T2, as follows. 
The bivariate PDF ( , )f t  is given by Equation (40) of [23], as in Equation (II-21), 
   1 2 1 2 20( , ) ( ) ( )exp ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
t
f t t u u du u du


            (II-21) 
for 2 1T T , with an analogous expression for 1 2T T . This PDF is expressed in terms of 
probability in Equation (II-22). 
 
    


        
 1 2 1 2
Pr{ , , }
( , )
T d t T t dt T t T t
f t
d dt
 (II-22) 
The specific system considered is composed of two EDG trains and is subject to the same 
three failures modes typically considered in SPAR models [29], [30]. These failure modes are 
treated slightly differently than standard industry practice; the specific sources and 
assumptions used to obtain the model parameters are discussed later in Chapter III. At this 
point in the development, consider only the two following failure modes. From time t=0 to t=1 
hour an EDG may experience an individual failure to load (FTL), while after time t=1 hour an 
EDG may experience an individual failure to run (FTR). Thus the given hazard functions are 
actually piecewise, as expressed in the following equations, which denote the specific hazard 
time regime with a superscript on ; L and R stand for FTL and FTR hazards, respectively. There 
are now three distinct component failure sequences which lead to system failure,  
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   
  
   
   
  
   
( ),     if  1 ( ),     if  1
( )      and    ( )  .
( ),     if  1 ( ),     if  1
LL
ii
ii R R
i i
hr t t hr
t
hr t t hr
  (II-23) 
Equation (II-24) represents the sequence where the first EDG experiences a FTL and then 
the second EDG experiences a FTL. This equation is easily obtained from Equation (II-21) by 
simply specifying that the only hazards experienced are FTL. Equation (II-24) accounts for both 
cases, 2 1T T  and 1 2T T . 
 
  
  




      
     
     
   
 
 
1 2 1 2 20
2 1 1 2 10
( 1, 1) ( ) ( )exp ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )exp ( ) ( ) ( )
t
L L L L L
t
L L L L L
f t t u u du u du
t u u du u du
  (II-24) 
Equation (II-25) represents the sequence where the first EDG experiences a FTL and then 
the second EDG experiences a FTR. The designed hazard function portion of this is identical to 
Equation (II-24), while  's  the outside the exponential are changed to reflect the hazard 
experienced at the point of failure ( t ) of the second EDG.  
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  (II-25) 
The integral limits on the influenced hazard functions are split to account for the change in 
hazard from FTL to FTR, as follows: 
 
 
     
1
1
( ) ( ) ( ) .
t t
L R
i i iu du u du u du  (II-26) 
Equation (II-27) represents the sequence where the first EDG experiences a FTR and then 
the second EDG experiences a FTR. Here, the integral limits on the summed designed hazard 
functions are split at t=1 hour to account for the change in hazard from FTL to FTR. The rest of 
this joint density function is similar to Equation (II-21) except the hazard functions are specified 
as FTR (with superscript R ’s). 
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 (II-27) 
With the three variations to the joint PDF shown above in Equations (II-24)-(II-27), the CDF 
of failure times for this two-EDG system is shown in Equation (II-28). 
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 (II-28) 
II.2.2 Continuous Coincident Failures 
In Section II.2.1, the system failure CDF was developed using conditional hazard functions 
for individual EDG failures (FTL or FTR), and the system failed once two successive individual 
failures occurred. In this section the notion of coincident failure is introduced (also referred to 
as CCF). This type of failure occurs when a single root cause leads to the failure of both EDGs at 
the same time.  
For this system failure scenario there is only a single coincident failure time random 
variable and therefore a joint distribution is not required as in the last Section. Let F  be the 
distribution function of the absolutely continuous random lifetime T (single coincident failure 
time) and let  ( ) 1S t F  and  /f dF dt  be respectively the corresponding survival function 
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and density function of T . The coincident hazard rate function 12  of T  is defined in Equation 
(II-29). In Section II.2.1, t was defined as the random variable for the time of second EDG 
failure, which is also the time of system failure. In this section t  is defined as the time of 
coincident failure, which is again the time of system failure. 
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t t T T T t
t
  (II-29)  
The inclusion of coincident failures requires a slight redefinition of the designed and 
influenced hazard functions for individual failures; this is shown in Equations (II-30) and (II-31) 
respectively. 
 
 

   
    
 
   
   

1 2 12
1 2 12
0
Pr | , ,
( ) ( | , , ) lim ,  1,2ii i
T T T T
T T T i   (II-30) 
  
  



 
  
    
   

12
12
0
( ) ( ,  , )
Pr ,  ,
lim ,  1,2,  1' 2,  and 2' 1
i i i i
i i i
t
t t T T T t
t T t t T T T t
i
t
  (II-31) 
As in Section II.2.1, the given hazard functions are piecewise, as expressed in Equation 
(II-32). 
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Starting from a non-failed state after time t=0, the system may experience one of three 
different hazards; EDG 1 could individually fail, EDG 2 could individually fail, or both EDGs could 
coincidentally fail. Thus the cumulative hazard function   from t=0 until the time of the first 
hazard is given as 
   
0
( ) ( ) ,
t
totalt u du   (II-33) 
     1 2 12where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).total u u u u  It is well known that S  and   determine each other via 
the relation seen in Equation (II-34). 
     
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f t
t S t t
S t
  (II-34) 
Thus, the PDF for time of coincident failure is seen in Equation (II-35). 
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     12 0( ) ( )exp ( )
t
totalf t t u du   (II-35) 
The above PDF is for the case when neither EDG fails individually, but instead a coincident 
failure causes system failure 12 1 2( , )T T T . This PDF is expressed in terms of probability in (II-36). 
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  (II-36) 
Likewise, the CDF for time of coincident failure is shown in Equation (II-37). 
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II.2.3 Failures on Demand 
In addition to the designed and influenced individual and coincident continuous hazards, 
the possibility of an individual or coincident failure on demand is considered. This notion of 
demand failure is from the standard PRA basic event for EDGs; fail to start (FTS). These demand 
failures can occur at time  0t , next the system is subject to continuous FTL hazards from
 0 1t hr , and then finally continuous FTR hazards from  1 mhr t T . The system can be in one 
of four states at t=0. The associated probabilities for these demand states are 



  
1
2
3
0 1 2
(0) probability that EDG "1" individually fails to start,
(0) probability that EDG "2" individually fails to start,
(0) probability that both EDGs coincidentally fail to start,
and
(0) 1 (0) (
P
P
P
P P P  30) (0) probability of no failures on demand.P  
This addition of demand failures introduces some new failure sequences that could cause 
system failure. The most obvious of these is a coincident failure on demand of both EDGs; the 
probability of this is obtained from industry data for EDG common-cause FTS events [30], [31]. 
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The other new sequences occur when the first component failure occurs on demand and the 
second component failure is a continuous, influenced, individual failure. Using the relations 
shown in Equations (II-33) and (II-34), the PDF for the time of this second component failure is 
formed as in Equation (II-38).  
     0( ) ( )exp ( )
t
i if t t u du   (II-38) 
This PDF is expressed in terms of probability as follows: 
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Likewise, the CDF for time of the second component failure is shown in Equation (II-40). 
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  (II-40) 
In the past two (and current) sections, PDFs were developed in order to compute the 
probability for each failure sequence possible, according to this specific model case. In Equation 
(II-41), these PDFs for the mutually exclusive failure sequences are added to form a PDF for 
total system failure. From state 0, a single coincident or two successive individual continuous 
failures will create system failure. From state 1 or 2, a single individual continuous failure will 
create system failure. State 3 is defined as system failure; the probability that the system is in 
this state at t=0 is the coincident FTS probability determined from NRC data.  
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The CDF for time of system failure can be computed as in Equation (II-42). 
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When this is completely written out, with the failure modes (FTL and FTR) specified, 
Equation (II-43) results: 
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Here we have developed a systematic way to model the distribution of failure times for a 
system of redundant components which are subject to individual and coincident continuous 
and demand failures. 
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II.2.4 NRI Compared to the SPAR Convoluted Distribution Model 
Throughout the work for this thesis, it was discovered that the convoluted distribution 
method used by the industry SPAR models [22] (to quantify consecutive EDG failure sequences 
for LOOP/SBO problems) is actually a specialized case of the NRI developed in this thesis. When 
the NRI is constrained to modeling a hot standby system with constant failure rates, it produces 
the same result as the SPAR convoluted distribution model; this is shown in the current 
subsection with a simple two-EDG system example problem. The example problem only looks 
at the system failure sequence from two consecutive individual failures and is evaluated using a 
mission-time model of load. 
Equation (II-44) shows the general (two-EDG) form of the NRI (for two consecutive 
individual failures) developed in this thesis. 
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  (II-45) 
If we specialize this equation to a system of two identical EDGs with constant failure rates 
and no CCF (each EDG’s single failure rate is just  ) , then Equation (II-46) is formed. The 
analytic evaluation of the system failure time CDF is shown at the end of Equation (II-47). 
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  (II-48) 
This same problem is modeled using the SPAR convoluted distribution method. The PDF for 
the failure time of each EDG (1 and 2) is taken from Equation (34) of [22] and shown here in 
Equation (II-49). 
 
      1 2( ) exp( ) and ( ) exp( )d df t t f t t   (II-50) 
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The failure time PDF for each EDG is then convolved and integrated as shown in Equation 
(II-51), which has been adapted from Equation (33) of [22]. 
    
 
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  
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1
1
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T T
sys d d
t
T T
t
T f t f t dt dt
t t dt dt
T T
  (II-52) 
The analytical evaluation for the system failure time CDF for both models produces the 
same expression, as seen in the last line of Equations (II-53) and (II-54). This problem was coded 
and analytically integrated using MATLAB. The code for this test case is shown as follows: 
clear all 
syms r t1 t2 T 
%% SPAR 
f1s=r.*exp(-r.*t1);f2s=r.*exp(-r.*t2); 
Fsys_SPAR=int(f1s.*int(f2s,t2,t1,T),t1,0,T) 
%% NRI 
f1n=r.*exp(-2.*r.*t1);f2n=r.*exp(-r.*(t2-t1)); 
Fsys_NRI=int(int(f1n.*f2n,t1,0,t2),t2,0,T) 
II.3 Extension to Three-EDG Model 
The three-EDG system failure time probability model development is considered as an 
extension from the two-EDG case. As before, the system fails once all (three) EDGs have failed. 
Each EDG is subject to continuous hazards and demand failure events, similar to those from 
Section II.2; the main differences here are related to coincident events and influenced hazard 
functions. With a system of 3 EDGs, coincident failures can now come in two varieties; either 2-
out-of-3 fail, or all 3-out-of-3 fail. Also, influenced coincident failures can now occur as a 2-out-
of-2 failure event. Again, the term “hazard function” ( ( )t ) is used to mean an instantaneous 
failure rate as t tends to zero. These hazard functions are conditional on the specific EDG 
failure times. As before, all the hazard functions are piecewise as illustrated in the following 
equation: 
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 (II-55) 
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The designed hazard functions describe a frequency for a specific failure event, given that 
no EDGs have failed previously. The possible failure events are one of two types, either an 
individual (single EDG fails) or coincident (multiple EDGs fail) failure. The specific EDGs are 
referenced with a number (1, 2, or 3), and those involved in each failure event are denoted 
with a subscript number on  . The hazard functions for individual failures are 
     1 2 3( ),  ( ) or,  ( ) . The hazard functions for 2-out-of-3 coincident failures are 
    12 23 13( ),  ( ) or,  ( )t t t . The hazard function for the coincident failure event where all three 
EDGs fail is123( )t . This model has three different types of failure time random variables which 
are denoted as follows;   is for a failure event where two EDGs survive; t  is for a failure event 
where 1 EDG survives, and t  is for a failure event where no EDGs survive (system failure). 
Equation (II-56) defines a generic designed hazard function for this case in terms of probability 
of failure times. 
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 (II-56) 
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where
( , ),                    for an individual failure
( , ) ( , ),   for a 2-out-of-3 coincident failure
(123, ),  for a 3-out-of-3 coincident failure
and
, , , , , ,and 
i
x u ij t
t
T T T T T T T T   
The total hazard function for all possible failure events that could occur to the designed 
system is defined in Equation (II-57). 
              1 2 3 12 23 13 123( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )total u u u u u u u u  (II-57) 
The influenced hazard functions describe a frequency for a specific failure event, given that 
certain EDGs have failed previously. Again, the possible failure events can be either an 
individual or coincident failure. The hazard function for the individual failure of the ith EDG 
given that the jth EDG has already failed is written as  ( ')i j t . Similarly, the hazard function for a 
2-out-of-2 coincident failure (both the ith and jth EDGs fail given that the kth EDG has already 
failed) is written as  ( )ij k t . These two similar hazard functions are defined in Equation (II-58). 
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There is no 123T  mentioned in this definition or in (II-59) because once one EDG has failed, it 
becomes impossible for a 3-out-of-3 coincident failure to occur. 
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 (II-58) 
The hazard function for a 1-out-of-1 individual failure (the ith EDG fails given that the jth and 
kth EDGs have already failed) is written as ( )i jk t .  
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  (II-59) 
The total hazard function, defined in Equation (II-60), is for all possible failure events that 
could occur to a system where one EDG has already failed. The total hazard function for a 
system where two EDGs have already failed is simply ( )
k ij
t . 
      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )total i j i k i jk iu u u u  (II-60) 
In addition to these continuous time hazards, the EDGs are subject to demand failures to 
start. The system can be in one of seven states at t=0, the associated probabilities for these 
demand states are described as follows: 




1
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4
(0) probability that EDG "1" individually fails to start
(0) probability that EDG "2" individually fails to start
(0) probability that EDG "3" individually fails to start
(0) probability that EDG
P
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P
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s "1" and "2" coincidentally fail to start
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(0) probability that
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(0) 1 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) probability of no failures on demandP P P P P P P P
 
II.3.1 Failure Sequences  
In Sections II.3.1 through II.3.3, PDFs are developed in order to compute the probability for 
each possible sequence of events that will fail this three-EDG system. In Equation (II-61), these 
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PDFs for the mutually exclusive failure sequences are added to form a PDF for total system 
failure. The subscript numbers on the time variables denote which EDGs fail and correspond to 
the specific failure event; instances of multiple subscript numbers on a time variable indicate a 
coincident failure event. When the letters , ,or i j k appear on the subscript the conditions 
1,2,3,i 1,2,3,j 1,2,3,k  and i j k  apply (this is done to account for every combination 
of failure time orders while only expressing equations for the case  i j kT T T ). 
Following no failures to start (state 0), the system will fail from any one of the following 
event sequences (the corresponding PDF is also shown):  
 3-out-of-3 coincident failure; ( )ijkf t   
 2-out-of-3 coincident failure, then an individual failure;   ( , ) ,  ij k ij kf t t t t   
 Individual failure, then a 2-out-of-2 coincident failure;   ( , ) ,  i jk i jkf t t t t   
 Three subsequent individual failures;    ( , , ) ,  < i j k i j kf t t t t   
Following an individual failure to start (states 1, 2, or 3), the system will fail from either a 2-
out-of-2 coincident failure or from two subsequent individual failures (PDFs for these are
( )and ( , )jk j kf t f t t , respectively). Following a 2-out-of-3 coincident failure to start (states 4, 5, or 
6), the system will fail once the survived EDG individually fails (PDF is ( )kf t ). 
The above listed failure sequences PDFs are developed in the following subsections. These 
PDFs come in three main varieties; this is due to the fact that each PDF will have three, two, or 
one random failure time variables. The bivariate and univariate PDF models have already been 
developed in Section II.2. In Section II.3.1.1, the multivariate joint distribution of Shaked [6] is 
used to develop the PDF model for sequences with three different failure times. In Equation 
(II-61), these PDFs are combined to create a PDF for the system failure time due to every 
possible event sequence. The system failure PDF is written for all combinations of ordered 
failure times (that is,        1 2 3 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 3 1, , , ,T T T T T T T T T T T T  3 1 2 ,T T T  3 2 1andT T T ).  
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(II-61) 
II.3.1.1 Three Continuous Random Failure Times 
The model development begins with the system failure event caused by three consecutive 
continuous time hazards. As a means to account for the combinatorial sequencing of the three 
random failure times, an extension of the previously used joint PDF by Cox [23] is employed. 
This extension is given for the case of a general number of components, with ordered failure 
times   1 2 ... nT T T  [6]. The PDF is composed of both designed and influenced hazard 
functions as defined in Equations (II-62) and (II-63), respectively. 
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The general form of the multivariate joint density f of the vector of random EDG failure 
times T can be shown in Equation (II-64) for  1 2 ... nt t t , as from page 152 of Shaked and 
Shanthikumar [6]. 
 
 
 


   

  
   
  
   
         
   



 
1
1
1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2
( ,..., ) ( )exp
( ,..., ,.) exp ( ,..., ,.)
( )
i
i
nt
n j
j
n nt
i i i i j i it j ii
f t t t du
t T t T t u T t T t du
u
 (II-64) 
The PDF, Equation (II-65), for the three individual EDG failure case (for  i j kT T T ) is formed 
by setting n=3 for the general PDF above. 
 
 
37 
 
 
 
 
     
  


     
 
    
 
 

'
0
'
( , , ) ( )exp ( ) ( )exp ( )
( )exp ( )
t
j i total ii j k i total
t
k ij k ij
t
f t t u du t u du
t u du
  (II-65) 
Equation (II-65) is expressed as a probability statement directly below.  
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  (II-66) 
Again, the EDGs are subject to two types of continuous-time hazards; from time t=0 to t=1 
hour an EDG may experience an individual failure to load (FTL), while after time t=1 hour an 
EDG may experience an individual failure to run (FTR). The specific time regime for each hazard 
function is denoted with a superscript letter on ; L and R stand for FTL and FTR hazards, 
respectively. The piecewise hazard functions which compose Equation (II-65) have a jump 
discontinuity at t=1 hour and each of the three individual failure time variables are associated 
with a specific hazard function from either side of this discontinuity; thus Equation (II-65) 
contains four unique cases as in Equations (II-67)-(II-70).  
Equation (II-67) is written for the case where all three subsequent individual failures are 
from failure to load events (   1i j kt t ). The three failure times occur before the one hour 
mark, so this equation is easily obtained from Equation (II-65) by simply specifying that the only 
hazards experienced are FTL. 
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  (II-67) 
Equation (II-68) is given for the case where first an EDG fails to load, next an EDG fails to 
load, and then the last EDG fails to run (   1i j kt t ). The first two multiplied terms are 
identical to Equation (II-67), while the k ij  outside the exponential is changed to reflect the 
hazard experienced at the point of failure ( t ) for the third EDG. The integral limits on the last 
term are split to account for the change in hazard from FTL to FTR, as shown here 
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Equation (II-69) is given for the case where first an EDG fails to load, next an EDG fails to 
run, and then the last EDG fails to run (   1i j kt t ). The first multiplied term is identical to 
the pervious case, and the influenced hazard functions,  's , outside the exponential are both 
specified as FTR hazards. The integral limits on the middle term are split to account for the 
change in hazard from FTL to FTR, as shown here 
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  (II-69) 
Equation (II-70) is written for the case where all three EDGs loaded and successfully made it 
through time t=1 hour, and then each subsequently failed to run (   1 'i j kt t ). The integral 
limits on the first exponential are split at t=1 hour to account for the change in hazard from FTL 
to FTR, as shown here 
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total totaltotal u du u du u du . The rest of this joint density 
function is similar to Equation (II-65) except the hazard functions are specified as FTR (with 
superscript R ’s). 
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  (II-70) 
II.3.1.2 Two Continuous Random Failure Times 
The model for the joint distribution of two continuous failure times for components subject 
to both FTL and FTR hazards has already been developed in Equations (II-19)-(II-21) of Section 
II.2. Again, this model is based on the result from [23]. 
For the system of 3 EDGs introduced in Section II.3, the bivariate PDF can be used to 
describe the following system event sequences: 
 Individual FTS and then two subsequent individual failures; ( , )j kf t t    
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 2-out-of-3 coincident failure, then an individual failure; ( , )ij kf t t   
 Individual failure, then a 2-out-of-2 coincident failure; ( , )i jkf t   
Using the basic form of Equation (II-21), and the hazard functions defined at the beginning 
of this section, the expressions for these specific cases of the bivariate PDF are explicitly stated 
in Equations (II-71)-(II-73). The first line of these equations is expressed using hazard functions 
while the second line expresses them as a probability. 
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All hazard functions are piecewise with a discontinuity at t=1 hour, as explained in Equation 
(II-55). Equation (II-74) shows how to write the bivariate PDF for ordered pairs of failure times 
due to the following respective hazard pairs; (FTL,FTL), (FTL,FTR), (FTR,FTR). Equation (II-74) 
expresses (II-71) for the three different bivariate PDF cases for this section; this formalism 
similarly applies to Equations (II-72) and (II-73).  
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II.3.1.3 One Continuous Random Failure Time 
A model for the PDF of a single continuous random failure time has already been developed 
in Section II.2 and is used again here.  
For the system of 3 EDGs introduced in Section II.3, this univariate PDF can be used to 
describe the following system event sequences: 
 2-out-of-3 coincident FTS, then an individual failures; ( )kf t    
 Individual FTS, then a 2-out-of-2 coincident failure; ( )jkf t   
 3-out-of-3 coincident failure; 123( )f t   
Using Equations (II-33)-(II-35), but with the hazard functions defined at the beginning of 
this section, the expressions for these specific cases of the univariate PDF are explicitly stated in 
Equations (II-75)-(II-77). The second line of these equations express the PDF in terms of 
probability. 
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The single random failure time is due to either a FTL or FTR hazard. Equation (II-78) 
expresses Equation (II-75) for these two different cases of the univariate PDFs in this section; 
this formalism also applies to Equations (II-76) and (II-77). 
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II.4 Connection to Markov Model 
This section introduces a Markov model of the same two- and three-EDG systems from 
Sections II.2 and II.3, respectively. The only difference is that the NRI models (from Sections II.2 
and II.3) can accept time varying hazard functions (under certain conditions), while the Markov 
models in Section II.4 can only accept constant failure rates. Markov models are well known 
and understood for survival analysis problems, hence they were chosen as means to verify the 
system failure time CDFs from Sections II.2 and II.3. Section II.4.1 and II.4.2 develop the general 
two- and three-EDG Markov models, respectively. Chapter IV, “Results and Benchmarking”, will 
compare specific case results between the NRI and Markov models as a means to verify the 
results and coding of the NRI.  
II.4.1 Markov Model for Two Identical EDGs 
The state transition diagram for the two-EDG Markov model can be seen in Figure 4.The 
system states are described as follows: 0, no EDGs are failed; 1, EDG “1” is failed; 2, EDG “2” is 
failed; 3, both EDG are failed (thus system failure). The hazard functions ( 12 , ,i  
and ,for  i=1,2i ) in Figure 4 correspond to those defined in Equations (II-29)-(II-31), 
respectively. The initial state probabilities ( (0) (1) (1) (2)0 1 2 3, , ,P P P P ) are the same used in the model 
from Section II.2.3. Both two-EDG models have the same logic, assumptions, and inputs; thus 
the CDF for system failure times from Section II.2 (Equation (II-43)) should be identical to the 
temporal probability results (for state 3 of the Markov model) developed in this section. These 
results should be equal, while the specific process used to obtain them and the details they 
reveal are different. Section II.2 modeled the temporal probability for every possible event 
sequence that lead to system failure separately, and then summed these mutually exclusive 
results to obtain the complete PDF and CDF for the system failure times. The Markov model 
developed here computes the probability that the system is in each of its four possible states, 
as a function of time.  
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Figure 4 – State-Transition Diagram for the Two-EDG Markov Model. 
 
 
 
The state-transition differential equations for the system described above can be written as 
follows: 
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 (II-79) 
And the corresponding initial conditions are: 
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 (II-80) 
The first three of the transition Equations in (II-79) will be solved using a standard method 
of solving linear first-order differential equations. Assuming the following generic initial value 
problem, 
   0 0( ) ( )        with    ( ) ,
dy
p x y f x y x y
dx
  (II-81) 
its solution is given as 
0 
1 2 
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Written in the same form as the generic initial value problem, the transition equation for 
state 0 becomes 
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and its solution is 
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Likewise, the transition equation and solution for state 1 is 
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  (II-85) 
It should be noted here that Equation (II-85) above uses the following relation to arrive at 
its line 4, 
           2 2 20 0exp exp .
t t
du du du   (II-86) 
The state 2 transition equation and solution are similar to those of state 1; these can be 
shown in Equations (II-87) and (II-88), respectively. 
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The state 3 transition equation is shown as follows,  
     3 12 0 2 1 3 2
( )
( ) ( ) ( ).
dP t
P t P t P t
dt
  (II-89) 
It is worth noting here that Equation (II-89) and (II-41) are similar functions which were 
developed using two different methods. Integration of either of these two functions, however, 
produces the exact same result. 
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  (II-90) 
Because the right-hand side of (II-89) does not depend on 3( )P t , the state 3 equation can be 
obtained by simply integrating, as shown here: 
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This gives the probability that the system is in state 3 at or before time T (both EDGs failed, 
system failure).  
After some algebraic manipulations, Equation (II-91) in terms of the basic parameters of the 
model is shown in Equation (II-92). This equation is identical to the system failure time CDF 
shown in Equation (II-42). 
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As in Sections II.2 and II.3, each hazard function comes in two varieties, FTL or FTR. The 
piecewise nature of the hazard functions are shown in Equation (II-93). 
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When this is completely written out, with the failure modes (FTL and FTR) specified, 
Equation (II-94) is formed. Equation (II-94) is the state 3 transition equation solution which 
computes the probability of system failure by some time input, T . This equation is identical to 
the system failure time CDF shown in Equation (II-43) (except the failure rates are time-
dependent in (II-43)). While these final results are identical, the process used to arrive at these 
two results is very different. Equation (II-94) was obtained by solving a system of differential 
Markov state equations, while (II-43) is actually the sum of every possible (and mutually 
exclusive) system failure event sequence CDFs.  
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II.4.2 Markov Model for Three Identical EDGs 
The system states are described as follows: 0, no EDGs are failed; 1, EDG “1” is failed; 2, 
EDG “2” is failed; 3, EDG “3” is failed; 4, EDGs “1” and “2” are failed; 5, EDGs “2” and “3” are 
failed; 6, EDGs “1” and “3” are failed; 7, all three EDGs are failed (thus system failure). The EDGs 
in this system are subject to the same failure events as the three-EDG model introduced in 
Section II.3. The hazard functions for these events are defined in Equations (II-56), (II-58), and 
(II-59) From state 0 they are subject to designed failure events; either a single EDG, two EDGs, 
or all three EDGs can fail during a single failure event. From states 1, 2, and 3, the EDGs are 
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subject to the same influenced failure events; either one EDG can fail, or both remaining EDGs 
can fail. From states 4, 5, and 6, the only remaining EDG is subject to a single influenced failure 
event. The only major difference is that the previous three-EDG model was developed to 
handle hazard rates as a function of time while this Markov model only accepts constant failure 
rates.  
The initial state probabilities are the same used in the three-EDG model from Section II.3. 
Both three-EDG models have the same logic and assumptions (the same initial conditions and 
failure rate inputs are used to verify results); thus the CDF for system failure times in Section 
II.3 should be identical to the temporal probability results (for state 7 of the Markov model) 
developed in this section. These results should be equal, while the specific process used to 
obtain them and the details they reveal are different. Section II.3 modeled the temporal 
probability for every possible event sequence that lead to system failure separately, and then 
summed these mutually exclusive results to obtain the complete PDF and CDF for the system 
failure times. The Markov model of this section computes the probability that the system is in 
each of its eight possible states, as a function of time. 
The state-transition differential equations for the system described above can be written as 
follows: 
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It is assumed that the three EDGs are identical and subject to the exact same failure events, 
thus states 1 through 3 are identical and states 4 through 6 are identical as well. Thus the state 
equations for 1 through 3 and 3 through 4 have been collapsed to states i  and ij , respectively 
(as in Equation (II-96)).  
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The first three of the transition equations in (II-96) are solved using a standard method of 
solving linear first-order differential equations. Assuming the following generic initial value 
problem, 
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its solution is given as 
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 (II-98) 
Written in the same form as the generic initial value problem, the transition equation for 
state 0 becomes (II-99),  
  0 0
( )
( ) 0,total
dP t
P t
dt
 (II-99) 
and its solution is given as 
   
 
    
 
 0 0
0
0 0
1
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( )
t
t
totalP t Pu du du
t
P  (II-100) 
Likewise, state 'si  transition equation and solution can be shown in Equation (II-101). 
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(II-101) 
It should be noted here that Equation (II-101) above uses the following relation to arrive at 
its line 4 
                    0 0ex 2p x 2e p .2
t t
j i jk i j i jk i j i jk i
du du du   (II-102) 
State 'sij  transition equation is written in the same form as the generic initial value 
problem, and solved for in a similar manner, as in Equation (II-103). 
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 (II-103) 
The last state (7) equation can be put in the same form as the generic initial value problem 
and solved in a similar way. However there is no ( )t  term (because there are no transition 
rates leaving state 7) so this simplifies the calculation to an initial condition plus an integral 
over the possible state transitions that lead to state 7 (as seen in the last line of Equation 
(II-104)). 
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When the state equation solutions (for states 0, ,i  and ij  shown in (II-100), (II-101), and 
(II-103), respectively) are inserted and FTL vs. FTR failure modes are specified, Equation (II-104) 
is identical to Equation (II-61) from Section II.3 (once the specific PDF equations are input to 
(II-61) and integrated).  
II.5 Hot Standby versus Cold Standby 
Sections II.2 through II.4 have shown how to develop both the NRI and Markov models for a 
hot standby system of EDGs; however, this section is for an EDG system in a cold standby 
arrangement. A simple example problem is presented in the following paragraph and modeled 
three different ways in Sections II.5.1 through II.5.3. The NRI and Markov models are modified 
to fit a cold standby system of EDGs in Sections II.5.1 and II.5.2, respectively. The (cold standby) 
convoluted distribution model for the example problem is presented in Section II.5.3. Finally, 
the results for all three models are compared in Section II.5.4. 
The example problem is for a system composed of two EDGs that are operated in cold 
standby. Each EDG is subject to an individual running failure rate of 0.01 failures per hour, 1  
and 2 . There is no possibility of a CCF of both the EDGs. The first EDG is started with certainty 
(no demand failure) and run until failure, at which point the second EDG is started with 
certainty and run until failure. 
II.5.1 Non-Recovery Integral 
The models from Sections II.2 through II.4 have been developed for the case of a hot 
standby emergency AC power system, but the NRI can be modified to the cold standby case by 
simply replacing a couple of hazard function inputs and time variables in a system failure 
sequence PDF. When the component is subject to different failure types in certain time ranges 
(specifically failure to load and run (FTLR) for the first hour, and failure to run (FTR) after the 
first hour, as discussed in Chapter III), the cold-modified NRI provides a close approximation to 
the probability of system failure. The distinction between these two standby cases are shown 
below using the simple case of the general bivariate joint pdf, as first introduced in Equation 
(II-21) (each EDG is subject to a single failure but no CCF). 
                1 1 2 2 20( , ) ( )exp ( ) ( ) ( )exp ( )
t
f t u u du t u du   (II-105) 
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Equation (II-105) is written for two EDGs (that both begin operating at time zero (when the 
LOOP first occurs); the EDGs fail sequentially and the first failure time variable is   and the 
second is t . The probability that neither EDG fails from 0 to   is captured by the factor 
      1 20exp ( ) ( )u u du . A simple way to think about this is that the hazard functions in the 
exponential term describe the various failure options which could occur in the time period 
between the limits of integration. The hot standby system described by Equation (II-105) has 
both EDGs operating between time 0 and  , and either of these EDGs could potentially fail. For 
a cold standby system, the redundant EDG cannot fail while running until it is called upon after 
the first EDG failure and the above-mentioned factor should be switched to     10exp ( )u du
to reflect that. 
The probability that the second failure occurs around some infinitesimal time dt  is 2( )t dt  
and this is integrated from 0 to the hypothesized system failure time,T . When a time-
dependent hazard function is used as this model input, it is important to correct for the fact 
that the EDG does not experience any wear out from 0 to  . This is done by changing the time 
variable for the second failure hazard function, as shown in  2( )t . Please note that  2 2 , 
since this example case does not consider CCF. The bivariate joint PDF for the case of a cold 
standby system is 
                1 1 2 20( , ) ( )exp ( ) ( )exp ( ) .
t
f t u du t u du   (II-106) 
Equation (II-106) is integrated as in Equation (II-107) to give the results presented in Section 
II.5.4. 
    
0 0
( ) ( , )
T t
F T f t d dt   (II-107) 
Both of the above bivariate joint PDFs are shown for cases which do not consider CCFs. For 
a hot standby system or a cold standby system with externally-caused CCFs, a CCF hazard 
function should be added to the first exponential term. For a cold standby system with 
component-caused CCF (assuming each EDG contributes one half to the probability of CCF), one 
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half of the CCF hazard function should be added to the first exponential term. These 
distinctions can be noted in the following three equations, respectively. 
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  (II-108) 
A detailed description of both externally-caused and component-caused CCF can be found 
in Section III.3.3. 
II.5.1.1 Mixed (Hot and Cold) Standby Case Example 
Modeling a mixed case standby system (some EDGs are hot while others are cold standby) 
is explored in this section. Consider a system of three EDGs. Each EDG is subject to single 
running failures and no CCFs (the only way the system fails is from three consecutive single 
failures). The single failure rates are expressed as  's  with subscript numbers to denote the 
specific EDG. The EDGs fail sequentially and the first failure time variable is  , the second is t , 
and the third is t . The joint PDFs in this section are shown for the failure sequence where EDG 
“1” fails first, followed by EDG “2”, and then finally EDG “3” fails. The multivariate joint PDF for 
the case of a purely hot standby arrangement is shown below in Equation (II-109). 
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  (II-109) 
Using the same concepts developed in Section II.5.1, Equation (II-109) is modified to fit two 
different cold standby cases for this EDG system. The first modified case is for EDGs “1” and “2” 
in hot standby while EDG “3” is in cold standby. The multivariate joint PDF for this case is shown 
below, in Equation (II-110). 
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  (II-110) 
The second modified case is for EDG “1” in hot standby while EDGs “2” and “3” are in cold 
standby. The multivariate joint PDF for this case is shown below in Equation (II-111). 
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II.5.2 Markov 
The state transition equations for the (cold standby system) Markov model is shown in 
Equation (II-112) 
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  (II-112) 
At time equals zero, the system starts in state 0 with certainty. In state 0, EDG 1 runs while 
EDG 2 is in cold standby. EDG 1 can fail which brings the system into state 1 where EDG 2 
begins running. When EDG 2 fails, the system transitions to the absorbing state 2. The 
probability of system failure is the solution to 2( )P t  and these results are presented in Section 
II.5.4. These results were obtained by solving the system of equations seen in (II-112) using the 
ode45 function in MATLAB [32] (based on an explicit Runge-Kutta (4,5) formula, the Dormand-
Prince pair).  
II.5.3 Convoluted Distribution 
Part of the SPAR model has a technique called the convoluted distribution method which is 
for components in hot standby. The convoluted distribution model that is adapted here is for a 
cold standby system, is taken from [33], and is quoted as follows: 
“The failure probability density for the thi  and all prior units, 12...i( )f t , may be expressed in 
terms of that for the ( 1)thi  unit and all prior units, as the convolution of two failure 
probability densities: 
 12...i 12...(i 1)0
( ) ( ) ( )dt "
t
if t f t t f t     (II-113) 
In this equation, the failure probability density for the thi unit, ( )if t t , accounts for the 
system failure probability density for the time ( )t t during which the thi  unit is in operation, 
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while the 

 
12...( 1)( )dif t t  accounts for the failure probability of the ( 1)thi unit in dt about time 
t after all other units  , ( 1)j j i , have failed. The integration over the time of failure t of the 
( 1)thi  unit ranges from 0 to t because the actual time of the thi failure can occur any time 
between 0 and t . 
Equation (II-113) can be written in the form of nested integrals by recursively applying the 
equation. The result is  
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1
2
12...i 1 1 2 1 1 20 0
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( ) ( ) ( )...
( ) ( ).
it t
i i i i i i i
t
f t dt f t t dt f t t
dt f t t f t
  (II-114) 
The system failure probability density function is obtained from the general equation for a 
system of n components as in Equation (31) of [22]. For the specific example system consisting 
of two EDGs, the system failure PDF is shown in Equation (II-115) 
    12 2 10( ) ( ) ( )dt
t
f t f t t f t  (II-115) 
The EDGs have identical and constant failure rates. The failure time PDFs for the EDGs are 
equal and can be seen in Equation (II-116) (as from Equation (34) of [22]). 
    1 2( ) ( ) exp( )f t f t t  (II-116) 
The individual failure time PDFs of Equation (II-116) are input to the system failure time 
PDF of Equation (II-115) and this is integrated to obtain the results shown in Section II.5.4. 
          12 2 2 1 1
0 0
( ) exp( ( )) exp( )dt
T t
F T t t t dt   (II-117) 
II.5.4 Results Comparison 
The results for the models developed in Sections II.5.1 through II.5.3 are presented in Table 
1. This result comparison is meant to confirm that the modified NRI (Equation (II-107)) and the 
convolution method are both modeling a cold standby system. The results for these two 
models are compared against the results for the well-known Markov model. 
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Table 1 – Results for Simple Cold Standby System. 
T (hrs) NRI Markov Convolution 
0 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 
50 9.020E-02 9.020E-02 9.020E-02 
100 2.642E-01 2.642E-01 2.642E-01 
200 5.940E-01 5.940E-01 5.940E-01 
 
 
 
Table 1 shows that the results agree relatively well. Table 2 shows the difference between 
the results. There is no difference between the results of the NRI and convolution method. The 
small amount of difference between these results (NRI and convolution method) and the 
results of the Markov model is likely due to numerical approximations of the ode45 function in 
MATLAB (which was used to evaluate Equation (II-112)). 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Difference between Results. 
T (hrs) NRI-Convolution NRI-Markov 
0 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 
50 0.000E+00 -1.185E-10 
100 0.000E+00 -4.582E-09 
200 0.000E+00 -1.006E-07 
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CHAPTER III 
       DATA 
 
In this chapter, data are introduced that will later be used as inputs to the case study 
models of Chapter IV. These model input parameters are intended to represent an industry 
averaged EDG probability or rate of failure with distinctions between failure mode and possible 
CCF groups. The Risk Assessment of Operational Events (RASP) Handbook was used to aid in 
parameter development [29]. This handbook was created with the main objective to 
“document methods and guidance that NRC staff could use to achieve more consistent results 
when performing risk assessments of operational events”, and a secondary objective “to 
provide analysts and SPAR model developers with additional guidance to ensure that the SPAR 
models used in the risk analysis of operational events represent the as-build, as-operated plant 
to the extent needed to support the analyses”. The RASP Handbook references [34], which 
provides the basic event classification scheme as well as the alpha factor model used to 
estimate these basic event frequencies. The two types of inputs to the alpha factor model are a 
total unreliability estimate for a single component ( tQ ) and the alpha factors (
m
k ) (where k 
and m denote the number of components failed and the total number in the common-cause 
group; this is explained further in Section III.3).  
As prescribed by the RASP Handbook, component unreliability estimates were obtained 
from [30], and complimentary alpha factor estimates were obtained from [31]. Both of these 
sources have parameter estimates for the same three failure modes; failure to start (FTS), 
failure to load and run (FTLR), and failure to run (FTR). It is this division of failure modes that 
drives some of the model development in Chapter. For the models presented in this thesis, an 
EDG is subject to three different basic event types. First, the EDG may experience a demand 
based (probability data) FTS at time t=0. If instead the component successfully starts, it may 
experience a time based (rate data) FTLR from 0<t<1 hour or a FTR for times greater than 1 
hour. The use of data for FTLR events is slightly different than presented in [30]; this difference 
is explained in Section III.2.2. 
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The component unreliability estimates used represent the total frequency (include both 
individual and coincident hazard contributions) of the specified failure mode as averaged 
throughout the industry, and are not tailored to any one specific EDG group size. The alpha 
factor estimates however do depend on group size and thus provide a means to distinguish 
between single and coincident failures.  
It is worth noting that the model parameters developed using NRC guidance and data 
sources for continuous (or running) failures are constant rates. The models developed in 
Sections II.2 and II.3, however, can handle time-dependent hazard functions (under certain 
conditions), although this type of component failure data are not used or available for nuclear 
PRA applications at this time.  
III.1 EDG Component Boundary 
The component boundary encompasses the set of piece parts that are considered to form 
the component. The definition of this boundary dictates which failure event data are used to 
estimate parameters. The EDG boundary definition found in [30] is slightly different from the 
one used in [31]. One would think these component boundaries should be the same since the 
RASP Handbook recommends using these two data sources to obtain the basic event frequency 
estimates. These slight differences in boundary are noted here, but no data correction is 
employed. 
The following excerpt from [30] describes what is included inside the EDG boundary: 
“The EDG boundary includes the diesel engine with all components in the exhaust path, 
electrical generator, generator exciter, output breaker, combustion air, lube oil systems, fuel oil 
system, and starting compressed air system, and local instrumentation and control circuitry. 
However, the sequencer is not included. For the service water system providing cooling to the 
EDGs, only the devices providing control of cooling flow to the EDG heat exchangers are 
included. Room heating and ventilating is not included. [30]” 
The following list from [34] is valid for the parameter estimates presented in [31]; it 
describes the sub-components that make up the EDG component, as well as the smaller parts 
that make up each sub-component: 
 Battery 
 Breaker 
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o Logic circuit, relay, switch 
 Cooling 
o Miscellaneous, valve, heat exchanger, pump, piping 
 Engine 
o Piping, valve, turbocharger, shaft, piston, miscellaneous, governor, fuel rack, 
fuel nozzles, bearing, sensors 
 Exhaust  
o valve 
 Fuel oil  
o Fuel rack, strainer, tank, valve, pump, miscellaneous, piping 
 Generator  
o Casing, generator excitation, load sequencer, logic circuit, power resistor, relay, 
rotor, voltage regulator 
 Instrumentation & control  
o Instrumentation, fuse, governor, load sequencer, miscellaneous, piping, relay, 
sensors, valve, voltage regulator, generator excitation 
 Lube oil  
o Tank, check valve, heat exchanger 
 Starting  
o Valve, strainer, miscellaneous, motor 
The main difference between these boundaries is that [34] includes the sequencer and 
room HVAC in the EDG piece-parts, while [30] does not. 
III.2 Component Unreliability Data 
Component unreliability estimates were obtained from [30]. This type of estimate can be 
viewed as a representative-averaged total probability of failure for a single component. These 
estimates are independent of group size and do not make distinctions for common-cause 
events; instead they are concerned with capturing all failure events for a given component type 
and failure mode in order to reduce statistical uncertainty. In fact, the most basic maximum 
likelihood estimate (MLE) used to estimate these component reliabilities from data are simply 
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the ratio of total number of failures (for a specific component type and failure mode) to the 
total number of demands (or run time) for the same type and mode. The parameter estimates 
in [30] were obtained by applying the standard estimation methods as documented in [35]. 
The unreliability estimates used in this thesis are the industry averaged median point value 
for each failure mode, as shown in Table 3 (Table A.2.17-6 of [30]). The unreliability estimates 
for FTS and FTLR are both failure on demand probabilities, while the estimate for the FTR event 
is a failure rate. 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Industry Average Unreliability Estimates (reprinted with permission from [30]). 
Failure 
Mode 
Source 5% Median Mean 95% Distribution 
Type α β 
FTS EB/PL/KS 2.77E-04 3.24E-03 4.53E-03 1.32E-02 Beta 1.075 2.363E+02 
FTLR EB/PL/KS 3.07E-04 2.25E-03 2.90E-03 7.69E-03 Beta 1.411 4.856E+02 
FTR EB/PL/KS 1.52E-04 7.12E-04 8.48E-04 2.01E-03 Gamma 2.010 2.371E+03 
 
 
 
These distributions were obtained from data pooled at the plant level. This means the 
adjusted EPIX data for all the EDGs at each plant were combined to get representative EDG 
data for each individual plant; EPIX data are discussed further in Section III.2.1. Next, MLEs 
were computed at the plant level for the three failure modes. An estimate for this FTS mode 
was computed by dividing all the EDG FTS events for a specific plant by all the EDG start 
demands at that same plant. The MLE for the FTLR probability was computed in the same way, 
while the MLE for the FTR rate was computed similarly but with runtime hours in the 
numerator instead of demands. Once MLEs were computed for each plant, this data were fit to 
a distribution. Empirical Bayes analyses with a Kass-Steffey adjustment were used to 
characterize the distributions; the details for this adjustment can be found on page 8-6 of [35]. 
For the entirety of [30], demand failures are fit to a Beta distribution, while running failures are 
fit to a Gamma distribution. This is due partly to the data fitting well, and partly because 
Bayesian updating is very straightforward when using these distributions [35].  
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III.2.1 Raw Data Collection and Review 
The raw data used to estimate the EDG failure parameters come from the EPIX database, as 
processed using the Reliability and Availability Data System (RADS) analysis tool (as explained in 
Section 4.1.3.3 of [35]). The data come from events that occurred from 1998-2002, and involves 
225 EDGs from 95 plants. The EPIX database provides failure data at the component level, so 
this needs to be appropriately pooled to obtain industry average parameter estimates. A 
routine in RADS was used to search through reportable events logged in EPIX in order to obtain 
and group the FTS and FTR failure modes [35].  
A process was used in [30] to subdivide the FTR mode from EPIX into FTLR≤1 hour and 
FTR>1 hour failure modes. This was done because the journal article, “Historical perspective on 
failure rates for US commercial reactor components” [36], indicates that there is approximately 
a factor of 15 difference between failure rates for these two subdivisions. The process used to 
make this subdivision is approximate because failure records in EPIX often fail to include the 
operating time of a component before it had a FTR event. The process used, taken directly from 
page 27 of [30], is the following: 
1. Sort the components by run hours/demand, from lowest to highest. 
2. Add cumulative columns to the sorted component list indicating the total component 
demands and total component hours (up through the component being considered). 
3. Identify within this sorted list the component where the cumulative run hours divided 
by cumulative demands equals 1.0. The subset of components up through this 
component has an average of one hour of run time per demand. 
4. Calculate the FTR≤1H rate from the subset of components identified, using their run 
hours and FTR events. 
5. Use the remaining components to calculate FTR>1H. However, the FTR event total from 
these other components is reduced by the expected number of FTR≤1H events. (The 
expected number of FTR≤1H events is just the number of demands for this group times 
the FTR≤1H rate.) Also, the run hours in this group are reduced by the number of 
demands. In cases where the modified FTR>1H event total was negative, it was 
assumed that there were no FTR>1H events. 
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At this point, raw data from EPIX have been processed so that each of the 225 total EDGs 
has a count of FTS, FTLR, and FTR events, as well as the associated demands and failures [30]. 
Next, data were grouped at the plant level (data from multiple EDGs at a plant are combined to 
give representative EDG data for that plant) and reviewed in order to spot any anomalies [30]. 
This review indicated that several plants had unreasonably low start and/or load and run 
demands. In order for an EDG to attempt to load, it must have successfully started. However, 
when an EDG fails to start, it experiences a start demand but not a load demand. Thus the EDGs 
start demands must be greater than the load demands. Likewise, the same thinking applies for 
run events, where load demands must be greater than run demands. Because this review 
indicated some plants had too high load and run demands, the following data processing 
routine from [30] was used to find and modify this illogical data. If the load and run demands 
were greater than the start demands, then they were set equal to each other. However, if the 
load and run demands were less than 75% of the start demands, then they were changed to 
75% of the start demands. 
III.2.2 Modified Use of FTLR Data 
Reference [30] presents the FTLR data as a failure on demand at one hour. The way these 
data were obtained, however, does not indicate that a FTLR is actually a failure on demand. As 
described in the numbered process in Section III.2.1, the FTLR event data were obtained as the 
lowest run hour grouping of FTR events that had an average duration of 1 hour. This means the 
FTLR events occurred after a successful start on demand and after running for an average of 1 
hour. At the 1 hour mark, the FTLR events did not suddenly occur on demand as the presented 
FTLR demand failure probabilities suggest. In the Chapter IV models, the FTLR data are used as 
rates for a failure event that can occur after a successful start and before time equals 1 hour. 
Using the FTLR data as a demand probability at 1 hour versus a failure rate from 0 to 1 hour has 
the largest difference of results for mission times between 0 and 1 hour. All of the model cases 
presented in Chapter IV are concerned with much larger mission times, and this slight misuse of 
data from how [30] originally intended does not have a large impact on the model results.  
III.3 CCF Data and the Alpha Factor Model 
This thesis uses the alpha factor method as a convenient way to compute individual and 
coincident failure parameters using component, total-unreliability data obtained from [30]. 
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Alpha factors from [31] provide a means to estimate how CCF groups occur. An alpha factor 
( )mk  is defined as the fraction of total failure events that involve k component failures, for a 
common-cause component group (CCCG) of m identical components [34]. For example,  32  is 
defined as the ratio of total number of CCF events involving two components in a CCCG of size 
three, to the total number of all failure events for the same group. 
With Equation (III-1) from the alpha factor method (as presented in [34]), both single and 
coincident event parameters can be computed for each failure mode. More specifically, 
Equation (III-1) computes the probability (or rate) of a basic event involving k specific 
components out of a group sized m.  
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The following section will use an example to further define alpha factors and show how 
they are related to basic event frequencies. 
III.3.1 Basic Failure Events 
The model inputs are the demand failure probabilities and hazard functions for the EDGs. 
These inputs are determined from a common-cause probability model, specifically the alpha 
factor model (as explained on page 70 of [34]). The following example should explain the logic 
of the model and illustrate how a single EDG can be subject to various basic failure events. This 
example borrows heavily from concepts developed in Section 3.3 of [37].  
Consider a system of three components called A, B, and C. All the basic failure events for 
component A are defined as one of the following types: 
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 Independent failure of AIA  ;  coincident failure of both A and BABC   
coincident failure of both A and BACC  ;  coincident failure of A, B, and C ABCC   
These failure events partition the failure space of component A based on the impact the 
event had to other components in the group. Thus these events are mutually exclusive. 
The components are assumed to be identical so that probabilities of similar basic events 
are equal as follows: 
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  (III-2) 
Therefore a basic event probability is defined in general as: 
 
  probability of a basic event involving  specific components,
out of a group of  identical components.
m
kQ k
m
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The total failure probability (or rate) of A in this group of three similar components is the 
sum of every basic event probability (or rate) which involves component A. This is shown in 
Equation (III-3). 
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Because the group of components is assumed to be similar, this can be expressed in 
general as, 
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where tQ is the total failure frequency and its estimate is obtained from [30]. The binomial 
coefficient in Equation (III-4) represents the number of specific failure event types that will fail 
component A; only one independent or 3-out-of-3 CCF event will fail component A, while two 
different 2-out-of-3 CCF events will also fail component A. Alpha factors are defined in terms of 
basic event frequencies as, 
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where 
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The denominator of Equation (III-5) is the sum of these frequencies, and includes every 
basic event that may occur in the group as a whole for the specific failure mode in question. 
Going back to the three component sized group example, Equation (III-6) defines  
3
2  in terms 
of basic event frequencies 
 
 
     
     
             

 
 
      
3
3 2
2 3 3 3
1 2 3
3
3 3
AB AC BC
I I I AB AC BC ABC
P C P C P CQ
P A P B P C P C P C P C P CQ Q Q
  (III-6) 
The above shows how alpha factors are defined, but this formulation is somewhat the 
reverse of how they are actually used. However, alpha factor parameters are estimated in a 
similar manner. Reference [34] uses the ratio of the total number or CCF events to the total 
number of failure events to create MLEs (which its parameter estimate distributions are based 
on). 
III.3.2 Alpha Factor Estimation 
Distributions of alpha factors are estimated using impact vectors. Impact vectors are 
numerical quantifications of sometimes ambiguous event report data, and they facilitate the 
statistical analysis used to estimate alpha factors. Some details for how event reports are 
translated to impact vectors via data analysis are explained in the following paragraphs. For 
more detail, please refer to Section 7 of [34]. 
Impact vectors are a convenient way to classify a CCF event using numerals. For a group of 
m components, the impact vector is a m+1 dimensional vector. The ith component in this 
vector corresponds to how the number of components (i-1) affected in an event; 0 represents 
no failure and 1 represents failure. Their meaning is explained well by this example from [34]: 
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 “Consider a component group of size 2. Possible impact vectors are the following: 
 [1, 0, 0] No components failed. 
 [0, 1, 0] One and only one component failed. 
 [0, 0, 1] Two components failed due to a shared cause.” 
Sometimes uncertainty lies in the exact cause of a failure or an event report provides 
insufficient detail. If two or more possible impact vector classifications of an event could exist, 
the data analyst may compute a weighted average impact vector to classify the event. This is 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Example for Average Impact Vector Estimation (reprinted with permission from 
[34]). 
 
 
 
Some events are even more ambiguous and require additional techniques to compute their 
impact vector. They generally fall into three categories, as follows (taken directly from page 59 
of [34]): 
1. Events involving degraded component states 
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2. Events involving multiple component failures closely related in time but not 
simultaneously 
3. Events involving multiple failures for which the presence of a shared cause cannot be 
established with certainty. 
These techniques are explained fully in Section 7.2, “Generic Impact Vector Assessment,” of 
[34].  
CCF event frequenies can be estimated from impact vectors, as in Equation (III-7), 
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Finally, the maximum likelihood estimator for the alpha factor parameters can be seen in 
Equation (III-8). 
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Reference [34] acknowledges that its CCF parameter estimation techniques were first 
developed in more detail in Volumes I and II of NUREG/CR-4780, reference [37] and [38] 
respectively. For more detail on how alpha factor parameter distributions are obtained please 
refer to Appendix E in [38]. 
III.3.3 Types of CCF 
Reference [34] dictates and explains the CCF parameter estimation efforts by the NRC. On 
page 5, this reference acknowledges that “the definition of a CCF is closely tied to an 
understanding of the nature and significance of dependent events” [34]. It then goes on to 
classify types of dependencies; “In this classification, dependencies are first categorized based 
on whether they stem from intended intrinsic functional and physical characteristics of the 
system or are caused by external factors and unintended characteristics. Therefore, the 
dependence is either intrinsic or extrinsic to the system” [34]. The main classification 
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distinction made here is that “an intrinsic dependency refers to cases where the functional 
status of one component is affected by the functional status of another component”, while 
“extrinsic dependency refers to cases where the dependency or coupling is not inherent or 
intended in the functional characteristics of the system. The source and mechanism of such 
dependencies are often external to the system” [34]. Reference [34] acknowledges that 
intrinsic dependencies should be “modeled explicitly in the logic model (e.g., fault tree) of the 
system”. It also says that while many extrinsic dependencies should be modeled this way, 
“there are a large number of extrinsic mechanisms that are unpredictable (or misunderstood) 
and cannot be modeled” [34]. In these cases or when the mechanisms are understood but it is 
not cost effective to model explicitly, “the combined probabilistic effect of dependencies is 
treated parametrically. This means that these types of events are treated together as one 
group known as CCFs” [34]. Reference [34] provides the guidelines for parameter estimation 
that are used in the CCF Parameter Estimations updates (currently [31]), thus this definition for 
CCFs was applied when evaluating event data and estimating the alpha factors that are 
presented in [31].  
However, this definition for the types of CCF events that should be modeled with CCF 
parameters does not mesh well with the model objectives in this thesis. The models presented 
here do not attempt to model CCF dependencies of the EDGs explicitly in the logic model, but 
instead acknowledges the randomness of these events and treats them parametrically; these 
models also acknowledge that the EDGs are not only subject to extrinsic dependencies. The 
ultimate application of this thesis is to determine the level of improved safety margin from 
adding a hardened EDG to a location separate from the other normal onsite EDGs. This 
additional EDG would still be subject to some extrinsic dependencies, but the fact that it is in a 
hardened structure at a high elevation would reduce the likelihood of it taking damage from an 
external flooding event, for example (see Section I.2.3 for more details). The additional 
hardened EDG would be physically separated from the other EDGs and would not share any 
connections, thus the possibility of an intrinsic dependency event affecting all EDGs is 
eliminated. For example, if some root cause affects a single EDG in such a way that it fails 
explosively, this explosion could in turn fail another EDG that is housed nearby. This type of 
event would be very difficult to model explicitly, so parametric treatment of this possible CCF is 
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needed. However, the additional EDG, its location, and support systems have all been designed 
against these types of intrinsic dependencies. As such, a slightly different classification of CCF 
events are adopted here and used to modify some of the CCF parameters. This scheme was 
adopted from reference [39]. This scheme divides CCFs into two classes, externally-caused and 
component-caused CCFs; the following Section III.3.3.1 will explain the differences between 
these two types of CCF events in more detail. 
III.3.3.1 Externally-Caused and Component-Caused CCF 
Vaurio [39] makes the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic dependencies and asserts 
that CCF parameters should only be used to model the extrinsic dependencies that cannot be 
modeled explicitly. The focus of [39], however, “is on CCFs that occur at random times and are 
properly modeled by general multi-failure rates (GMFR)  /k n , i.e. frequencies of events failing 
specific k out of n components” [39]. It should be noted here that the term  /k n  is equivalent to 
 m
kQ  in Equation (III-1). Vaurio argues that certain types of intrinsic dependencies (specifically 
cascading component failures) should be modeled using CCF parameters, and it provides some 
of the logic to do this using available data. The focus of this article is the problem of how to 
combine failure data from dissimilar plants, as expressed in the following quote: 
“One general problem is that failure events observed at one or few plants are not generally 
sufficient to estimate the basic parameters. Assimilating experience from other plants is 
essential. It is complicated by the fact that other plants (source plants) may have different 
numbers n n  of redundant components compared to the target plant of interest which has 
the common-cause component group (CCCG) size  0n n . Lay-out, design and component 
separation principles are often different in families of plants with different degrees of 
redundancy. When k  components failed at a plant with CCCG size n , it is not clear at all how 
relevant that event is to another plant with CCCG size n . A safe way is to use data only from 
source plants that have the same degree of redundancy, 0n . However, if one wants to use data 
from plants with different values of n , one has to make assessments about how likely the cause 
event would occur at the target plant, and conclude how many would have failed if the plant 
had n  equal to 0n  instead of n , and had separation principles similar to the target plant.” 
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The article makes the distinction between the two different sets of CCF mechanisms and 
assumptions, as expressed in the following paragraph (taken directly from [39]). 
“The first set of mapping-down rules can be obtained assuming externally-caused CCFs, and 
assuming that the plants with 1n  trains are similar to the plants with n  trains, with one 
component removed. ‘Similarity’ here means that all cause events occur with the same 
frequency and have equal consequences, i.e. the cause events fail existing components equally 
likely at both families of plants.”…“The second set of mapping-down rules has been developed 
for cascading failures or component-caused CCFs, meaning that a single component failure 
causes other components to fail with certain probabilities. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
plants with 1n  trains have the same single failure rates and the same failure propagation 
probabilities as the plant with n  trains.” 
It should be noted here that these rules are intended for combining failure data from plants 
with different numbers of CCCGs and that “both sets of rules assume identical design, 
separation, operations and maintenance principles in plants with different CCCG sizes n ” [39]. 
This thesis uses these rules to compute its “influenced” failure rates, a concept that is explored 
at the end of this chapter. These “influenced” rates are essentially an adjusted failure event 
rate considering that some component(s) has already failed.  
The mapping-down rules from [39] for CCF rates are used here. The general mapping-down 
equation for externally-caused CCF rates can be seen in Equation (III-9). The examples given for 
this type of event are “shocks like lightning or maintenance actions to hit subgroups of 
components” [39]. Essentially, the CCF cause comes from something external to the CCCG. 
       / 1 / 1/ ,     for 1,2,..., 1k n k n k n k n  (III-9) 
Figure 6 illustrates how to map down from a system of 2n  to 1n  by obtaining the 
effective rate    1/1 1/2 2/2 . 
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Figure 6 – Mapping-Down from a Two- to One-EDG System, for Externally-Caused CCF 
(reprinted with permission from [39]). 
 
 
 
The general mapping-down equation for component-caused CCF rates can be seen in 
Equation (III-10). This rule is “based on the assumption that all /k n -events initiate as a failure 
of one of the components, and the failure can propagate to one or more other components, 
with some probabilities” [39]. For this type of event, the CCF cause initiates from a single 
component failure and then cascades to other components inside the CCCG. 
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Figure 7 illustrates how to map down from a system of 2n  to 1n  by obtaining the 
effective rate     121/1 1/2 2/2 . 
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Figure 7 – Mapping-Down from a Two- to One-EDG System, for Component-Caused CCF 
(reprinted with permission from [39]). 
 
 
 
III.3.3.2 Alpha Factor Test 
It is important to understand if the alpha factor estimates provided in [31] are given for 
externally-caused, component-caused, or both types of CCF events. Unfortunately [31] does 
not explicitly state this assumption, but Vaurio [39] states that “mapping rules of externally-
caused CCF were applied already when the alpha-values were estimated in NUGEG/CR-5497 
[40]”. Reference [40] was the first “Common-Cause Failure Parameter Estimations” report 
issued by the NRC in 1998. The current update to this report is "CCF Parameter Estimations, 
2012 Update" [31] and it is assumed that these alpha factors are also estimated using 
externally-caused CCF event rules. This assumption can be verified by using Equations (III-9) and 
(III-10), as shown in the mathematical check below. 
Reference [30] does not mention group size when it reports the total unreliability estimates 
for single components ( 'tQ s ) so we assume these estimates are independent of group size (this 
alone hints at the externally-caused nature of alpha factor method). Because tQ  is independent 
of group size, as the CCCG size increases it does not affect the value of tQ , and this implies that 
additional components do not affect the frequency at which a single component in the group 
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fails. This notion is proved mathematically in Equations (III-11)-(III-15). First, by using Equation 
(III-1) ( ) 'mkQ s (for 3m ) are computed in terms of alpha factors and tQ , as in Equation (III-11).  
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Next, the ( ) 'mkQ s  for a CCCG of m=3 are mapped down to m=2 by using the externally- and 
component-caused mapping-down rules as seen in (III-9) and (III-10), respectively. The 
component-caused mapping-down can be seen in (III-12) while the externally-caused mapping-
down can be seen in (III-13). 
    2 3 3 2 3 31 21 1 2 2 2 32 3 and Q Q Q Q Q Q   (III-12) 
    2 3 3 2 3 31 1 2 2 2 3 and Q Q Q Q Q Q   (III-13) 
Now the validity of these assumptions are checked for the component-caused event case. 
By using (III-4), tQ  can be computed in terms of the mapped down, two component group 
( ) 'mkQ s , as seen in (III-14). The right hand side of the first line in (III-14) substitutes the results 
from (III-12) to put this in terms of the m=3. The second and third lines of (III-14) write these 
( ) 'mkQ s  in terms of alpha factors, by substituting the definitions in Equation (III-11). The fact that 
this equation for tQ  does not simplify back to tQ  after these substitutions are made indicates 
that either Equation (III-1) is not intended for component-caused events, and/or that tQ  is 
intended to vary with CCCG size for component-caused events. 
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  (III-14) 
Lastly, the validity of these assumptions are checked for the externally-caused event case. 
The same process that was followed above for the component-caused case is repeated here in 
Equation (III-15). The fact that this equation for tQ  does simplify back to tQ after these 
substitutions are made indicates that the rules in [34] are intended for externally-caused events 
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and thus the alpha factor parameters found in [31] have been estimated for these same CCF 
event types. 
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CHAPTER IV 
     RESULTS AND VERIFICATION 
 
This chapter presents specific EDG case studies and their results, using the NRI model 
developed in Chapter II and the data introduced in Chapter III. The presented NRI results 
provide a means to quantify how system reliability changes for various EDG arrangements; a 
comparison of results for different arrangements is provided in Section IV.6.  
All (but the last) of the cases presented here are given for hot standby systems because it 
seems standard onsite EDG systems are actually operated in hot standby, as discussed in 
Section I.3.2. These first four hot standby cases (Sections IV.1-IV.4) are for systems composed 
of two and three identical EDGs. These four cases will be examined using both a mission-time 
model of load and an offsite-recovery model of load (as discussed in Section II.1.1); results will 
be evaluated for a wide range of LOOP durations, many of which far exceed the standard PRA 
24 hour mission time cutoff. The numerical results from these first four cases are also verified 
using results from the analytical solutions to standard Markov model state transition equations. 
The NRI equations for these system cases were coded and evaluated using MATLAB [32]; the 
code for Sections IV.1 and IV.2 is displayed in Appendix A while the code for Sections IV.3 and 
IV.4 is displayed in Appendix B. The comparison between the NRI and Markov model results 
serve to verify that the NRI coding and numerical integration performed in MATLAB are correct 
and accurate. 
The last two cases presented in this chapter will be for an emergency power system 
composed of two standard EDGs in either hot or cold standby (one case for each option) and 
one FLEX DG in cold standby; these cases will employ a mission-time model of load. These two 
cases will only be modeled using the NRI; no equivalent Markov models will be developed for 
these cases. The NRI equations for these two cases were coded and evaluated using MATLAB 
[32]; the code for Section IV.5.1 is displayed in Appendix C while the code for Section IV.5.2 is 
displayed in Appendix D. The failure rate inputs for the FLEX DG will be varied in order to 
explore the extent to which the entire system failure probability is a function of the reliability of 
the FLEX DG, either independently or as part of a common-cause group.  
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IV.1 Two Identical EDGs with Mission-Time Load 
The NRI model inputs and results for the system case of 2 identical emergency diesel 
generators (iEDGs) with a mission-time model of load are presented in this section. Results 
from a Markov model of the same system will also be presented as a means to verify the NRI 
results and numerical integration.  
The alpha factor data used here are from pages 240, 241, and 243 of “CCF Parameter 
Estimates, 2012 Update”; specifically the median point value for a CCCG of two EDGs for each 
of the three failure modes [31]. Only the 1 value was so obtained, while the second alpha 
factor is computed as   2 11 . The component unreliability estimates ( tQ s ) were obtained 
from Table A.2.17-6 of [30] (the median point value for the EB/PL/KS analysis type). These data 
can be seen in Table 4. 
 
 
 
Table 4 – α-Factor Parameters for Two-iEDG Model. 
  α 1 α 2 Qt 
FTS (Failure To Start) 0.990656 9.3440E-03 3.24E-03 unitless 
FTL (Failure To Load) 0.997015 2.9850E-03 2.25E-03 1/hr 
FTR (Failure To Run) 0.984593 1.5407E-02 7.12E-04 1/hr 
 
 
 
By using the above FTS data and the alpha factor method (Equation (III-1)), the initial 
conditions for the problem can be computed, as shown in Table 5. Here P1(0) and P2(0) are the 
failure on demand probabilities for EDG “1” and “2”, respectively, P3(0) is the probability of CCF 
on demand, and P0(0) is the probability of no failures on demand, computed as 
   0 1 2 3(0) 1 (0) (0) (0)P P P P . 
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Table 5 – Initial Conditions for Two-iEDG Model. 
P1 (0) 3.18001141335362E-03 
P2 (0) 3.18001141335362E-03 
P3 (0) 5.99885866463764E-05 
P0 (0) 9.93579988586646E-01 
 
 
 
The definitions and notations for hazard functions developed in Chapter II are used again 
here. The “designed” failure rates can be computed using the FTL and FTR data of Table 5 in 
Equation (III-1); these are shown in Table 6. 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Designed Failure Rates for Two-iEDG Model. 
  
FTL FTR 
single failure rate for EDG "1" 1 2.2366E-03 6.9039E-04 
single failure rate for EDG "2" 2 2.2366E-03 6.9039E-04 
2-out-of-2 CCF rate 12 1.3392E-05 2.1606E-05 
 
 
 
The influenced failure rates for each EDG are computed assuming that all CCF events are 
due to only component causes, not external causes. The designed failure rates and Equation 
(III-10) are used to compute the influenced failure rates, as in Equation (IV-1). The specific 
values for the influenced failure rates are shown in Table 7. 
       11/1 122 ,     for 1,2i i i  (IV-1) 
 
 
 
Table 7 – Influenced Failure Rate for Two-iEDG Model. 
 
FTL FTR 
i   2.2433E-03 7.0119E-04 
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When constant failure rates are applied to Equation (II-43) it simplifies to Equation (IV-2) 
(this was coded in MATLAB [32]). Numerical integration was performed using the MATLAB 
functions integral and integral2. The absolute and relative error tolerances for these integration 
routines were adjusted; it will be shown that as the error tolerances are lowered, the results 
approach the analytical solution of the Markov model. 
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  (IV-2) 
When the integrals in Equation (II-94) (for the Markov model) are evaluated explicitly, for 
constant failure rates, Equation (IV-3) is formed. This equation was coded in Excel [41] and 
evaluated for various values of time,T .  
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 (IV-3) 
The analytical results from the Markov model are compared against the NRI results in Table 
8 below. This NRI was evaluated in MATLAB [32] using three different sets of numerical 
integration error tolerances (high, default, and low tolerances corresponding to smaller, 
intermediated, and higher accuracies). The default tolerance setting has an absolute tolerance 
of 1e-10 while the relative tolerance is 1e-6. The high tolerance setting has an absolute 
tolerance of 1e-6 and a relative tolerance of 1e-2. The low tolerance setting has an absolute 
tolerance of 1e-16 and a relative tolerance of 1e-12. See Table 8 for the results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
 
 
Table 8 – Results; Two iEDGs with Mission-Time Load. 
  
Non-Recovery Integral 
T (hrs) Markov Analytical high tol. default tol. low tol. 
0 6.00E-05 6.00E-05 6.00E-05 6.00E-05 
1 9.25E-05 9.25E-05 9.25E-05 9.25E-05 
6 2.49E-04 2.49E-04 2.49E-04 2.49E-04 
12 4.66E-04 4.66E-04 4.66E-04 4.66E-04 
24 9.98E-04 9.98E-04 9.98E-04 9.98E-04 
48 2.44E-03 2.44E-03 2.44E-03 2.44E-03 
96 6.73E-03 6.73E-03 6.73E-03 6.73E-03 
192 2.03E-02 2.03E-02 2.03E-02 2.03E-02 
384 6.30E-02 6.30E-02 6.30E-02 6.30E-02 
768 1.83E-01 1.83E-01 1.83E-01 1.83E-01 
1000 2.64E-01 2.64E-01 2.64E-01 2.64E-01 
2000 5.76E-01 5.76E-01 5.76E-01 5.76E-01 
 
 
 
Most of the results agree for ten or more digits, much more than the three digits shown in 
Table 8; thus, an easier way to compare them is to look at their difference. Table 9 below 
shows three columns where the high, default and low tolerance cases are each subtracted from 
the analytical results for the Markov model. As the numerical integration error tolerance is 
lowered, the Markov model analytical and NRI results agree more closely. The difference for 
each case changes from positive to negative at least once which indicates the difference is likely 
due to numerical integration approximations. For very long times, the low tolerance case and 
Analytical results agree to 15 digits of accuracy. 
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Table 9 – Difference between Results; Two iEDGs with Mission-Time Load. 
T (hrs) Analytical-high Analytical-default Analytical-low 
0 9.49E-20 9.49E-20 9.49E-20 
1 2.42E-16 1.65E-16 1.65E-16 
6 5.40E-16 2.59E-16 2.59E-16 
12 1.50E-15 1.27E-16 1.27E-16 
24 8.23E-15 -1.79E-16 -1.80E-16 
48 2.61E-14 1.40E-16 1.40E-16 
96 2.49E-13 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
192 1.78E-12 3.02E-16 3.02E-16 
384 5.93E-12 3.90E-15 -4.11E-15 
768 -2.80E-10 7.60E-14 0.00E+00 
1000 -1.08E-09 2.58E-13 0.00E+00 
2000 -1.08E-08 7.26E-12 0.00E+00 
 
 
 
IV.2 Two Identical EDGs with Exponential Offsite-Recovery Load 
The NRI model results for the system case of 2 identical EDGs with an offsite power 
recovery model of load are presented in this section. Results from a Markov model of the same 
system will also be presented as a means to verify the NRI results and numerical integration. 
The logic, state equations, and analytical solutions for the Markov model will be developed in 
Section IV.2.1. 
As explained in Section II.1, the NRI model assumes that the random variables for system 
failure time and offsite power recovery time are statistically independent. Therefore the system 
failure PDF ( Cf ) is identical to the “no recovery” case (Section IV.4), and is multiplied by a CCDF 
for offsite power recovery time ( LF ), as illustrated in Equation (IV-4). For this specific model 
case,  0critT , and the power recovery rate is a constant 0.04 hour
-1, therefore 
 ( ) exp( 0.04 )L C CF t t .  
 


  
0
Probability of Failure ( ) ( )f L C crit C C CP F t T f t dt   (IV-4)  
The initial conditions and failure rates used for this case are identical to the data in Section 
IV.1 (as seen in Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7). The state equations and analytical solutions for 
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the Markov model are presented in Section IV.2 and the state transition diagram is illustrated in 
Figure 8. 
The analytical results from the Markov model are compared against the NRI results in Table 
10 below. The NRI was numerically integrated in MATLAB [32] using the functions integral and 
integral2 and two different sets of error tolerances. The default tolerance setting has an 
absolute tolerance of 1e-10 while the relative tolerance is 1e-6. The low tolerance setting has 
an absolute tolerance of 1e-16 and the relative tolerance is 1e-12. It can be seen below that as 
the error tolerances are lowered, the results approach the analytical solution of the Markov 
model. 
 
 
 
Table 10 – Results; Two iEDGs with Offsite-Recovery Load. 
 
Markov Model Non-Recovery Integral 
T (hrs) Analytical Solution default tolerance low tolerance 
0 5.99885866463764E-05 5.99885866463763E-05 5.99885866463763E-05 
1 9.18171727364025E-05 9.18171727364094E-05 9.18171727364094E-05 
6 2.27440793074019E-04 2.27440793074024E-04 2.27440793074024E-04 
12 3.79056468279794E-04 3.79056468279792E-04 3.79056468279794E-04 
24 6.37885838466108E-04 6.37885838466027E-04 6.37885838466103E-04 
48 9.82656398295802E-04 9.82656398293078E-04 9.82656398295802E-04 
96 1.24454317648595E-03 1.24454317643100E-03 1.24454317648600E-03 
192 1.31000490458345E-03 1.31000490623800E-03 1.31000490458300E-03 
384 1.31216133238182E-03 1.31216133089200E-03 1.31216133238200E-03 
768 1.31216278738664E-03 1.31216279650700E-03 1.31216278738700E-03 
2000 1.31216278738703E-03 1.31216278818500E-03 1.31216278738700E-03 
 
 
 
Because the results agree for many digits, an easier way to compare them is to look at their 
difference. Table 11 below shows two columns where the default and low tolerance cases are 
each subtracted from the analytical results for the Markov model. As time increases, the 
difference for each case changes from positive to negative which indicates the difference is 
likely due to numerical integration approximations.  
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Table 11 – Difference between Results; Two iEDGs with Offsite-Recovery Load. 
T (hrs) Analytical-default Analytical-low 
0 8.13151629364E-20 8.13151629364E-20 
1 -6.85757874097E-18 -6.85757874097E-18 
6 -4.79759461325E-18 -4.79759461325E-18 
12 1.51788304148E-18 -4.87890977618E-19 
24 8.12067427192E-17 5.20417042793E-18 
48 2.72438321902E-15 0.00000000000E+00 
96 5.49530039529E-14 -4.68375338514E-17 
192 -1.65454629164E-12 4.53847029402E-16 
384 1.48982020297E-12 -1.79760720198E-16 
768 -9.12035984929E-12 -3.59738280831E-16 
2000 -7.97970196864E-13 2.99239799606E-17 
 
 
 
IV.2.1 Markov Model Analytical Solution 
The analytical solution of the Markov model is derived here. The solution derivation for this 
problem has been provided by Vera Moiseytseva. Both EDGs have identical failure parameters, 
thus to simplify the notation used only two failure rates are used (the single failure event and 
CCF event rates, as defined directly below) 
 1 2 12    and    cc         
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 - Markov Diagram for Two iEDGs with Offsite Power Recovery. 
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The state-transition differential equations for the system shown in Figure 8 can be written 
as: 
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The corresponding initial conditions are: 
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Similar to the state transition equations shown in Section II.4.1, this system is composed of 
first-order linear differential equations. As in Chapter II, these equations are solved using an 
integrating factor to obtain the general solution. Differently from before, the integrals are 
indefinite and evaluated analytically as they appear; next the integration constant is solved for 
using the initial conditions. The state “0” equation solution is straightforward and can be seen 
in the equation below. 
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The state “1” equation is rewritten below to make the general form of the ODE. 
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The state “1” equation general solution is derived below. 
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Next, the state “1” initial condition is used to solve for the integration constant, and the 
exact solution is shown below.   
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Because both EDGs are identical, the state “1” and “2” equations are similar as shown in 
the equation below. 
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Since P1(t) = P2(t), the state “3” equation reduces to the one shown below.  
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And now the state “3” equation solution can be obtained by simply integrating the state 
“0” and “1” equation solutions, as shown in the equation below. 
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Now that these integrals are computed, they are input back to the state “3” equation 
solution, and the analytical solution is obtained as seen below. 
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The state “4” equation is in a form very similar to the state “3” equation; thus their 
solutions are obtained in a similar manner, as seen in the equations below.  
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It should be noted here that the above derivation does not explicitly differentiate between 
FTL and FTR failure rates, but this poses no problem because constant failure rates are used 
and the model is “memoryless”. As explained in Chapter 2, FTL rates are valid for time ≤ 1 hour 
while FTR rates are valid for time > 1 hour. Thus the state equation solutions for time equal to 
or less than one hour use the given initial conditions and FTL rates as illustrated in Equation 
(IV-5) for the state 0 solution. 
    
     
 
2 ( 1)
0 0 01 (1)
L L
cc tP P P et   (IV-5) 
 For times greater than 1 hour, the initial conditions are replaced with the state solution for 
t=1 hour, FLR rates are used, and t is replaced with t-1, as in Equation (IV-6) below. 
    
     
 
2 ( 1)
0 01 (1)
R R
cc tt r PhP e   (IV-6) 
 This same logic applies to the Markov model solutions developed in Sections IV.3 and IV.4.  
IV.3 Three Identical EDGs with Mission-Time Load 
The NRI model inputs and results for the system case of 3 identical EDGs with a mission-
time model of load are presented in this section. Results from a Markov model of the same 
system will also be presented as a means to verify the NRI results and numerical integration. 
The logic, state equations, and analytical solutions for the Markov model will be developed in 
Section IV.3.1. 
The alpha factor data used here are from pages 240, 241, and 243 of “CCF Parameter 
Estimates, 2012 Update” [31]; specifically the mean point value for a CCCG of 3 EDGs for each 
of the three failure modes. The 1  and 3 values were obtained from this reference, while the 
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second alpha factor is computed as     2 1 31 . The component unreliability estimates (

tQ s ) were obtained from Table A.2.17-5 of [30] (the median point value for the EB/PL/KS 
analysis type). These data are shown in Table 12. 
 
 
 
Table 12 – α-Factor Parameters for Three-iEDG Model. 
Parameters for α-factor model 
 
α1 α2 α3 Qt 
FTS (Failure To Start) 0.990496 6.16E-03 3.34E-03 3.24E-03 unitless 
FTL (Failure To Load) 0.991208 7.42E-03 1.37E-03 2.25E-03 1/hr 
FTR (Failure To Run) 0.985501 8.86E-03 5.64E-03 7.12E-04 1/hr 
 
 
 
By using the above FTS data and the alpha factor method (Equation (III-1)), the initial 
conditions for the problem can be computed as shown in Table 13. P1(0), P2(0), and P3(0) are 
the failure on demand probabilities for EDG “1”,“2”, and “3”, respectively. P4(0), P5(0), and P6(0) 
are the failure on demand probabilities for the 2-out-of-3 CCF (for the failures of “1”&”2”, 
“2”&”3”, and “1”&”3”, respectively). The probability of no failures on demand, P0(0), is 
computed as in Equation (IV-7). 
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7(0) 1 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)P P P P P P P P  (IV-7) 
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Table 13 – Initial Conditions for Three-iEDG Model. 
Initial Conditions 
P1 (0) 3.16851068871416E-03 
P2 (0) 3.16851068871416E-03 
P3 (0) 3.16851068871416E-03 
P4 (0) 1.97181007144238E-05 
P5 (0) 1.97181007144238E-05 
P6 (0) 1.97181007144238E-05 
P7 (0) 3.20531098569967E-05 
P0 (0) 9.90403260521857E-01 
 
 
 
The definitions and notations for hazard functions developed in Chapter II are used here for 
the constant failure rates. The “designed” failure rates can be computed using the FTL and FTR 
data above input to Equation (III-1); these are shown in Table 14. 
 
 
 
Table 14 – Designed Failure Rates for Three-iEDG Model.  
 
  FTL FTR 
single failure rate  i 2.20778251409180E-03 6.87824612136189E-04 
2-out-of-3 CCF rate ij 1.65315068276178E-05 6.18308681463999E-06 
3-out-of-3 CCF rate 123 9.15447225296537E-06 1.18092142345308E-05 
 
 
 
The influenced failure rates for each EDG are computed assuming that all CCF events are 
due to only component-causes, not external-causes. The designed failure rates and Equation 
(III-10) are used to compute the influenced failure rates, as in Equations (IV-8)-(IV-10). The 
specific values for the influenced failure rates are shown in Table 15. 
     1
2j ijj i
  (IV-8) 
     2 1233jkjk i   (IV-9) 
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        1 1 1 1232 2 3k ik jkk ij   (IV-10) 
 
 
 
Table 15 – Influenced Failure Rates for Three-iEDG Model. 
  FTL FTR 

j i 
2.21604826750561E-03 6.90916155543509E-04 

jk i 
2.26344883295947E-05 1.40558963043272E-05 

k ij 
2.22736551167041E-03 6.97944103695673E-04 
 
 
 
The NRI model is based up the PDFs developed in Section II.3. The NRI model CDF for the 
system failure time of this case is shown in Equation (IV-11). This equation was formed by 
integrating and combining the previously developed failure sequence PDFs. The three EDGs are 
identical, thus the failure sequences involving 3 and 2 failure events are multiplied by 6 and 3, 
respectively (in order to account for each unique combination of the failure ordering for EDGs. 
Equation (IV-11) was coded and evaluated using MATLAB [32]. Numerical integration was 
performed using the MATLAB functions integral, integral2, and integral3. The absolute and 
relative error tolerances for these integration routines were adjusted; it will be shown that as 
the error tolerances are lowered, the results approach the analytical solution of the Markov 
model. 
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 (IV-11) 
The analytical results for the Markov model are compared against the NRI results in Table 
16. The NRI was evaluated in MATLAB [32] using two different sets of numerical integration 
error tolerances. The default tolerance setting has an absolute tolerance of 1e-10 while the 
relative tolerance is 1e-6. The low tolerance setting has an absolute tolerance of 1e-16 while 
the relative tolerance is 1e-12. 
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Table 16 – Results; Three iEDGs with Mission-Time Load. 
  
Non-Recovery Integral 
T (hrs) Markov Analytical default tolerance low tolerance 
0 3.20531098569967E-05 3.205310985700E-05 3.205310985700E-05 
1 4.16218657460282E-05 4.162186574608E-05 4.162186574608E-05 
6 1.01846796296793E-04 1.018467962969E-04 1.018467962969E-04 
12 1.75491531461444E-04 1.754915314614E-04 1.754915314614E-04 
24 3.28742683653675E-04 3.287426836535E-04 3.287426836536E-04 
48 6.69238288596580E-04 6.692382885964E-04 6.692382885965E-04 
96 1.55963329808756E-03 1.559633298088E-03 1.559633298088E-03 
192 4.65447114911682E-03 4.654471149117E-03 4.654471149117E-03 
384 1.84875326784657E-02 1.848753267844E-02 1.848753267847E-02 
768 8.13086371675060E-02 8.130863716749E-02 8.130863716751E-02 
 
 
 
Because the results agree for many digits, an easier way to compare them is to look at their 
difference. Table 17 shows two columns where the default and low tolerance cases are each 
subtracted from the analytical results for the Markov model. The difference for each case 
changes from positive to negative at least once which indicates the difference is likely due to 
numerical integration approximations. For very long times, the low tolerance case and 
Analytical results agree to 15 digits of accuracy. 
 
 
 
Table 17 – Difference between Results; Three iEDGs with Mission-Time Load. 
T (hrs) Analytical-default Analytical-low 
0 0.0000000000E+00 0.0000000000E+00 
1 -5.1316644076E-17 -5.4413396532E-17 
6 -6.3683325106E-17 -7.9688859678E-17 
12 6.1149002528E-17 3.9139698427E-17 
24 1.6127507316E-16 8.3266726847E-17 
48 1.4571677198E-16 7.2749965774E-17 
96 -4.4061976290E-16 -4.4061976290E-16 
192 -1.7694179455E-16 -1.7694179455E-16 
384 2.3699792129E-14 -2.9837243787E-16 
768 1.4030443474E-14 0.0000000000E+00 
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IV.3.1 Markov Model Analytical Solution 
The analytical solution of the Markov model is derived here. The solution derivation for this 
problem has been provided by Vera Moiseytseva. All three EDGs have identical failure 
parameters, thus to simplify the notation only three designed failure rates are used, as follows:  
   
   
 
  
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1 2 3
,2 12 23 13
,3 123
,
,
and .
cc
cc
 
This system is composed of first-order linear differential equations. These equations are 
solved using an integrating factor to obtain the general solution. The indefinite integrals are 
solved analytically right away as they appear; next the integration constant is solved for using 
the initial conditions.  
The initial value problem (IVP) for state “0” is as follows: 
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The state “0” equation solution is straightforward and can be seen in the following 
equation: 
  
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3 3
0 0 e .
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P t P
  
The initial value problem (IVP) for state “0” is as follows: 
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The state “1” equation general solution is derived in the following equation. 
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 
 
 
 
  
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 

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cc ,2 cc ,3
cc ,2 cc ,3
cc ,2 cc ,3
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1
3
1
2 32 2
3
0
cc,2 cc,3
2
2 2
3 3 30
cc,2 cc,3
1
3
'
1
3
t
t
t
t
dt
e
e P
P
e Const e
Const



t
  
Next, the state “1” initial condition is used to solve for the integration constant, and the 
exact solution is shown below. 
 
 
   
  
  
 
     
 
     
 
       
       
   
 
 
   
 
 
    
 
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cc ,2 cc ,3
0 0
1 1 1
cc,2 cc,3 cc,2 cc,3
2
2 2
3 330 0
1 1
cc,2 cc,3 cc,2 cc,3
0  
1 1
3 3
 
1 1
3 3
t
t
P P
P t P Const Const P
P P
P t P e e
  
Since the three EDGs are assumed to be identical for this case, the state “2” and “3” 
equation solutions are very similar to the state “1” solution. This similarity can be noted in the 
following two equations. 
 
   
 
  
  
  
  
 
     
 
     
 
       
 
     
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 
 
 
   
    
 
 
 
   
    
 
cc ,2 cc ,3
cc ,2 cc ,3
cc ,2 cc ,3
cc ,2
2
2 2
3 330 0
2 2
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2
2 2
3 330 0
3 3
cc,2 cc,3 cc,2 cc,3
 
1 1
3 3
 
1 1
3 3
t
t
t
P P
P t P e e
P P
P t P e e  
cc ,3 t
  
The state “4” equation and solution derivation can be seen in the equations below. 
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 
       
 
       
     
         



  
     
 
4
,2 0 ,2 1 ,2 2 cc,2 cc,3 4
4 4
1 1 1
2 2 3
0
cc cc cc
dP t
P t P t P t P t
dt
P t P
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   
 
     
  
  
  
  
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
   
      
   
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
  



 
 
    
 
 

 
  
 

 
  
 

  



 

cc ,2 cc ,3 cc ,2 cc ,3
cc ,2 cc ,3
cc ,2 cc ,3
cc ,2 cc ,3
1 1
3 3
1 ,2 0 ,2 1
3
4 1
3
,2 2
1
3
1
2
1
2
t t
cc cc
t
t
cc
t
P t e dt P t e dt
P t e
P t e dt
e
  
  
  

 
  

  

     
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 

 
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cc ,2 cc ,3
cc ,2 cc ,3
2
2 2
,2 0 3
,2
cc,2 cc,3
1
30
1 2
cc,2 cc,3
2
2 2
3
0
cc,2 cc,3 cc,2 c
...
1
2 22 2
3
1
3
1 2
2 2
3 3
t
cc
cc
t
t
P
e
P
P e
P e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
  




  














c,3
Const
  
Again, the integration constant (Const) can be found from the initial condition for P4(t).  
Finally (taking into account that the EDGs are identical), the state “4”equation solution 
simplifies as  
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   
  

 
 
        
 

     
  
 
 
    
      
             
  
 
 
 
 
  
  



cc ,2 cc ,33 3,2 0 0
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2
2 2 122 2 2 2
3 3 3
1
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3 3
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P
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 
  

 
  
 
           
 
 
 
  
 
   
  
 
 
   
        
 


 


 
 
  
 
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2
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3
,2 0
4 ,2
cc,2 cc,3
1
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1
2 22 2
3
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1 1 2 1
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t
cc
cc
P
P
P P
P P e
 
 
 
,3
.
t
  
The state “5” and “6” equation solutions are similar to the state “4” solution shown above. 
In order to simplify the state “7” equation derivation, the following coefficients are introduced: 
Let 
     1 cc,2 cc,3
1
3  
       2 cc,2 cc,3 1
2
2 2 2
3  
           cc,2 cc,3 1 2 13 3 3tot   


 0
1
A P
  
  

  
    
  
,2 cc,2 0
1
1 1
2
2
ccB A P
  
  

 
    
 
,2 1
1
2 1
2
ccC P A
  
  

  
      
  
4 ,2 0 ,2
2
1 1
2
2
cc ccD P P A C
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With these coefficients the solutions derived above could be rewritten as follows: 
 
 


  


  

    
    
2
2 1
0 0
1 2 3 0
4 5 6
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
tot
tot
tot
t
tt
t t t
P t P e
P t P t P t P A e Ae
P t P t P t Be Ce De   
 
        
      
       
 
    
  
       
    
          
   
  
      
 
      
             
      
 
7
,3 0 cc,2 cc,3 cc,2 cc,3 1 2 3
cc,2 cc,3 4 5 6
,3 0 cc,2 cc,3 cc,2 cc,3 1 cc,2 cc,3 4
7 7
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...
3 3
1
3
2 2 1
3 3
3 3 3
0
cc
cc
dP t
P t P t P t P t
dt
P t P t P t
P t P t P t
P t P
 
Straightforward integration and using the coefficients introduced above will give: 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
tot
2 1
cc,3 0 cc,2 cc,3 1
-λ t
7
tot
1 cc,2 cc,3 1
-λ t -λ t
7
2
2
λ P - 3A λ + λ + 3Bλ
3
P t = 1- e
λ
2
P + A λ + λ +Cλ
3
+3 1- e + 3D 1- e + P
λ
  
IV.4 Three Identical EDGs with Exponential Offsite-Recovery Load 
The NRI model results for the system case of 3 identical EDGs with a mission-time model of 
load are presented in this section. Results from a Markov model of the same system will also be 
presented as a means to verify the NRI results and numerical integration. The logic, state 
equations, and analytical solutions for the Markov model are developed in Section IV.3.1. The 
initial conditions and failure rates used for this case are identical to the data from Section IV.3, 
as seen in Table 13, Table 14, and Table 15. 
As explained in Section II.1, the NRI model assumes that the random variables for system 
failure time and offsite power recovery time are statistically independent. Therefore the system 
failure PDF ( Cf ) is identical to the “no recovery” case, and is multiplied by a CCDF for offsite 
power recovery time ( LF ), as illustrated in the following equation. For this specific model case, 
 0critT , and the power recovery rate is a constant 0.04 hour
-1, therefore  ( ) exp( 0.04 )L C CF t t . 
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

  
0
Probability of Failure ( ) ( )f L C crit C C CP F t T f t dt
  
The analytical results for the Markov model are compared against the NRI results in Table 
18. The NRI was evaluated in MATLAB [32] using two different sets of numerical integration 
error tolerances. The default tolerance setting has an absolute tolerance of 1e-10 while the 
relative tolerance is 1e-6. The low tolerance setting has an absolute tolerance of 1e-16 while 
the relative tolerance is 1e-12. It can be seen in Table 18 that as the error tolerances are 
lowered, the results approach the analytical solution of the Markov model. 
 
 
 
Table 18 – Results; Three iEDGs with Offsite-Recovery Load. 
 
Markov Model Non-Recovery Integral 
T (hrs) Analytical Solution  default tolerance low tolerance 
0 3.2053109857E-05 3.2053109857E-05 3.2053109857E-05 
1 4.1431969197E-05 4.1431969197E-05 4.1431969197E-05 
6 9.3863074078E-05 9.3863074078E-05 9.3863074078E-05 
12 1.4534332021E-04 1.4534332021E-04 1.4534332021E-04 
24 2.2048210762E-04 2.2048210762E-04 2.2048210762E-04 
48 3.0327157306E-04 3.0327157313E-04 3.0327157306E-04 
96 3.5807973281E-04 3.5807973281E-04 3.5807973281E-04 
192 3.7214653605E-04 3.7214653618E-04 3.7214653605E-04 
384 3.7273037183E-04 3.7273037152E-04 3.7273037183E-04 
768 3.7273096305E-04 3.7273096621E-04 3.7273096305E-04 
2000 3.2053109857E-05 3.2053109857E-05 3.2053109857E-05 
 
 
 
Because the results agree for many digits, an easier way to compare them is to look at their 
difference. Table 19 shows two columns where the default and low tolerance cases are each 
subtracted from the analytical results for the Markov model. As time increases, the difference 
for each case changes from positive to negative which indicates the difference is likely due to 
numerical integration approximations.  
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Table 19 – Difference between Results; Three iEDGs with Offsite-Recovery Load. 
T (hrs) Analytical-default Analytical-low 
0 0.0000000000E+00 0.0000000000E+00 
1 1.8838012747E-18 -2.3174821437E-18 
6 5.2841303382E-17 1.6398557859E-18 
12 1.2834243217E-16 1.0327025693E-17 
24 -1.1595542235E-16 7.0473141212E-18 
48 -6.8935525691E-14 4.3368086899E-19 
96 3.0037279088E-15 9.7578195524E-18 
192 -1.2899669397E-13 8.2941466195E-18 
384 3.0767565145E-13 1.8648277367E-17 
768 -3.1608169315E-12 -5.3939058081E-17 
2000 0.0000000000E+00 0.0000000000E+00 
 
 
 
IV.4.1 Markov Model Analytical Solution 
The analytical solution of the Markov model is derived here. The solution derivation for this 
problem has been provided by Vera Moiseytseva. All three EDGs have identical failure 
parameters, thus to simplify the notation only three designed failure rates are used as shown in 
the following equations:  
   
   
 
  
  

1 2 3
,2 12 23 13
,3 123
,
,
and .
cc
cc
 
Similar to the state transition equations in Sections IV.2.1 and IV.3.1, this system is 
composed of first-order linear differential equations. These equations are solved using an 
integrating factor to obtain the general solution. The indefinite integrals are solved analytically 
right away as they appear; next the integration constant is solved for using the initial 
conditions.  
This system of ODEs is similar to the one in Section IV.3.1 (3 identical EDGs with no 
recovery) but now the Offsite Recovery state “8” is added. Offsite power can be recovered via a 
transition from states “0” through “6” and power cannot be lost once it reaches state “8”. 
Offsite power recovery is not possible once the EDG system has failed (state “7”). The offsite 
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power recovery rate is  =0.04 hr-1. The system of ODEs for this Markov model is shown in the 
following equations. 
 
 
   
 
   
 
   
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2
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2
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3
2
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P t
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P t P t
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P t P t
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   
 
       
 
       
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   
        
        

 
    
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5
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6
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7
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1
3
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

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  
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 
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And the corresponding initial conditions (ICs) are the same as given in Table 13 with the 
additional   8 0 0P t  for state 8. The following notation for ICs is also used: 
   0 ,   for   0,1, 2, 3, 4,5,6,7,8.i iP t P i   
The analytical solutions for the equation above will look pretty similar to the ones derived 
in Case 2A, the only difference is in the presence of the power recovery rate,  . The 
introduction of the following three new coefficients will take care of this.  
 
  
  
  
 
 


 
1 1
2 2
tot tot   
 
 
100 
 
 
 
Then the solutions can be written as (using the coefficients from Case 2A and the ones just 
introduced above):  
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IV.5 FLEX Model with Mission-Time Load 
In this section we will analyze a backup emergency power system comprised of two 
standard identical EDGs (iEDGs) and one non-identical FLEX DG. The FLEX DG is comprised of 
more robust and redundant piece parts, thus it is less susceptible to individual and CCF events. 
The FLEX DG is in a separate hardened structure far above potential flood zones; thus it does 
not contribute to nor is it subject to, any component-caused failure events and any externally-
caused CCF events are less likely to fail it. While there may be a 2-out-of-2 CCF event for the 
two identical EDGs, there is no possibility of a CCF event that fails one standard iEDG and the 
FLEX DG but not the other iEDG. It is assumed that any externally-caused CCF event strong 
enough to fail one standard iEDG and the FLEX DG would also fail the other iEDG with certainty. 
The purpose of this model is to quantify how the failure probability (inverse measure of safety 
margin) of the system changes as a function of the FLEX DG robustness. In order to accomplish 
this, the single failure rate of the FLEX DG and the 3-out-of-3 CCF rate are varied as fractions of 
the corresponding baseline failure rates for three iEDGs.  
The designed hazard functions (here a piecewise constant rate) describe a frequency for a 
specific failure event, given that no EDGs have failed previously. This follows the definition first 
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presented in Chapter II, and expressed mathematically in Equation (II-56). The designed failure 
rates are given for three types of events; a single failure event, a 2-out-of-3 CCF event, and a 3-
out-of-3 CCF event. The specific EDGs failed are denoted with a subscript on ; for the two 
iEDGs the subscripts are “1” and “2”, while the FLEX DG is denoted with “F”. The 2-out-of-3 CCF 
event can be due to external or component causes, and this is denoted with a superscript “E” 
or “C”, respectively. Only the two iEDGs can experience a 2-out-of-3 CCF; any CCF event which 
failed an iEDG and the FLEX DG would also fail the other iEDG. The 3-out-of-3 CCF event is only 
due to external causes. The notation for these events is shown as follows. 
 
  
  

 
1 2
12 12 12
12
single failure event:  ,  ,  
2-out-of-3 CCF:  
3-out-of-3 CCF:  
F
E C
F   
This EDG system is different from most EDG systems analyzed, hence to obtain all the 
model parameters some modifications to the standard estimation techniques are made, as 
described here. The component total unreliability estimates were obtained from the median 
values listed in Table A.2.17-6 of NUREG/CR-6928 [30]. The alpha factors were obtained from 
the median value of Section 1.13.1 of “CCF Parameter Estimates, 2012 Update” [31]. Data for a 
CCF group (CCFG) of 2 were chosen since the two iEDGs are practically in a CCCG by 
themselves. The data used can be seen in Table 20. 
 
 
 
Table 20 – α-Factor Parameters for FLEX Model. 
 
1 2 Qt 
FTS (Failure To Start) 0.990656 9.3440E-03 3.24E-03 
FTL (Failure To Load) 0.997015 2.9850E-03 2.25E-03 
FTR (Failure To Run) 0.984593 1.5407E-02 7.12E-04 
 
 
 
The single failure (for EDG “1” and “2”) and 2-out-of-3 CCF (external cause) event 
parameters are estimated using the above data and Equation (III-1), assuming a system of two 
components; the 2-out-of-3 CCF (external cause) event rate is actually estimated as a 2-out-of-2 
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CCF event. The 2-out-of-3 CCF component-cause event parameter is estimated to be one half of 
the 2-out-of-3 CCF external-cause event parameter. The rates for the single failure of the FLEX 
DG, and the 3-out-of-3 CCF event are varied thus creating results for different cases of the FLEX 
DG robustness. The baseline rates for the single failure of the FLEX DG and the 3-out-of-3 CCF 
event are one-half of the rates for (EDGs “1” and “2”) the single failure and 2-out-of-3 CCF 
(external cause) rates. These baseline rate values are divided by “robustness factors” (2, 4, 8, 
and 16) in order to create four different cases of increasing FLEX DG reliability. The designed 
failure rates can be seen in Table 21; the FLEX rates are given at their baseline value.  
 
 
 
Table 21 – Designed Failure Rates for the FLEX Model.  
  FTL FTR 
1 2.23660747668210E-03 6.90393326025919E-04 
2 2.23660747668210E-03 6.90393326025919E-04 
F 1.11830373834105E-03 3.45196663012959E-04 
12E 1.33925233178961E-05 2.16066739740813E-05 
12C 6.69626165894807E-06 1.08033369870406E-05 
12F 6.69626165894807E-06 1.08033369870406E-05 
 
 
 
The influenced failure rates for this system are computed a little differently than in Sections 
IV.1 through IV.4. The mapping rules from Vaurio [39], as in Equations  and (III-10), are again 
used to estimate these failure rates once one or two EDGs have failed. However, some 
modification to how these equations are used is needed. The rate for a single failure event of 
one iEDG, given the other iEDG is failed (and the FLEX DG is operating) can be seen in Equation 
(IV-12). EDG “1” and “2” can have a CCF from either an external or component cause,  
         11 12 1221 2 1 2 2 1,    and  .
E C  (IV-12) 
The rate for a single failure event of one iEDG, given the FLEX DG is failed (and the other 
iEDG is operating), can be seen in Equation (IV-13). There is no possibility of any 2-out-of-3 CCF 
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between an iEDG and FLEX DG, thus this designed failure rate only includes the single failure 
rate portion. 
     11 1 2,    and  F F F   (IV-13) 
The same logic applies to the designed rate for a single failure event of the FLEX DG, given 
one iEDG has failed (and the other iEDG is operating), 
     
1 1 2
,   and  .FF F F   (IV-14) 
The rate for a CCF failure event of both iEDGs (given the FLEX DG is failed) is given in 
Equation (IV-15). The 3-out-of-3 CCF contribution (12F ) is due to an external cause, as 
previously stated. 
      12 12 1212
E C
FF
  (IV-15) 
The rate for a CCF failure event of an iEDG and the FLEX DG (given an iEDG is failed) can be 
seen in Equation (IV-16).  
   121 2 FF   (IV-16)  
The rate for a single failure event of an iEDG (given the other two EDGs have failed) can be 
seen in Equation (IV-17). An externally-caused 2-out-of-3 CCF event between both iEDGs would 
appear as a single failure if one of the iEDGs was already failed, thus this failure rate term is 
found in Equation (IV-17). The same is true for the 12
C  term, except each iEDG contributes half 
of this rate. When any two EDGs are failed, the externally-caused 3-out-of-3 failure event 
would appear as a single failure, which is illustrated with the 12F  term included in Equations 
(IV-17) and (IV-18).  
           11 12 12 1221 2 1 2 2 1,    and    
E C
FF F F
  (IV-17) 
The rate for a failure event of the FLEX DG (given both iEDGs have failed) can be seen in 
Equation (IV-18). 
     1212 F FF   (IV-18) 
 
 
104 
 
 
 
The baseline influenced failure rates can be seen in Table 22. The single (designed) failure 
rate for the FLEX DG and the 3-out-of-3 CCF rate are adjusted from their baseline values as 
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, which in turn affect these rates. 
 
 
 
Table 22 – Baseline Influenced Failure Rates for the FLEX Case. 
  FTL FTR 
 
1 2 2 1
,

2.25334813082947E-03 7.17401668493520E-04 
 
1 2
,
F F 
2.23660747668210E-03 6.90393326025919E-04 
 
1 2
,
F F 
1.11830373834105E-03 3.45196663012959E-04 

12 F 
2.67850466357923E-05 4.32133479481625E-05 

1 2F 
6.69626165894807E-06 1.08033369870406E-05 
 
1 2 2 1
,
F F 
2.26004439248842E-03 7.28205005480561E-04 

12F 
1.12500000000000E-03 3.56000000000000E-04 
 
 
 
Neither of the FLEX cases (Sections IV.5.1 and IV.5.2) account for the possibility of offsite 
power recovery and instead follow a mission-time model of load. But this detail is secondary to 
the principal purpose of these cases, which is to see how the overall reliability of the system 
changes as a function of the reliability of the FLEX DG, and to examine the differences in results 
when the FLEX DG is operated in hot versus cold standby. 
IV.5.1 Hot FLEX Case 
In this case we assume the FLEX DG is operated in hot standby along with the other two 
iEDGs. Thus, all three EDGs are started and run together at the same time. The results for this 
case are presented in Section IV.6.3. The MATLAB code used to obtain these results is in 
Appendix C. 
The possible failure sequences considered for this case are described in the bullet points 
following this paragraph; failures to load and failures to run will not be differentiated. They will 
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each simply be described as running failures (if a failure is not described as a failure to start, it 
should be assumed a running failure). 
 All three EDGs start successfully followed by... 
o three subsequent individual running failures 
o a CCF of both iEDGs, then a single failure of the FLEX DG 
o a single failure of the FLEX DG, then a CCF of both iEDGs 
o a single failure of an iEDG, then a CCF of an iEDG and the FLEX DG 
o a CCF of all three EDGs 
 A single iEDG fails to start followed by… 
o a single failure of an iEDG, then a single failure of a FLEX DG 
o a single failure of a FLEX DG, then a single failure of an iEDG 
o a CCF of an iEDG and the FLEX DG 
 The FLEX DG fails to start followed by… 
o two subsequent single failures of both iEDGs 
o a CCF of both iEDGs 
 Both iEDGs have a CCF to start followed by a single running failure of the FLEX DG 
 All three EDGs experience an externally-caused CCF to start 
The initial conditions of the system (failure on demand probabilities) can be seen in Table 
23. The probability for states 1 (also 2) and 4 were computed using the alpha factor model 
parameters from Table 20 (as the probability of a 1-out-of-2 and 2-out-of-2 failure, respectively. 
This model does not consider the common-cause FTS of an iEDG and the FLEX DG to be a 
possibility. 
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Table 23 – Initial Conditions for the FLEX Model (Hot). 
P1 (0); EDG “1” FTS 3.18001141335362E-03 
P2 (0); EDG “2” FTS 3.18001141335362E-03 
P3 (0); FLEX DG FTS 1.59000570667681E-03 
P4 (0); EDG “1”,”2” CCFTS 5.99885866463764E-05 
P5 (0); EDG “1”,FLEX CCFTS 0.00000000000000E+00 
P6 (0); EDG “2”,FLEX CCFTS 0.00000000000000E+00 
P7 (0); 3-out-of-3 CCFTS 2.99942933231882E-05 
P0 (0); no EDGs FTS 9.91959988586646E-01 
 
 
 
The equation development for this case follows the same principles as the hot standby, 3-
EDG system from Section II.3. The MATLAB code for this hot FLEX case is presented in Appendix 
D. 
IV.5.2 Cold FLEX Case 
In this case we assume the FLEX DG is operated in cold standby while the two iEDGs are 
operated in hot standby. Thus, the two iEDGs are started and run together at the same time; 
once they both have failed the FLEX DG is started and run until failure. However, this case does 
consider the possibility of a 3-out-of-3 externally-caused CCF, even before the FLEX DG has 
started. The capacity (joint PDF) for the system failure sequence where two hot standby 
components individually fail followed by a cold standby component individually failing is 
developed in Section II.5.1.1. The results for this case are first presented in Section IV.6.3 and 
then compared with the results from Section IV.1 in Section IV.6.4 in order to see how an 
additional FLEX DG improves the safety margin for an originally two-EDG system. The MATLAB 
code used to obtain these results is in Appendix D. 
The possible failure sequences considered for this case are described in the bullet points 
following this paragraph; again, failures to load and failures to run will not be differentiated. 
They will each simply be described as running failures (if a failure is not described as a failure to 
start, it should be assumed a running failure). 
 Both iEDGs start successfully followed by... 
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o two subsequent individual running failures of the iEDGs, a successful start of 
the FLEX DG, and a running failure of the FLEX DG 
o two subsequent individual running failures of the iEDGs, and a failure to start of 
the FLEX DG 
o a single individual running failure of an iEDG, and a CCF of the iEDG and FLEX 
DG (due to the 3-way external cause) 
o a two-way CCF of the iEDGs, a successful start of the FLEX DG, and a running 
failure of the FLEX DG 
o a two-way CCF of the iEDGs, and a failure to start of the FLEX DG 
o a CCF of all three EDGs 
 A single iEDG fails to start followed by… 
o an iEDG running failure, a successful start of the FLEX DG, and a running failure 
of the FLEX DG 
o an iEDG running failure, and a failure to start of the FLEX DG 
o a CCF of an iEDG and FLEX DG (due to the 3-way external cause) 
 Both iEDGs have a CCF to start followed by… 
o A failure to start of the FLEX DG 
o a single running failure of the FLEX DG 
 An externally-caused CCF fails all three EDGs at the beginning of the LOOP event; a 3-
way CCF to start. 
The initial conditions of the system (failure on demand probabilities) can be seen in Table 
23. The probability for states 1 (also 2) and 4 were computed using the alpha factor model 
parameters from Table 20 (as the probability of a 1-out-of-2 and 2-out-of-2 failure, respectively. 
This model does not consider the common-cause FTS of an iEDG and the FLEX DG to be a 
possibility.  
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Table 24 – Initial Conditions for the FLEX Model (Cold). 
P1 (0); EDG “1” FTS 3.18001141335362E-03 
P2 (0); EDG “2” FTS 3.18001141335362E-03 
P3 (0); FLEX DG FTS 0.00000000000000E+00 
P4 (0); EDG “1”,”2” CCFTS 5.99885866463764E-05 
P5 (0); EDG “1”,FLEX CCFTS 0.00000000000000E+00 
P6 (0); EDG “2”,FLEX CCFTS 0.00000000000000E+00 
P7 (0); 3-out-of-3 CCFTS 2.99942933231882E-05 
P0 (0); no EDGs FTS 9.93549994293323E-01 
 
 
 
The cold standby case has an additional set of initial conditions which occur after both 
iEDGs have failed. P3(*) denotes the probability that the FLEX DG fails to start while P0(*) 
denotes the probability that the FLEX DG successfully starts. 
 
 
 
Table 25 – Conditions after First Failure for the FLEX Model (Cold). 
P3 (*); FLEX DG FTS 1.59000570667681E-03 
P0 (*); FLEX DG successfully starts 9.98409994293323E-01 
 
 
 
The complete equation development is not presented for this case. The equations for the 
failure sequences consisting of three individual running failures are developed here and the 
complete MATLAB code is presented in Appendix D. 
This equation development begins with Equation (IV-19) which is written for three 
consecutive, generic, running failures for a system composed of two hot standby EDGs and one 
cold standby EDG. Equation (IV-20) shows Equation (IV-21) written using the failure rate 
notation introduced in Section IV.5. 
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  (IV-22) 
In Equations (IV-23) through (IV-24), superscripts L and R are used to denote FTLR versus 
FTR running failure modes. The first equality in these equations take the generic running failure 
joint PDF, f , in Equation (IV-25) and spell out each specific failure sequence; the second 
equality in these equations integrates these PDFs over the correct limits to produce the 
specified CDF, P . These failure sequences are written such that EDG “1” always fails first 
followed by EDG “2” failing at which point the cold EDG “F” begins running until failure. In the 
argument for the joint PDF, f , for each of these equations the specific running failure mode is 
specified; 1 here refers to one hour of operation which is the separation point between FTLR 
and FTR modes.    
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  (IV-31) 
IV.6 Results Comparison and Discussion 
The results from the specific system cases in Chapter IV are compared and discussed in the 
following subsections. These results are presented graphically as plots of system failure 
probability versus time in hours (unless otherwise specified). The system failure probability 
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results are the CDFs for system failure time computed using a NRI with either a mission-time or 
offsite-power recovery model of load; these NRIs were evaluated using default error tolerance 
for numerical integration in MATLAB [32]. Ratios of system failure probabilities are used in the 
following subsections as relative risk measures to compare how much safer one system 
arrangement is over another. 
IV.6.1 Different Models of Load for the System of Two Identical EDGs 
As explained in Section II.1.1, both mission-time and offsite-recovery (exponential) models 
of load were applied to the cases in Section IV.1 through IV.4. The type of load has a large 
impact on the overall system failure probability, especially for long duration scenarios. The 
mission-time model of load produces the most conservative results (for times before the 
mission time) because it assumes there is no possibility that offsite power is recovered for 
times before the mission time; for times after the mission time, this model of load assumes that 
offsite power has been recovered with absolute certainty. The offsite-recovery model of load 
assigns a high probability of recovery past a certain LOOP duration; for the constant recovery 
rate used in this chapter (0.04 hour-1) there is over a 98% probability of offsite power recovery 
100 hours after the LOOP event. 
This section shows system failure probability results for a mission-time model of load and 
two different offsite-recovery models of load; one is an exponential distribution of recovery 
times (constant recovery rate of 0.04 hour-1) while the other is a lognormal distribution with 
mean of the natural logarithm of the recovery time =  0.3  and standard deviation of that 
quantity = 1.064.  As explained in Section II.1.1, the lognormal recovery time distribution is 
more accurate for the first 24 hours and comes from industry data presented in [27]. The case 
of a two identical EDG system was used to compare system failure probability results for the 
mission-time, exponential recovery, and lognormal recovery load models. This comparison is 
shown for the first 24 and 96 hours in Figure 9 and Figure 10, respectively.  
 
 
112 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 – Load Comparison for the First 24 Hours of the Two Identical EDGs Case. 
 
 
 
For the lognormal model of load, the system failure probability reaches a plateau around 6 
hours and does not increase much after this.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 – Load Comparison for the First 96 Hours of the Two Identical EDGs Case 
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For the exponential model of load, the cumulative probability of system failure reaches a 
plateau around 96 hours and the system failure probability does not increase much after this. 
While both of the offsite power recovery models of load dramatically decrease the estimated 
system failure probability compared to the mission-time model, they may be masking 
interesting results, especially for long-duration scenarios.  
IV.6.2 Two and Three Identical EDG Systems 
A comparison of the results between the two and three identical EDG systems (Section IV.1 
through IV.4) is presented in this section for both the mission-time and offsite-recovery 
(exponential) models of load. We also look at percent contributions from different failure 
sequences to the total system failure probability at the end of Section IV.6.2. 
The comparison is made using a ratio of the two-EDG system failure probability results to 
the three-EDG system failure probability results, as in Equation (IV-32) . This ratio expresses a 
multiplication factor for how many times more likely the two-EDG system is to fail, by a given 
LOOP duration, compared to the three-EDG system; likewise, this ratio expresses a 
multiplication factor for safety margin of the three-EDG system compared to the two-EDG 
system. A plot of this ratio versus time is presented in Figure 11; the plot shows results for 
mission times of 0, 1, 6, 12, 24, 48, 96, 192, 384, and 768 hours. 
  (2EDG system fails)ratio (3EDG system fails)
P
P   (IV-32) 
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Figure 11 – The Two- and Three-EDG System Comparison for Mission-Time and Offsite-
Recovery Models of Load. 
 
 
 
Both the mission-time and offsite-recovery models of load reach a maximum failure 
probability ratio (ratio of two-EDG system to three-EDG system) around 196 hours. The ratio for 
the mission-time load model begins decreasing after that while the offsite-recovery load model 
ratio plateaus around 3.5. 
Some relative contributions to the total system failure probability (for the three-iEDG 
system) are shown in Table 26. The percent contribution due to 3-out-of-3 FTS, three 
consecutive individual running failures, and 3-out-of-3 running failure events are shown for 
various mission times in Table 26. 
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Table 26 – Relative Contributions to the Total System Failure Probability. 
 
Demand Failure Running Failure 
T (hours) 3-out-of-3 FTS 3 Single Failures 3-out-of-3 CCF 
1 77.0% 0.03% 21.7% 
6 31.5% 0.18% 65.6% 
24 9.75% 1.75% 82.1% 
96 2.06% 18.0% 64.8% 
192 0.69% 42.3% 39.5% 
768 0.04% 85.4% 5.47% 
 
 
 
The results in this table indicate that for the first couple hours, the 3-out-of-3 FTS events 
dominate the contribution to total system failure. As time increases, both the running failure 
event contributions begin increasing. The 3-out-of-3 CCF contribution increases more quickly 
and hits a maximum around 24 hours before it begins to decrease. The consecutive individual 
running failure events contribution increases steadily all the way 768 hours; the individual 
failure contribution begins to dominate over the CCF contribution around 192 hours. 
IV.6.3 FLEX DG System Case Comparison 
The system failure probability results for both the hot and cold FLEX cases (as described in 
Sections IV.5.1 and IV.5.2) are presented and compared here. Both of these cases use a 
mission-time model of load. The results were evaluated for a mission time of 0 to 768 hours, in 
increments of one hour. The result comparisons in this section are meant to quantify improved 
safety margin due to the following three factors: operating the FLEX DG in cold standby, 
increasing the FLEX DG reliability, and decreasing the rate of 3-out-of-3 CCF events. As 
explained in Section IV.5, the single failure rate for the FLEX DG and the 3-out-of-3 CCF rate 
were each varied in order to see these combined effects on the overall system reliability. Both 
of these rates have a base case and they each have cases where “robustness factors” are 
divided the base case failure rates (thereby lowering the failure rate and increasing the 
reliability of the FLEX DG). For every case, the same “robustness factor” is divided by the base 
case rates for both the single failure and 3-out-of-3 CCF events. The last two comparison plots 
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in this section decompose the “robustness factors” so that separate effects of single FLEX DG 
failure and 3-out-of-3 CCF events can be examined. 
A comparison between the hot and cold standby FLEX arrangements for the base case is 
shown in Figure 12. The intuitive notion that a system is more reliable when operated in cold 
standby versus hot standby is confirmed with these results; again, both of these cases have the 
two iEDGs in hot standby while the FLEX DG arrangement is varied. The difference in reliability 
between the hot and cold standby cases becomes noticeable about halfway through the 768 
hour mission-time, and becomes much more pronounced towards the end of the mission time; 
however, before a mission time of 200 hours, this difference is miniscule. The small difference 
for the first 192 hours is because the 3-out-of-3 CCF contribution dominates here (as seen in 
Table 26) and it is the same for both the hot and cold FLEX arrangements; after 192 hours, the 
effects from the FLEX DG being in cold standby can be seen since the consecutive single failure 
contribution begins to dominate (as seen in Table 26). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 – Hot and Cold Standby Results for the Base Case. 
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Figure 13 is shown in order to compare the base FLEX DG reliability to each of the 
“robustness factors” for the system of two iEDGs in hot standby and the FLEX DG in cold 
standby.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 – All “Robustness Factor” Cases for the Cold FLEX System. 
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factor” was applied to both the FLEX DG single failure and 3-out-of-3 CCF rates. For the results 
shown in Figure 14, “robustness factors” are only applied to the FLEX DG single failure rate 
while in Figure 15 they are only applied to the 3-out-of-3 CCF rates. Figure 14 and Figure 15 
both show three curves for results at three different mission times (24, 192, and 768 hours). 
The x-axis for these plots is the “robustness factor”, thus as the x-axis increases, the rate 
decreases for the specific failure event under consideration (single FLEX DG failure or 3-out-of-3 
CCF). The y-axis for these plots is the ratio of the base case (“robustness”=1) to the current case 
(corresponding to the x-axis value for the “robustness factor”). This ratio expresses a 
multiplication factor for how many times more likely the base case system is to fail, by a given 
LOOP duration, compared to the system with the specific “robustness factor’ applied. This ratio 
on the y-axis is directly related to the safety margin of the system. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 – Single FLEX DG Failure Impact on Safety Margin. 
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less, decreasing the FLEX DG single failure rate does very little for the safety margin. For 
mission times of 768 hours, the peak ratio value in Figure 14 suggests that a reduction in single 
failure rate of 16 times only produces an increase in safety margin of 2.1 times.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 – CCF (3-out-of-3) Impact on Safety Margin. 
 
 
 
The ratios in Figure 15 are much higher compared to the ratios in Figure 14 (except for the 
“768 hours” curves in both plots). Figure 15 shows that decreasing the 3-out-of-3 CCF rate 
increases safety margin more dramatically for shorter mission times. The results in Table 26 can 
shed some light on what is going on here (even though those results are for a system of three 
iEDGs, the basic behavior should be the same for the FLEX system). The results in Table 26 
suggest that the 3-out-of-3 CCF contribution increases for the first 24 hours (with a maximum 
around 82% of the total system failure probability), and then begins to decrease. Thus the 
largest impact that the 3-out-of-3 CCF rate has on the safety margin is for mission times around 
24 hours, and this notion is reflected in the “24 hours” curve of Figure 15. 
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IV.6.4 Improved Safety Margin Due to FLEX DG 
The failure probability results for the two identical EDGs with a mission-time load (Section 
IV.1) are compared to the cold FLEX system (base case of Section IV.5.2) in this subsection. The 
ratio of the two-EDG system failure probability to the FLEX system failure probability is plotted 
versus time in Figure 16 (with data legend “FLEX”). This ratio provides a measure of relative risk 
as a means to show improved safety margin to a two-EDG system that is upgraded with an 
additional FLEX DG. The ratio of the two-EDG system failure probability results to the three-EDG 
system failure probability results (with mission-time loads) are also plotted in Figure 16 (with 
data legend “3 EDGs”) as a way to compare improvement (to a originally two-EDG system) from 
adding an EDG versus a FLEX DG. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 – Additional FLEX DG Impact on Safety Margin. 
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margin from adding a FLEX DG to two-EDG system. When compared to the results ratio of the 
two-EDG to three-EDG systems, it can be easily seen that the FLEX system has a higher safety 
margin for LOOP durations of around 96 hours and longer.  
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CHAPTER V 
     FUTURE WORK 
 
Two model features that this thesis did not expand on and could be explored as future 
work are using time-dependent failure rates and accounting for EDG repair. The NRI can accept 
time-dependent failure rates (under certain conditions, as discussed in Section V.3.1), but none 
of the cases in Chapter IV applied this capability. Throughout the research required to complete 
this thesis, it became apparent that a semi-Markov model may be a more appropriate way to 
capture the important processes associated with the LOOP/SBO problem (especially when 
modeling a system containing cold standby components). Modeling the LOOP/SBO problem 
with a semi-Markov process is explored in this chapter. 
A simple two-EDG system case with time-dependent failure rates is presented in Section 
V.1. Next, a brief semi-Markov model development is reproduced from [42] in Section V.2. The 
simple two-EDG system problem is solved using the developed semi-Markov model in Section 
V.2 and the NRI in Section V.3. The results for these two different models are compared in 
Section V.4.  
The problem in this chapter does not include the possibility of EDG repair; a semi-Markov 
model could account for this repair but the NRI developed in this thesis could not. The main 
goal of this chapter is to point toward potential features of creating a model based on a semi-
Markov process and suggest further development of this idea as an extension of the work in 
this thesis.  
V.1 Time-Dependent Problem 
The system is composed of two EDGs, each subject to individual failures and externally-
caused CCFs. The possible failure events are characterized by Weibull distributions of failure 
times. This problem assumes that there are no failure-on-demand events (both EDGs always 
start), only failures while running. This system will be modeled in both cold and hot standby 
redundancy. The NRI in this thesis is only valid for hot standby systems (when constant failure 
rates are used) while the semi-Markov model is suited for cold standby systems; however each 
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of these models will be modified so that results for both hot and cold standby systems can be 
compared between the two models. 
There are three different possible failure events; either the first EDG can fail while the 
other EDG is in standby (hot or cold), both EDGs can fail due to a CCF (while one EDG is in 
standby), or the second EDG can fail after the first EDG has already failed. The state transition 
diagrams for the cold and hot standby system cases can be seen in Figure 17 and Figure 18, 
respectively. Both of these systems start in state 0 at time equals zero with absolute certainty. 
For the cold standby system only one EDG starts in state 0 while for the hot standby case both 
EDGs start. For the hot standby case, states 1 and 2 represent either combination of the event 
when the active EDG fails and the standby EDG becomes active.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 – Cold Standby System Case. 
 
 
 
   
  
Figure 18 – Hot Standby System Case.  
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Each of the state transition events above are described by a Weibull distribution of failure 
times. The shape parameter,  , for each of these events is 1.3 to represent an increasing 
failure rate. The scale parameters for the failure rates   ( ),  ( ),  and ( )CCt t t  are 0.1, 0.11, and 
0.01 failures per hour, respectively. The hazard function, PDF, and CCDF for a transition from 
state i to j can be found in Equations (V-1)-(V-3), respectively.  
 
 
  


1
( ) ij ijij ij ijt t   (V-1) 
       1( ) exp ( )ij ij ijij ij ij ijf t t t   (V-2) 
     0( ) 1 ( ) exp ( )
ij
t
ij ij ijF t f t dt t   (V-3) 
V.2 Semi-Markov 
A semi-Markov model is suited to analyze cold standby systems because this type of 
process tracks the sojourn time (the waiting time between transition events); after each 
transition to a new state, sojourn time resets to zero. This sojourn time is contrasted with what 
will be referred to as clock time, which is the time the system as a whole has been operating 
since the initiating event. For a semi-Markov process (only tracks sojourn time), restarting at 
time zero after each transition means that any time-dependent hazard functions are also reset 
to zero which lends itself to a new component coming into operation. When the semi-Markov 
model is applied to the hot standby case (seen in  
Figure 18), there is a slight issue with states 1 and 2. The standby EDG has been running 
since time 0 but comes into action after this, once the system is in state 1 or 2. The standby 
EDG should have experienced wear since the beginning of state 0, but the transition to state 1 
or 2 resets the time-dependent failure rate to a “brand-new” condition. Thus this case is 
referred to as “warm” standby. The term “warm” standby is used elsewhere in reliability 
engineering literature to refer to refer to a component which obtains some amount of wear 
while in standby but not the full amount of wear that it would obtain if it was not in standby, 
but instead fully operating and loaded; the use of “warm” standby in this chapter should not be 
confused with the definition typically used in reliability engineering. A generalized semi-Markov 
tracks both the clock time and sojourn time [43], but its mathematical formulation is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
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The model developed here was adapted from [42] and the interested reader should refer 
to this document for further details. The basics of the model development are supplied here. 
The probability that the system is in state j at time t, given that it entered state i at time zero, is 
solved for in Equation (4) of [42], and this is shown in Equation (V-4), 
 
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
t
ij ij i ik kj
k
t W t h t         (V-4) 
where,  


   
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0 ,   ,  and   ( ) 1 ( ).
0  
t
ij i i
i j
t W t w t
i j
 
The other two parameters needed for this model are defined in terms of the PDF and CCDF 
for the Weibull transition events. The holding time probability is defined in Equation (V-5) and 
the unconditional waiting time density is defined in Equation (V-6). 
 

 ( ) ( ) ( )ij ij ij
k j
h t f t F t   (V-5) 
 ( ) ( )i ij
j
w t h t   (V-6) 
Two algorithms to solve Equation (V-4) are derived in Appendix A of [42]. The algorithm 
based on the trapezoidal rule was used to solve both the hot and cold system cases from 
Section V.1. These algorithms were coded in MATLAB and can be seen in Appendix E; Section 
E.1 contains the code for the cold standby case while Section E.2 contains the code for the 
“warm” standby case. 
V.3 NRI 
The NRI is primarily used to analyze hot standby systems, but it can be modified for cold 
standby, as explained in Section II.5.1. The general two-EDG NRI model developed in Section 
II.2 was used for the hot standby case of the time-dependent problem in Section V.1. The cold 
standby modification developed in Section II.5.1 was used for the cold case of this time-
dependent problem. The MATLAB code used to produce the NRI results in Section V.4 is in 
Section E.3 and E.4 of Appendix E (for the cold and hot standby case, respectively). 
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V.3.1 Conditions for Time-Dependent Hazard Functions 
The bivariate and multivariate failure time joint PDFs presented by Shaked and 
Shanthikumar are only proper PDFs when the conditional hazard functions satisfy certain 
conditions; the following quote from [28] explains these conditions for the two-component 
(bivariate) case and the mathematical conditions are given in Equation (V-7). For “the 
multivariate conditional hazard rate functions determine the joint distribution to be a proper 
bivariate density function, it is necessary that the   functions are nonnegative and that they 
satisfy” the following: 
 
 





 
 
 
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
1
2
1 20
2 1 1
1 2 2
[ ( ) ( )] ,
( )   for all t 0,  and
( )   for all t 0.
t
t
u u du
u t du
u t du
  (V-8) 
The hazard function notation above was slightly modified to fit the bivariate joint PDF 
presented in Equation (II-21). More details about the conditions on the construction of hazard 
functions for the multivariate case can be found on pages 290-291 of [28].  
V.4 Results 
A plot of the results (system failure probability versus time) can be seen in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 – Results for the Time-Dependent System Cases. 
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CHAPTER VI 
    SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this thesis a system failure time PDF for an onsite emergency AC power system 
(composed of 2 or 3 EDGs) was developed in Chapter II based on a joint PDF developed by 
Shaked and Shanthikumar [6]. This system failure PDF accounts for the timing dependencies of 
individual EDG failures, can accept time-dependent failure rates (for a hot standby system 
only), and can be modified to model a cold standby or mixed case system (this modification is 
discussed in Section II.5.1). This PDF can be integrated alone or multiplied with an offsite power 
recovery time distribution to create the NRI model with a mission-time or offsite-recovery loads 
(discussed in Section II.1.1). A standard Markov model was also developed in order to verify the 
accuracy of the NRI model results.  
Nuclear industry and SPAR model data were used as inputs to the NRI to create the 6 
different model cases in Chapter IV. First, a system of two identical EDGs (in hot standby) was 
modeled with both a mission-time or offsite-recovery load. Next, a system of three identical 
EDGs (hot standby) was modeled with both a mission-time or offsite-recovery load. Finally, the 
thesis objective case for a system composed of two identical EDGs and one FLEX DG was 
modeled with a mission-time load in Section IV.5. This system had two model cases, one where 
the FLEX DG was operating in hot standby while the other case had it operating in cold standby. 
As expected, an additional EDG improves system reliability (result shown in Section IV.6.2) 
while a FLEX DG improves it further (result in Section IV.6.4). In Section IV.6.4, improved safety 
margin due to an additional FLEX DG is quantified by looking at the ratio of system failure 
probabilities for a two-EDG system compared to the FLEX DG system. It can be seen that the 
FLEX DG system is half as likely to fail for the entire range of LOOP durations that were 
examined (0 to 768 hours); the failure probability ratio (for the FLEX system compared to the 
two-EDG system) drops to one third by 24 hours and decreases even further for longer LOOP 
durations. 
Some conclusions about EDG system behavior and modeling technique effects can be 
drawn from the results comparison in Section IV.6. As discussed in Section IV.6.1, Figure 9 and 
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Figure 10 suggest that an offsite power recovery model of load could mask interesting results 
for long duration LOOP events when compared to mission-time models of load. The choice of 
load is very important when making risk-informed decisions based on system failure probability 
models; a range of different load models should be tested and considered so that a more 
complete picture of offsite power recovery can be captured. This notion of load choice 
potentially masking some system behavior appears again when examining the results in Figure 
11. The peak ratio (this ratio is a measure of safety margin, as explained in Section IV.6.2) in the 
mission-time load model curve of this figure shows that the difference in safety margin for the 
three-EDG system over the two-EDG system occurs around 192 hours and for longer times this 
difference begins to decrease. The ratio for offsite-power recovery model of load in Figure 11 
does not show this peak but instead plateaus around 192 hours; this masks some behavior of 
the two systems for times longer than 192 hours. The curve peak for the mission-time model in 
Figure 11 suggest that adding a third EDG to the system has the largest increase in safety 
margin for the first 192 hours. The results in Table 26 show that the 3-out-of-3 CCF contribution 
to the total system failure probability dominates over the single failure contribution for the first 
100 hours. The results in Figure 11 and Table 26 indicate that reducing 3-out-of-3 CCF is crucial 
to effectively increase safety margin for the first 100 hours of a LOOP.  
Results from the FLEX DG system cases are compared in Section IV.6.3 and some 
conclusions can be drawn about these results. The results in Figure 12 and Figure 13 show that 
the “robustness factor” (applied to lower both the FLEX DG single failure rate and 3-out-of-3 
CCF rate) has a much larger impact on safety margin than whether or not the FLEX DG is 
operated in hot or cold standby. In order to examine the impact to safety margin of the FLEX 
system separately due to the FLEX DG single failure rate and 3-out-of-3 CCF rate, Figure 14 and 
Figure 15 were created. For the results shown in Figure 14, “robustness factors” are only 
applied to the FLEX DG single failure rate while in Figure 15 they are only applied to the 3-out-
of-3 CCF rates. The ratios (measure of safety margin) in Figure 15 are much higher compared to 
the ratios in Figure 14 (except for the “768 hours” curves in both plots). Figure 15 shows that 
decreasing the 3-out-of-3 CCF rate increases safety margin very dramatically for “short” mission 
times (short here refers to mission times around 24 hours and actual plant data [27] suggests 
that LOOP events longer than 24 hours are extremely rare). Thus the most effective way to 
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increase safety margin (for the most likely LOOP duration scenarios) is to reduce the likelihood 
of 3-out-of-3 CCFs. 
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APPENDIX A 
TWO IDENTICAL EDG SYSTEM MATLAB MODELS 
 
This appendix contains the MATLAB code for the system of two iEDGs (Sections IV.1 and 
IV.2). This code contains both the mission-time and offsite recovery models of load; different 
values for the variable “H” can be toggled on and off to obtain the specific load cases. This code 
also contains both the default and low error tolerances for numerical integration. 
 
%% Begin input 
clear all 
T=2000; % mission time in hours 
H=@(x) 1;  % toggle for norecovery case 
% H=@(x)exp(-.4.*x); % exp CCDF in time (hours) for recovery of offsite 
power 
% H=@(x)exp(-.04.*x); % exp CCDF in time (hours) for recovery of 
offsite power 
% H=@(x)(1-logncdf(x,.3,1.064)); % "realistic" lognormal CCDF model of 
load 
%% failure data 
% Failure to start data; failure-on-demand probabilities 
QFTS=3.24E-03;alpha1FTS=0.990656;alpha2FTS=1-
alpha1FTS;alphatFTS=alpha1FTS+2*alpha2FTS; 
% Initial Conditions; failure on demand probabilities 
P1=alpha1FTS*QFTS/alphatFTS; % EDG "0" 
P2=P1;            % EDG "1" ; 0 and 1 are identical and have the same 
prob/rates 
P3=2*alpha2FTS*QFTS/alphatFTS; 
P0=1-P1-P2-P3; 
% Failure to load-and-run data 
QFTLR=2.25E-03;alpha1FTLR=0.997015;alpha2FTLR=1-
alpha1FTLR;alphatFTLR=alpha1FTLR+2*alpha2FTLR; 
% Failure to run data; constant failure rates 
QFTR=7.12E-04; alpha1FTR=0.984593;alpha2FTR=1-
alpha1FTR;alphatFTR=alpha1FTR+2*alpha2FTR; 
%% failure rates 
r1_2a=alpha1FTLR*QFTLR/alphatFTLR; r1_2b=alpha1FTR*QFTR/alphatFTR; 
r2_2a=2*alpha2FTLR*QFTLR/alphatFTLR; r2_2b=2*alpha2FTR*QFTR/alphatFTR; 
r1_1a=r1_2a+.5*r2_2a; r1_1b=r1_2b+.5*r2_2b; 
total_a=2*r1_2a+r2_2a; total_b=2*r1_2b+r2_2b; 
%% 
ymax = @(z) z; 
%% First contribution from two independent failures 
%% Computation of nonrecovery integral 
% 2 Independent FTLR/FTR events 
% t0<t1 
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FTS_FTLR=@(z)(P1.*(r1_1a.*exp(-r1_1a.*z)).*H(z)); 
FTS_FTR=@(z)(P1.*(r1_1b.*exp(-r1_1a).*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-1)))).*H(z)); 
FTLR_FTLR=@(z,y)(P0.*(r1_2a.*exp(-total_a.*y)).*(r1_1a.*exp(-r1_1a.*(z-
y))).*H(z)); 
FTLR_FTR=@(z,y)(P0.*(r1_2a.*exp(-total_a.*(y))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-
r1_1a.*(1-y)).*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-1)))).*H(z)); 
FTR_FTR=@(z,y)(P0.*(r1_2b.*exp(-total_a).*exp(-total_b.*(y-
1))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-y)))).*H(z)); 
%% 2-way common-cause failure  
CCFTLR = @(z)(P0.*(r2_2a.*exp(-total_a.*z)).*H(z)); 
CCFTR = @(z)(P0.*(r2_2b.*exp(-total_a).*exp(-(total_b.*(z-1)))).*H(z)); 
%% Numerical Integration   toggle for default and low tolerances 
% % probabilities  
% P_FTS_FTLR=2.*integral(FTS_FTLR,0,1); 
% P_FTS_FTR=2.*integral(FTS_FTR,1,T); 
% P_FTLR_FTLR=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTLR,0,1,0,ymax);      
% P_FTLR_FTR=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTR,1,T,0,1); 
% P_FTR_FTR=2.*integral2(FTR_FTR,1,T,1,ymax); 
% % probabilities  
% FTS_CCF = P3; 
% FTLR_CCF = integral(CCFTLR,0,1); 
% FTR_CCF = integral(CCFTR,1,T); 
%  
% % probabilities  
P_FTS_FTLR=2.*integral(FTS_FTLR,0,1,'AbsTol',1e-6,'RelTol',1e-2); 
P_FTS_FTR=2.*integral(FTS_FTR,1,T,'AbsTol',1e-6,'RelTol',1e-2); 
P_FTLR_FTLR=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTLR,0,1,0,ymax,'AbsTol',1e-
6,'RelTol',1e-2);      
P_FTLR_FTR=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTR,1,T,0,1,'AbsTol',1e-6,'RelTol',1e-2); 
P_FTR_FTR=2.*integral2(FTR_FTR,1,T,1,ymax,'AbsTol',1e-6,'RelTol',1e-2); 
% probabilities  
FTS_CCF = P3; 
FTLR_CCF = integral(CCFTLR,0,1,'AbsTol',1e-6,'RelTol',1e-2); 
FTR_CCF = integral(CCFTR,1,T,'AbsTol',1e-6,'RelTol',1e-2); 
% %  
%% Total 
if T==0 
  PCSBO=FTS_CCF; 
elseif T<=1 
  PCSBO=FTS_CCF+P_FTS_FTLR+P_FTLR_FTLR+FTLR_CCF;       %may be 
incorrect for times between 0 and 1 hour 
elseif T>1 
  
PCSBO=FTS_CCF+FTLR_CCF+FTR_CCF+P_FTS_FTLR+P_FTLR_FTLR+P_FTR_FTR+P_FTS_F
TR+P_FTLR_FTR; 
end 
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APPENDIX B 
THREE IDENTICAL EDG SYSTEM MATLAB MODELS 
 
This appendix contains the MATLAB code for the system of three iEDGs (Sections IV.3 and 
IV.4). This code contains both the mission-time and offsite recovery models of load; different 
values for the variable “H” can be toggled on and off to obtain the specific load cases. This code 
also contains both the default and low error tolerances for numerical integration. 
 
%% Begin Input 
clear all 
% 
T=768; 
% H=@(x)1; % uncomment for norecovery case 
H=@(x)exp(-.04.*x); % exp CCDF in time (hours) for recovery of offsite 
power 
%% Input data 
% Failure to start data 
QFTS=3.24E-03;alpha1FTS=0.990496;alpha3FTS=3.34E-03;alpha2FTS=1-
alpha1FTS-alpha3FTS;alphatFTS=alpha1FTS+2*alpha2FTS+3*alpha3FTS; 
% Failure to load-and-run data 
QFTLR=2.25E-03;alpha1FTLR=0.991208;alpha3FTLR=1.37E-03;alpha2FTLR=1-
alpha1FTLR-alpha3FTLR;alphatFTLR=alpha1FTLR+2*alpha2FTLR+3*alpha3FTLR; 
% Failure to run data 
QFTR=7.12E-04;alpha1FTR=0.985501;alpha3FTR=5.64E-03;alpha2FTR=1-
alpha1FTR-alpha3FTR;alphatFTR=alpha1FTR+2*alpha2FTR+3*alpha3FTR; 
% 
%% Input data for three-way common-cause failures  
FTS3way=3*alpha3FTS*QFTS/alphatFTS;FTLR3way = 
3*alpha3FTLR*QFTLR/alphatFTLR;FTR3way = 3*alpha3FTR*QFTR/alphatFTR; 
% 
%% Input data for independent failures 
FTS_I=alpha1FTS*QFTS/alphatFTS;FTLR_I=alpha1FTLR*QFTLR/alphatFTLR;FTR_I
=alpha1FTR*QFTR/alphatFTR;  
% 
%% Input data for two-way common-cause failures  
FTS2way=alpha2FTS*QFTS/alphatFTS;FTLR2way=alpha2FTLR*QFTLR/alphatFTLR;F
TR2way=alpha2FTR*QFTR/alphatFTR; 
%% 'Basic Event' rates ; the following data assumes 3 identical EDGs 
% Designed Hazard Functions a=FTLR and b=FTR 
% rates for single failures of EDGs 1,2,and 3 
r1_3a=FTLR_I;r1_3b=FTR_I; 
% rates for 2 out of 3 CCFs 
r2_3a=FTLR2way;r2_3b=FTR2way; 
% rate for 3-way CCF 
r3_3a=FTLR3way;r3_3b=FTR3way; 
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%% Influenced Hazard Functions 
% 1-out-of-2; rate for single failure of 2 given 1 has already failed 
and 3 has not (EDGs subject to component-caused CCF, not external)            
r1_2a=r1_3a+(.5).*r2_3a; r1_2b=r1_3b+(.5).*r2_3b; 
% 2-out-of-2; rate for CCF of 2&3 given 1 has already failed(EDGs 
subject to component-caused CCF, not external) 
r2_2a=r2_3a+(2/3).*r3_3a; r2_2b=r2_3b+(2/3).*r3_3b; 
% 1-out-of-1; single failure rate for EDG3 given only EDG3 operating 
r1_1a=r1_3a+r2_3a+(1/3).*r3_3a; r1_1b=r1_3b+r2_3b+(1/3).*r3_3b; 
%% other rates (combinations of basic event rates); _a=FTLR, _b=FTR 
r_total_a=3*r1_3a+3*r2_3a+r3_3a; % total rate of any basic event given 
all EDGs operating 
r_total_b=3*r1_3b+3*r2_3b+r3_3b; 
r_total_2a=2*r1_3a+2*r2_3a+(2/3)*r3_3a; % total rate of any basic event 
given two EDGs operating 
r_total_2b=2*r1_3b+2*r2_3b+(2/3)*r3_3b; 
%% state probabilities; Initial Conditions 
%% t=0hr 
P1=FTS_I ;P2=P1 ;P3=P1 ;P4=FTS2way ;P5=P4 ;P6=P4 ;P7=FTS3way ; 
P0=1-3*P1-3*P4-P7;% no failures 
%% three consecutive 'single' failures; written as 1 fails followed by 
2 and 3 
% define anonymous function for integrand 
% (z,y,x)=(t,t',tau)  
FTLR_FTLR_FTLR=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(r1_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*x)).*(r1_2a.*exp(-
r_total_2a.*(y-x))).*(r1_1a.*exp(-r1_1a.*(z-y))).*H(z)); 
FTLR_FTLR_FTR=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(r1_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*x)).*(r1_2a.*exp(-
r_total_2a.*(y-x))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-r1_1a.*(1-y)).*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-
1)))).*H(z)); 
FTLR_FTR_FTR=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(r1_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*x)).*(r1_2b.*exp(-
r_total_2a.*(1-x)).*exp(-r_total_2b.*(y-1))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-
y)))).*H(z)); 
FTR_FTR_FTR=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(r1_3b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-r_total_b.*(x-
1))).*(r1_2b.*exp(-r_total_2b.*(y-x))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-
y)))).*H(z)); 
%% 2 random variable integrands 
% 
FTLR_FTLR=@(z,y)(P1.*(r1_2a.*exp(-r_total_2a.*y)).*(r1_1a.*exp(-
r1_1a.*(z-y))).*H(z)); 
FTLR_FTR=@(z,y)(P1.*(r1_2a.*exp(-r_total_2a.*(y))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-
r1_1a.*(1-y)).*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-1)))).*H(z)); 
FTR_FTR=@(z,y)(P1.*(r1_2b.*exp(-r_total_2a).*exp(-r_total_2b.*(y-
1))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-y)))).*H(z)); 
% 
FTLR2_FTLR=@(z,y)(P0.*(r2_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*y)).*(r1_1a.*exp(-
r1_1a.*(z-y))).*H(z)); 
FTLR2_FTR=@(z,y)(P0.*(r2_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*(y))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-
r1_1a.*(1-y)).*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-1)))).*H(z)); 
FTR2_FTR=@(z,y)(P0.*(r2_3b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-r_total_b.*(y-
1))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-y)))).*H(z)); 
% 
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FTLR_FTLR2=@(z,y)(P0.*(r1_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*y)).*(r2_2a.*exp(-
r_total_2a.*(z-y))).*H(z)); 
FTLR_FTR2=@(z,y)(P0.*(r1_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*(y))).*(r2_2b.*exp(-
r_total_2a.*(1-y)).*exp(-(r_total_2b.*(z-1)))).*H(z)); 
FTR_FTR2=@(z,y)(P0.*(r1_3b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-r_total_b.*(y-
1))).*(r2_2b.*exp(-(r_total_2b.*(z-y)))).*H(z)); 
% 
%% 1 random variable integrands 
% 
FTLR=@(z)(P4.*(r1_1a.*exp(-r1_1a.*z)).*H(z));  
FTR=@(z)(P4.*(r1_1b.*exp(-r1_1a).*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-1)))).*H(z)); 
% 
FTLR2=@(z)(P1.*(r2_2a.*exp(-r_total_2a.*z)).*H(z)); 
FTR2=@(z)(P1.*(r2_2b.*exp(-r_total_2a).*exp(-r_total_2b.*(z-
1))).*H(z)); 
% 
FTLR3=@(z)(P0.*(r3_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*z)).*H(z)); 
FTR3=@(z)(P0.*(r3_3b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-r_total_b.*(z-1))).*H(z)); 
%% evaluate the definite integral numerically 
% define limits of integration 
ymax = @(z) z; 
xmax = @(z,y) y; 
%% 1 random variable CDFs 
% 
P_FTS2_FTLR=3.*integral(FTLR,0,1); 
P_FTS2_FTR=3.*integral(FTR,1,T); 
% 
P_FTS_FTLR2=3.*integral(FTLR2,0,1); 
P_FTS_FTR2=3.*integral(FTR2,1,T); 
% 
P_FTLR3=integral(FTLR3,0,1); 
P_FTR3=integral(FTR3,1,T); 
%% 2 random variable CDFs 
% 
P_FTS_FTLR_FTLR=6.*integral2(FTLR_FTLR,0,1,0,ymax); 
P_FTS_FTLR_FTR=6.*integral2(FTLR_FTR,1,T,0,1); 
P_FTS_FTR_FTR=6.*integral2(FTR_FTR,1,T,1,ymax); 
% 
P_FTLR2_FTLR=3.*integral2(FTLR2_FTLR,0,1,0,ymax); 
P_FTLR2_FTR=3.*integral2(FTLR2_FTR,1,T,0,1); 
P_FTR2_FTR=3.*integral2(FTR2_FTR,1,T,1,ymax); 
% 
P_FTLR_FTLR2=3.*integral2(FTLR_FTLR2,0,1,0,ymax); 
P_FTLR_FTR2=3.*integral2(FTLR_FTR2,1,T,0,1); 
P_FTR_FTR2=3.*integral2(FTR_FTR2,1,T,1,ymax); 
%% 3 random variable CDFs 
% assume identical; x6 accounts for 123, 132, 213, 231, 312, and 321 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTLR=6.*integral3(FTLR_FTLR_FTLR,0,1,0,ymax,0,xmax); % 
FTLR_FTLR_FTLR 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTR=6.*integral3(FTLR_FTLR_FTR,1,T,0,1,0,xmax); 
P_FTLR_FTR_FTR=6.*integral3(FTLR_FTR_FTR,1,T,1,ymax,0,1); 
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P_FTR_FTR_FTR=6.*integral3(FTR_FTR_FTR,1,T,1,ymax,1,xmax); % 
FTR_FTR_FTR 
% %% 1 random variable CDFs 
% % 
% P_FTS2_FTLR=3.*integral(FTLR,0,1,'AbsTol',1e-16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% P_FTS2_FTR=3.*integral(FTR,1,T,'AbsTol',1e-16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% % 
% P_FTS_FTLR2=3.*integral(FTLR2,0,1,'AbsTol',1e-16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% P_FTS_FTR2=3.*integral(FTR2,1,T,'AbsTol',1e-16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% % 
% P_FTLR3=integral(FTLR3,0,1,'AbsTol',1e-16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% P_FTR3=integral(FTR3,1,T,'AbsTol',1e-16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% %% 2 random variable CDFs 
% % 
% P_FTS_FTLR_FTLR=6.*integral2(FTLR_FTLR,0,1,0,ymax,'AbsTol',1e-
16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% P_FTS_FTLR_FTR=6.*integral2(FTLR_FTR,1,T,0,1,'AbsTol',1e-
16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% P_FTS_FTR_FTR=6.*integral2(FTR_FTR,1,T,1,ymax,'AbsTol',1e-
16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% % 
% P_FTLR2_FTLR=3.*integral2(FTLR2_FTLR,0,1,0,ymax,'AbsTol',1e-
16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% P_FTLR2_FTR=3.*integral2(FTLR2_FTR,1,T,0,1,'AbsTol',1e-
16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% P_FTR2_FTR=3.*integral2(FTR2_FTR,1,T,1,ymax,'AbsTol',1e-
16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% % 
% P_FTLR_FTLR2=3.*integral2(FTLR_FTLR2,0,1,0,ymax,'AbsTol',1e-
16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% P_FTLR_FTR2=3.*integral2(FTLR_FTR2,1,T,0,1,'AbsTol',1e-
16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% P_FTR_FTR2=3.*integral2(FTR_FTR2,1,T,1,ymax,'AbsTol',1e-
16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% %% 3 random variable CDFs 
% % 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTLR=6.*integral3(FTLR_FTLR_FTLR,0,1,0,ymax,0,xmax,'AbsTol'
,1e-16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTR=6.*integral3(FTLR_FTLR_FTR,1,T,0,1,0,xmax,'AbsTol',1e-
16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% P_FTLR_FTR_FTR=6.*integral3(FTLR_FTR_FTR,1,T,1,ymax,0,1,'AbsTol',1e-
16,'RelTol',1e-12); 
% P_FTR_FTR_FTR=6.*integral3(FTR_FTR_FTR,1,T,1,ymax,1,xmax,'AbsTol',1e-
16,'RelTol',1e-12);  
%% no random variable 
% CCFTS 
P_FTS3=FTS3way; 
%% 
PCSBO1=P_FTS3+P_FTLR_FTLR_FTLR+P_FTS_FTLR_FTLR+P_FTS2_FTLR+P_FTLR2_FTLR
+P_FTLR_FTLR2+P_FTS_FTLR2+P_FTLR3; 
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PCSBO2=P_FTLR_FTLR_FTR+P_FTLR_FTR_FTR+P_FTR_FTR_FTR+P_FTS_FTLR_FTR+P_FT
S_FTR_FTR+P_FTS2_FTR+... 
  P_FTLR2_FTR+P_FTR2_FTR+P_FTLR_FTR2+P_FTR_FTR2+P_FTS_FTR2+P_FTR3; 
% Total 
if T==0 
  PCSBO=P_FTS3; 
elseif T<=1 
  PCSBO=PCSBO1;  % may be incorrect for times between 0 and 1 hour 
elseif T>1 
  PCSBO=PCSBO1+PCSBO2; 
end 
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APPENDIX C 
FLEX DG (HOT) SYSTEM MATLAB MODELS 
 
This appendix contains the MATLAB code for Section IV.5.1. 
 
% 2iEDGs in hot standby & FLEX in hot standby; mission-time model of 
load 
clear all 
tic 
r=(1/1); % change for different "r-factor" cases 
% 
%% Input Data  
% Failure to start data; failure-on-demand parameters 
QFTS=3.24E-03;alpha1FTS=0.990656;alpha2FTS=1-
alpha1FTS;alphatFTS=alpha1FTS+2*alpha2FTS; 
% Initial Conditions; failure on demand probabilities 
P1=alpha1FTS.*QFTS/alphatFTS; % EDG "1" FTS 
P2=P1;                       % EDG "2" FTS ; 1 and 2 are iEDGs 
P3=(P1/2).*r;                       % FLEX EDG FTS                                                               
P4=2*alpha2FTS.*QFTS/alphatFTS; % both iEDG's CCFTS 
P5=0;  % no possibility that EDG "1" and flex EDG CCFTS                                                                         
P6=0;  % no possibility that EDG "2" and flex EDG CCFTS                                                                         
P7=(P4/2).*r;  % all three EDGs FTS                                                                               
P0=1-P1-P2-P3-P4-P5-P6-P7; 
% Failure to load-and-run data 
QFTLR=2.25E-03;alpha1FTLR=0.997015;alpha2FTLR=1-
alpha1FTLR;alphatFTLR=alpha1FTLR+2*alpha2FTLR; 
% Failure to run data; constant failure rates 
QFTR=7.12E-04; alpha1FTR=0.984593;alpha2FTR=1-
alpha1FTR;alphatFTR=alpha1FTR+2*alpha2FTR; 
%% failure rates 
% Designed 
r1_3a=alpha1FTLR*QFTLR/alphatFTLR; r1_3b=alpha1FTR*QFTR/alphatFTR; 
rF_3a=(r1_3a/2)*r;rF_3b=(r1_3b/2)*r; 
r2_3aE=2*alpha2FTLR*QFTLR/alphatFTLR; 
r2_3bE=2*alpha2FTR*QFTR/alphatFTR; 
r2_3aC=r2_3aE/2; r2_3bC=r2_3bE/2; 
r2_3a=r2_3aE+r2_3aC;r2_3b=r2_3bE+r2_3bC; 
r3_3a=(r2_3aE/2)*r;r3_3b=(r2_3bE/2)*r; 
% Influenced 
r1_2a=r1_3a+r2_3aE+.5*r2_3aC; r1_2b=r1_3b+r2_3bE+.5*r2_3bC; % when one 
iEDG is failed 
rF_2a=rF_3a;rF_2b=rF_3b; % single FLEX failure given one iEDG is 
already failed 
r2_2a=r2_3a+r3_3a;r2_2b=r2_3b+r3_3b; % 2/2 failure (FLEX is already 
failed) 
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r1_1a=r1_3a+r2_3aE+.5*r2_3aC+r3_3a;r1_1b=r1_3b+r2_3bE+.5*r2_3bC+r3_3b; 
% only 1 iEDG operating 
rF_Fa=rF_3a+r3_3a;rF_Fb=rF_3b+r3_3b; % single failure, onle FLEX is 
operating 
r_total_a=2*r1_3a+r2_3a+rF_3a+r3_3a; 
r_total_b=2*r1_3b+r2_3b+rF_3b+r3_3b; 
%% three consecutive 'single' failures; written as 1 fails followed by 
2 and 3 
% _a=2iEDGs, then FLEX; _b=iEDG, FLEX, iEDG; _c=FLEX, then 2 iEDGs 
% (z,y,x)=(t,t',tau)  
FTLR_FTLR_FTLR_a=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(r1_3a.*exp(-
r_total_a.*x)).*(r1_2a.*exp(-(r1_2a+rF_2a+r3_3a).*(y-
x))).*(rF_Fa.*exp(-(rF_Fa).*(z-y))));% 2 iEDGs then FLEX; confirm (2/3) 
and (1/3) in exp totals 
FTLR_FTLR_FTLR_b=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(r1_3a.*exp(-
r_total_a.*x)).*(rF_2a.*exp(-(r1_2a+rF_2a+r3_3a).*(y-
x))).*(r1_1a.*exp(-(r1_1a).*(z-y))));% iEDG, FLEX, then iEDG; 
FTLR_FTLR_FTLR_c=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(rF_3a.*exp(-
r_total_a.*x)).*(r1_3a.*exp(-(2*r1_3a+r2_2a).*(y-x))).*(r1_1a.*exp(-
(r1_1a).*(z-y))));% FLEX, iEDG, then iEDG; 
% 
FTLR_FTLR_FTR_a=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(r1_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*x)).*(r1_2a.*exp(-
(r1_2a+rF_2a+r3_3a).*(y-x))).*(rF_Fb.*exp(-(rF_Fa).*(1-y)).*exp(-
(rF_Fb).*(z-1)))); 
FTLR_FTLR_FTR_b=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(r1_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*x)).*(rF_2a.*exp(-
(r1_2a+rF_2a+r3_3a).*(y-x))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1a).*(1-y)).*exp(-
(r1_1b).*(z-1)))); 
FTLR_FTLR_FTR_c=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(rF_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*x)).*(r1_3a.*exp(-
(2*r1_3a+r2_2a).*(y-x))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1a).*(1-y)).*exp(-
(r1_1b).*(z-1)))); 
% 
FTLR_FTR_FTR_a=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(r1_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*x)).*(r1_2b.*exp(-
(r1_2a+rF_2a+r3_3a).*(1-x)).*exp(-(r1_2b+rF_2b+r3_3b).*(y-
1))).*(rF_Fb.*exp(-(rF_Fb).*(z-y)))); 
FTLR_FTR_FTR_b=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(r1_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*x)).*(rF_2b.*exp(-
(r1_2a+rF_2a+r3_3a).*(1-x)).*exp(-(r1_2b+rF_2b+r3_3b).*(y-
1))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1b).*(z-y)))); 
FTLR_FTR_FTR_c=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(rF_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*x)).*(r1_3b.*exp(-
(2*r1_3a+r2_2a).*(1-x)).*exp(-(2*r1_3b+r2_2b).*(y-1))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-
(r1_1b).*(z-y)))); 
% 
FTR_FTR_FTR_a=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(r1_3b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-r_total_b.*(x-
1))).*(r1_2b.*exp(-(r1_2b+rF_2b+r3_3b).*(y-x))).*(rF_Fb.*exp(-
(rF_Fb).*(z-y)))); 
FTR_FTR_FTR_b=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(r1_3b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-r_total_b.*(x-
1))).*(rF_2b.*exp(-(r1_2b+rF_2b+r3_3b).*(y-x))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-
(r1_1b).*(z-y)))); 
FTR_FTR_FTR_c=@(z,y,x)(P0.*(rF_3b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-r_total_b.*(x-
1))).*(r1_3b.*exp(-(2*r1_3b+r2_2b).*(y-x))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1b).*(z-
y)))); 
% define limits of integration 
ymax = @(z) z; 
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xmax = @(z,y) y;  
% 
%% 2 random variable integrands 
% _a=2iEDGs, then FLEX; _b=iEDG, FLEX, iEDG; _c=FLEX, then 2 iEDGs 
% FTS, 1/2, then 1/1 
FTLR_FTLR_a=@(z,y)(P1.*(r1_2a.*exp(-
(r1_2a+rF_2a+r3_3a).*y)).*(rF_Fa.*exp(-rF_Fa.*(z-y)))); 
FTLR_FTLR_b=@(z,y)(P1.*(rF_2a.*exp(-
(r1_2a+rF_2a+r3_3a).*y)).*(r1_1a.*exp(-r1_1a.*(z-y)))); 
FTLR_FTLR_c=@(z,y)(P3.*(r1_3a.*exp(-(2*r1_3a+r2_2a).*y)).*(r1_1a.*exp(-
r1_1a.*(z-y)))); 
% FTS, 1/2, then 1/1 
FTLR_FTR_a=@(z,y)(P1.*(r1_2a.*exp(-
(r1_2a+rF_2a+r3_3a).*y)).*(rF_Fb.*exp(-rF_Fa.*(1-y)).*exp(-(rF_Fb.*(z-
1))))); 
FTLR_FTR_b=@(z,y)(P1.*(rF_2a.*exp(-
(r1_2a+rF_2a+r3_3a).*y)).*(r1_1b.*exp(-r1_1a.*(1-y)).*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-
1))))); 
FTLR_FTR_c=@(z,y)(P3.*(r1_3a.*exp(-(2*r1_3a+r2_2a).*y)).*(r1_1b.*exp(-
r1_1a.*(1-y)).*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-1))))); 
% FTS, 1/2, then 1/1 
FTR_FTR_a=@(z,y)(P1.*(r1_2b.*exp(-(r1_2a+rF_2a+r3_3a)).*exp(-
(r1_2b+rF_2b+r3_3b).*(y-1))).*(rF_Fb.*exp(-(rF_Fb.*(z-y))))); 
FTR_FTR_b=@(z,y)(P1.*(rF_2b.*exp(-(r1_2a+rF_2a+r3_3a)).*exp(-
(r1_2b+rF_2b+r3_3b).*(y-1))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-y))))); 
FTR_FTR_c=@(z,y)(P3.*(r1_3b.*exp(-(2*r1_3a+r2_2a)).*exp(-
(2*r1_3b+r2_2b).*(y-1))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1b.*(z-y))))); 
% 2i/3, then 1f/1 
FTLR2_FTLR=@(z,y)(P0.*(r2_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*y)).*(rF_Fa.*exp(-
rF_Fa.*(z-y)))); 
FTLR2_FTR=@(z,y)(P0.*(r2_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*(y))).*(rF_Fb.*exp(-
rF_Fa.*(1-y)).*exp(-(rF_Fb.*(z-1))))); 
FTR2_FTR=@(z,y)(P0.*(r2_3b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-r_total_b.*(y-
1))).*(rF_Fb.*exp(-(rF_Fb.*(z-y))))); 
% F/3, then 2/2 
fFTLR_FTLR2=@(z,y)(P0.*(rF_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*y)).*(r2_2a.*exp(-
(2*r1_3a+r2_2a).*(z-y)))); 
fFTLR_FTR2=@(z,y)(P0.*(rF_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*(y))).*(r2_2b.*exp(-
(2*r1_3a+r2_2a).*(1-y)).*exp(-((2*r1_3b+r2_2b).*(z-1))))); 
fFTR_FTR2=@(z,y)(P0.*(rF_3b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-r_total_b.*(y-
1))).*(r2_2b.*exp(-((2*r1_3b+r2_2b).*(z-y))))); 
% 1i/3, then iEDG/FLEX CCF 
iFTLR_FTLR2=@(z,y)(P0.*(r1_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*y)).*(r3_3a.*exp(-
(r1_2a+rF_Fa).*(z-y)))); 
iFTLR_FTR2=@(z,y)(P0.*(r1_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*y)).*(r3_3b.*exp(-
(r1_2a+rF_Fa).*(1-y)).*exp(-((r1_2b+rF_Fb).*(z-1))))); 
iFTR_FTR2=@(z,y)(P0.*(r1_3b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-r_total_b.*(y-
1))).*(r3_3b.*exp(-((r1_2b+rF_Fb).*(z-y))))); 
%% 1 random variable integrands 
% iEDGs CCFTS, then single FLEX 
FTLR=@(z)(P4.*(rF_Fa.*exp(-rF_Fa.*z)));  
FTR=@(z)(P4.*(rF_Fb.*exp(-rF_Fa).*exp(-rF_Fb.*(z-1)))); 
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% FLEX FTS, then a CCF of both iEDGs 
fFTS_FTLR2=@(z)(P3.*(r2_2a.*exp(-(2*r1_3a+r2_2a).*z))); 
fFTS_FTR2=@(z)(P3.*(r2_2b.*exp(-(2*r1_3a+r2_2a)).*exp(-
(2*r1_3b+r2_2b).*(z-1)))); 
% iEDG FTS, then a CCF of iEDG/FLEX 
iFTS_FTLR2=@(z)(P1.*(r3_3a.*exp(-(r1_2a+rF_2a+r3_3a).*z))); 
iFTS_FTR2=@(z)(P1.*(r3_3b.*exp(-(r1_2a+rF_2a+r3_3a)).*exp(-
(r1_2b+rF_2b+r3_3b).*(z-1)))); 
% all 3 CCF 
FTLR3=@(z)(P0.*(r3_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*z))); 
FTR3=@(z)(P0.*(r3_3b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-r_total_b.*(z-1)))); 
% 
%% no random variable 
% CCFTS 
P_FTS3=P7; 
%% T=0 
PCSBO(1)=P_FTS3; 
%% T=1 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTLR_a=2.*integral3(FTLR_FTLR_FTLR_a,0,1,0,ymax,0,xmax); % 
FTLR_FTLR_FTLR 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTLR_b=2.*integral3(FTLR_FTLR_FTLR_b,0,1,0,ymax,0,xmax); 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTLR_c=2.*integral3(FTLR_FTLR_FTLR_c,0,1,0,ymax,0,xmax); 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTLR=P_FTLR_FTLR_FTLR_a+P_FTLR_FTLR_FTLR_b+P_FTLR_FTLR_FTLR
_c; 
% 
P_FTS_FTLR_FTLR_a=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTLR_a,0,1,0,ymax); 
P_FTS_FTLR_FTLR_b=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTLR_b,0,1,0,ymax); 
P_FTS_FTLR_FTLR_c=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTLR_c,0,1,0,ymax); 
P_FTS_FTLR_FTLR=P_FTS_FTLR_FTLR_a+P_FTS_FTLR_FTLR_b+P_FTS_FTLR_FTLR_c; 
% 
P_FTLR2_FTLR=integral2(FTLR2_FTLR,0,1,0,ymax); 
P_fFTLR_FTLR2=integral2(fFTLR_FTLR2,0,1,0,ymax); 
P_iFTLR_FTLR2=2.*integral2(iFTLR_FTLR2,0,1,0,ymax); 
% 
P_FTS2_FTLR=integral(FTLR,0,1); 
P_FTLR3=integral(FTLR3,0,1); 
% 
P_iFTS_FTLR2=2.*integral(iFTS_FTLR2,0,1); 
P_fFTS_FTLR2=integral(fFTS_FTLR2,0,1); 
% 
PCSBO(2)=P_FTS3+P_FTLR_FTLR_FTLR+P_FTS_FTLR_FTLR+P_FTLR2_FTLR+P_fFTLR_F
TLR2+P_iFTLR_FTLR2+P_FTS2_FTLR+P_FTLR3+P_iFTS_FTLR2+P_fFTS_FTLR2; 
%% T>1 
for i=3:769 
% 3 random variable CDFs 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTR_a(i)=2.*integral3(FTLR_FTLR_FTR_a,1,i-1,0,1,0,xmax); 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTR_b(i)=2.*integral3(FTLR_FTLR_FTR_b,1,i-1,0,1,0,xmax); 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTR_c(i)=2.*integral3(FTLR_FTLR_FTR_c,1,i-1,0,1,0,xmax); 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTR(i)=P_FTLR_FTLR_FTR_a(i)+P_FTLR_FTLR_FTR_b(i)+P_FTLR_FTL
R_FTR_c(i); 
% 
P_FTLR_FTR_FTR_a(i)=2.*integral3(FTLR_FTR_FTR_a,1,i-1,1,ymax,0,1); 
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P_FTLR_FTR_FTR_b(i)=2.*integral3(FTLR_FTR_FTR_b,1,i-1,1,ymax,0,1); 
P_FTLR_FTR_FTR_c(i)=2.*integral3(FTLR_FTR_FTR_c,1,i-1,1,ymax,0,1); 
P_FTLR_FTR_FTR(i)=P_FTLR_FTR_FTR_a(i)+P_FTLR_FTR_FTR_b(i)+P_FTLR_FTR_FT
R_c(i); 
% 
P_FTR_FTR_FTR_a(i)=2.*integral3(FTR_FTR_FTR_a,1,i-1,1,ymax,1,xmax);  % 
FTR_FTR_FTR 
P_FTR_FTR_FTR_b(i)=2.*integral3(FTR_FTR_FTR_b,1,i-1,1,ymax,1,xmax); 
P_FTR_FTR_FTR_c(i)=2.*integral3(FTR_FTR_FTR_c,1,i-1,1,ymax,1,xmax); 
P_FTR_FTR_FTR(i)=P_FTR_FTR_FTR_a(i)+P_FTR_FTR_FTR_b(i)+P_FTR_FTR_FTR_c(
i); 
% 2 random variable CDFs 
P_FTS_FTLR_FTR_a(i)=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTR_a,1,i-1,0,1); 
P_FTS_FTLR_FTR_b(i)=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTR_b,1,i-1,0,1); 
P_FTS_FTLR_FTR_c(i)=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTR_c,1,i-1,0,1); 
P_FTS_FTLR_FTR(i)=P_FTS_FTLR_FTR_a(i)+P_FTS_FTLR_FTR_b(i)+P_FTS_FTLR_FT
R_c(i); 
% 
P_FTS_FTR_FTR_a(i)=2.*integral2(FTR_FTR_a,1,i-1,1,ymax); 
P_FTS_FTR_FTR_b(i)=2.*integral2(FTR_FTR_b,1,i-1,1,ymax); 
P_FTS_FTR_FTR_c(i)=2.*integral2(FTR_FTR_c,1,i-1,1,ymax); 
P_FTS_FTR_FTR(i)=P_FTS_FTR_FTR_a(i)+P_FTS_FTR_FTR_b(i)+P_FTS_FTR_FTR_c(
i); 
% 
P_FTLR2_FTR(i)=integral2(FTLR2_FTR,1,i-1,0,1); 
P_FTR2_FTR(i)=integral2(FTR2_FTR,1,i-1,1,ymax); 
% 
P_fFTLR_FTR2(i)=integral2(fFTLR_FTR2,1,i-1,0,1); 
P_fFTR_FTR2(i)=integral2(fFTR_FTR2,1,i-1,1,ymax); 
% 
P_iFTLR_FTR2(i)=2.*integral2(iFTLR_FTR2,1,i-1,0,1); 
P_iFTR_FTR2(i)=2.*integral2(iFTR_FTR2,1,i-1,1,ymax); 
% 1 random variable CDFs 
P_FTS2_FTR(i)=integral(FTR,1,i-1); 
P_iFTS_FTR2(i)=2.*integral(iFTS_FTR2,1,i-1); 
P_fFTS_FTR2(i)=integral(fFTS_FTR2,1,i-1); 
P_FTR3(i)=integral(FTR3,1,i-1); 
PCSBO(i)=PCSBO(2)+P_FTLR_FTLR_FTR(i)+P_FTLR_FTR_FTR(i)+P_FTR_FTR_FTR(i)
+P_FTS_FTLR_FTR(i)+P_FTS_FTR_FTR(i)+P_FTLR2_FTR(i)... 
    
+P_FTR2_FTR(i)+P_iFTLR_FTR2(i)+P_iFTR_FTR2(i)+P_FTS2_FTR(i)+P_FTR3(i)+P
_fFTLR_FTR2(i)+P_fFTR_FTR2(i)+P_iFTS_FTR2(i)+P_fFTS_FTR2(i); 
end 
  
toc 
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APPENDIX D 
FLEX DG (COLD) SYSTEM MATLAB MODELS 
 
This appendix contains the MATLAB code for Section IV.5.2. 
 
% 2iEDGs in hot standby & FLEX in cold standby; mission-time model of 
load 
% 3/3 externally caused CCF is possible even though FLEX isnt started 
clear all 
% 
T=768; 
tic 
r=(1/1); % change for different "r-factor" cases 
% 
%% Input data 
% Failure to start data; failure-on-demand parameters 
QFTS=3.24E-03;alpha1FTS=0.990656;alpha2FTS=1-
alpha1FTS;alphatFTS=alpha1FTS+2*alpha2FTS; 
% Initial Conditions; failure on demand probabilities 
P1=alpha1FTS*QFTS/alphatFTS; % EDG "1" FTS 
P2=P1;                       % EDG "2" FTS ; 1 and 2 are iEDGs 
P3=0;                        % FLEX EDG FTS at t=0                                     
P4=2*alpha2FTS*QFTS/alphatFTS; % both iEDG's CCFTS 
P5=0;  % no possibility that EDG "1" and flex EDG CCFTS                                                                         
P6=0;  % no possibility that EDG "2" and flex EDG CCFTS                                                                         
P7=(P4/2).*r;  % all three EDGs FTS; not possible for the cold standby 
case                                                                               
P0=1-P1-P2-P3-P4-P5-P6-P7; 
% 
P_3=(P1/2)*r;  % FLEX EDG FTS after both iEDGs failed 
P_0=1-P_3;     % FLEX EDG successfully starts after both iEDGs failed 
% Failure to load-and-run data 
QFTLR=2.25E-03;alpha1FTLR=0.997015;alpha2FTLR=1-
alpha1FTLR;alphatFTLR=alpha1FTLR+2*alpha2FTLR; 
% Failure to run data; constant failure rates 
QFTR=7.12E-04; alpha1FTR=0.984593;alpha2FTR=1-
alpha1FTR;alphatFTR=alpha1FTR+2*alpha2FTR; 
%% failure rates 
% Designed 
r1_2a=alpha1FTLR*QFTLR/alphatFTLR; r1_2b=alpha1FTR*QFTR/alphatFTR; 
rFa=(r1_2a/2)*r;rFb=(r1_2b/2)*r; 
r2_2aE=2*alpha2FTLR*QFTLR/alphatFTLR; 
r2_2bE=2*alpha2FTR*QFTR/alphatFTR; 
r2_2aC=r2_2aE/2; r2_2bC=r2_2bE/2; 
r2_2a=r2_2aE+r2_2aC;r2_2b=r2_2bE+r2_2bC; 
r3_3a=(r2_2aE/2)*r;r3_3b=(r2_2bE/2)*r;  
% Influenced 
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r1_1a=r1_2a+r2_2aE+.5*r2_2aC; r1_1b=r1_2b+r2_2bE+.5*r2_2bC; % single 
iEDG failure rate when one iEDG is failed 
rF_Fa=rFa+r3_3a;rF_Fb=rFb+r3_3b;%% 
r_total_a=2*r1_2a+r2_2a+r3_3a; r_total_b=2*r1_2b+r2_2b+r3_3b; % cold 
mod 
%% three consecutive 'single' failures; written as 1 fails followed by 
2 and 3 
% need to think about which rates compose the needed conditional hazard 
functions for this joint pdf '3IND' 
% define anonymous function for integrand 
% (z,y,x)=(t,t',tau)  
FTLR_FTLR_FTLR=@(z,y,x)(P0.*P_0.*(r1_2a.*exp(-
r_total_a.*x)).*(r1_1a.*exp(-(r1_1a+r3_3a).*(y-x))).*(rF_Fa.*exp(-
(rF_Fa).*(z-y))));% 2 iEDGs then FLEX; confirm (2/3) and (1/3) in exp 
totals 
FTLR_FTLR_FTR=@(z,y,x)(P0.*P_0.*(r1_2a.*exp(-
r_total_a.*x)).*(r1_1a.*exp(-(r1_1a+r3_3a).*(y-x))).*(rF_Fb.*exp(-
(rF_Fa).*(1)).*exp(-(rF_Fb).*(z-y-1)))); 
FTLR_FTR_FTLR=@(z,y,x)(P0.*P_0.*(r1_2a.*exp(-
r_total_a.*x)).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1b+r3_3b).*(y-x))).*(rF_Fa.*exp(-
(rF_Fa).*(z-y)))); 
FTLR_FTR_FTR=@(z,y,x)(P0.*P_0.*(r1_2a.*exp(-
r_total_a.*x)).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1b+r3_3b).*(y-x))).*(rF_Fb.*exp(-
(rF_Fa).*(1)).*exp(-(rF_Fb).*(z-y-1)))); 
FTR_FTR_FTLR=@(z,y,x)(P0.*P_0.*(r1_2b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-
r_total_b.*(x-1))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1b+r3_3b).*(y-x))).*(rF_Fa.*exp(-
(rF_Fa).*(z-y)))); 
FTR_FTR_FTR=@(z,y,x)(P0.*P_0.*(r1_2b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-
r_total_b.*(x-1))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1b+r3_3b).*(y-x))).*(rF_Fb.*exp(-
(rF_Fa).*(1)).*exp(-(rF_Fb).*(z-y-1)))); 
% define limits of integration 
ymax = @(z) z; 
xmax = @(z,y) y; 
% 
%% 2 random variable integrands 
% iEDG FTS, iEDG running failure, FLEX running failure 
FTLR_FTLR=@(z,y)(P1.*P_0.*(r1_1a.*exp(-
(r1_1a+r3_3a).*y)).*(rF_Fa.*exp(-rF_Fa.*(z-y)))); 
FTLR_FTR=@(z,y)(P1.*P_0.*(r1_1a.*exp(-(r1_1a+r3_3a).*y)).*(rF_Fb.*exp(-
rF_Fa.*(1)).*exp(-(rF_Fb.*(z-y-1))))); 
FTR_FTLR=@(z,y)(P1.*P_0.*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1a+r3_3a)).*exp(-
(r1_1b+r3_3b).*(y-1))).*(rF_Fa.*exp(-rF_Fa.*(z-y)))); 
FTR_FTR=@(z,y)(P1.*P_0.*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1a+r3_3a)).*exp(-
(r1_1b+r3_3b).*(y-1))).*(rF_Fb.*exp(-rF_Fa.*(1)).*exp(-(rF_Fb.*(z-y-
1))))); 
% iEDGs 2/2 running failure, FLEX running failure 
FTLR2_FTLR=@(z,y)(P0.*P_0.*(r2_2a.*exp(-r_total_a.*y)).*(rF_Fa.*exp(-
rF_Fa.*(z-y)))); 
FTLR2_FTR=@(z,y)(P0.*P_0.*(r2_2a.*exp(-r_total_a.*(y))).*(rF_Fb.*exp(-
rF_Fa.*(1)).*exp(-(rF_Fb.*(z-y-1))))); 
FTR2_FTLR=@(z,y)(P0.*P_0.*(r2_2b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-r_total_b.*(y-
1))).*(rF_Fa.*exp(-rF_Fa.*(z-y)))); 
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FTR2_FTR=@(z,y)(P0.*P_0.*(r2_2b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-r_total_b.*(y-
1))).*(rF_Fb.*exp(-rF_Fa).*exp(-(rF_Fb.*(z-y-1))))); 
% iEDG 1/2 running failure, iEDG 1/1 running failure, FLEX FTS 
FTLR_FTLR_FTS=@(z,y)(P0.*P_3.*(r1_2a.*exp(-
(r_total_a).*y)).*(r1_1a.*exp(-(r1_1a+r3_3a).*(z-y)))); 
FTLR_FTR_FTS=@(z,y)(P0.*P_3.*(r1_2a.*exp(-
(r_total_a).*y)).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1a+r3_3a).*(1-y)).*exp(-
(r1_1b+r3_3b).*(z-1)))); 
FTR_FTR_FTS=@(z,y)(P0.*P_3.*(r1_2b.*exp(-(r_total_a)).*exp(-
(r_total_b).*(y-1))).*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1b+r3_3b).*(z-y)))); 
% iEDG 1/2, iEDG and FLEX EDG CCF 
FTLR_FTLR2=@(z,y)(P0.*(r1_2a.*exp(-(r_total_a).*y)).*(r3_3a.*exp(-
(r1_1a+r3_3a).*(z-y)))); % FLEX failure rate not included in "exp(-
(r1_1a+r3_3a)" because it hasnt turned on yet (cold) 
FTLR_FTR2=@(z,y)(P0.*(r1_2a.*exp(-(r_total_a).*y)).*(r3_3b.*exp(-
(r1_1a+r3_3a).*(1-y)).*exp(-(r1_1b+r3_3b).*(z-1)))); 
FTR_FTR2=@(z,y)(P0.*(r1_2b.*exp(-(r_total_a)).*exp(-(r_total_b).*(y-
1))).*(r3_3b.*exp(-(r1_1b+r3_3b).*(z-y)))); 
% 
%% 1 random variable integrands 
% 2/2 FTS, FLEX failure while running 
FTLR=@(z)(P4.*P_0.*(rF_Fa.*exp(-rF_Fa.*z)));  
FTR=@(z)(P4.*P_0.*(rF_Fb.*exp(-rF_Fa).*exp(-rF_Fb.*(z-1)))); 
% 2/2 iEDG CCF, then FLEX FTS 
FTLR2=@(z)(P0.*P_3.*(r2_2a.*exp(-(r_total_a).*z))); 
FTR2=@(z)(P0.*P_3.*(r2_2b.*exp(-(r_total_a)).*exp(-(r_total_b).*(z-
1)))); 
% iEDG FTS, iEDG running failure, FLEX EDG FTS 
FTS_FTLR_FTS=@(z)(P1.*P_3.*(r1_1a.*exp(-(r1_1a+r3_3a).*z))); 
FTS_FTR_FTS=@(z)(P1.*P_3.*(r1_1b.*exp(-(r1_1a+r3_3a)).*exp(-
(r1_1b+r3_3b).*(z-1)))); 
% 3/3 CCF 
FTLR3=@(z)(P0.*(r3_3a.*exp(-r_total_a.*z))); 
FTR3=@(z)(P0.*(r3_3b.*exp(-r_total_a).*exp(-r_total_b.*(z-1)))); 
% iEDG 1/2 FTS, iEDG and FLEX CCF 
FTS_FTLR2=@(z)(P1.*(r3_3a.*exp(-(r1_1a+r3_3a).*z))); 
FTS_FTR2=@(z)(P1.*(r3_3b.*exp(-(r1_1a+r3_3a)).*exp(-(r1_1b+r3_3b).*(z-
1)))); 
%% no random variable 
% CCFTS 
P_FTS3=P7; 
P_FTS2_FTS=P4.*P_3; 
%% 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTLR=2.*integral3(FTLR_FTLR_FTLR,0,1,0,ymax,0,xmax); % 
FTLR_FTLR_FTLR 
P_FTS_FTLR_FTLR=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTLR,0,1,0,ymax); 
P_FTLR2_FTLR=integral2(FTLR2_FTLR,0,1,0,ymax); 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTS=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTLR_FTS,0,1,0,ymax); 
P_FTS2_FTLR=integral(FTLR,0,1); 
P_FTLR2_FTS=integral(FTLR2,0,1); 
P_FTLR3=integral(FTLR3,0,1); 
P_FTS_FTLR2=2.*integral(FTS_FTLR2,0,1); 
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P_FTS_FTLR_FTS=2.*integral(FTS_FTLR_FTS,0,1); 
P_FTLR_FTLR2=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTLR2,0,1,0,ymax); 
%% 
PCSBO(1)=P_FTS3+P_FTS2_FTS; 
PCSBO(2)=PCSBO(1)+P_FTLR_FTLR_FTLR+P_FTS_FTLR_FTLR+P_FTLR2_FTLR+P_FTLR_
FTLR_FTS+P_FTS2_FTLR... 
    +P_FTLR2_FTS+P_FTS_FTLR2+P_FTLR3+P_FTS_FTLR_FTS+P_FTLR_FTLR2; 
  
  
%% 
for i=3:T+1 
% 3 random variable CDFs 
P_FTLR_FTLR_FTR(i)=2.*integral3(FTLR_FTLR_FTR,1,i-1,0,1,0,xmax); 
P_FTLR_FTR_FTLR(i)=2.*integral3(FTLR_FTR_FTLR,i-2,i-1,1,ymax,0,1); 
P_FTLR_FTR_FTR(i)=2.*integral3(FTLR_FTR_FTR,1,i-1,1,ymax,0,1); 
P_FTR_FTR_FTLR(i)=2.*integral3(FTR_FTR_FTLR,i-2,i-1,1,ymax,1,xmax); 
P_FTR_FTR_FTR(i)=2.*integral3(FTR_FTR_FTR,1,i-1,1,ymax,1,xmax);  % 
FTR_FTR_FTR  
% 2 random variable CDFs 
P_FTS_FTLR_FTR(i)=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTR,1,i-1,0,1); 
P_FTS_FTR_FTLR(i)=2.*integral2(FTR_FTLR,i-2,i-1,1,ymax); 
P_FTS_FTR_FTR(i)=2.*integral2(FTR_FTR,1,i-1,1,ymax); 
P_FTLR2_FTR(i)=integral2(FTLR2_FTR,1,i-1,0,1); 
P_FTR2_FTLR(i)=integral2(FTR2_FTLR,i-2,i-1,1,ymax); 
P_FTR2_FTR(i)=integral2(FTR2_FTR,1,i-1,1,ymax); 
P_FTLR_FTR_FTS(i)=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTR_FTS,1,i-1,0,1); 
P_FTR_FTR_FTS(i)=2.*integral2(FTR_FTR_FTS,1,i-1,1,ymax); 
P_FTLR_FTR2(i)=2.*integral2(FTLR_FTR2,1,i-1,1,ymax); 
P_FTR_FTR2(i)=2.*integral2(FTR_FTR2,1,i-1,1,ymax); 
% 1 random variable CDFs 
P_FTS2_FTR(i)=integral(FTR,1,i-1); 
P_FTR2_FTS(i)=integral(FTR2,1,i-1); 
P_FTR3(i)=integral(FTR3,1,i-1); 
P_FTS_FTR2(i)=2.*integral(FTS_FTR2,1,i-1); 
P_FTS_FTR_FTS(i)=2.*integral(FTS_FTR_FTS,1,i-1); 
% 
PCSBO(i)=PCSBO(2)+P_FTLR_FTLR_FTR(i)+P_FTLR_FTR_FTLR(i)+P_FTLR_FTR_FTR(
i)+P_FTR_FTR_FTLR(i)+P_FTR_FTR_FTR(i)+P_FTS_FTLR_FTR(i)+P_FTS_FTR_FTR(i
)+P_FTLR2_FTR(i)+P_FTR2_FTR(i)... 
    
+P_FTR2_FTLR(i)+P_FTR2_FTS(i)+P_FTLR_FTR_FTS(i)+P_FTR_FTR_FTS(i)+P_FTS2
_FTR(i)+P_FTS_FTR2(i)+P_FTR3(i)+P_FTS_FTR_FTS(i)+P_FTLR_FTR2(i)+P_FTR_F
TR2(i); 
end 
PCSBO_=PCSBO'; 
toc 
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APPENDIX E 
FUTURE WORK MATLAB MODELS 
 
E.1 Semi-Markov Cold Standby Case 
clear all 
tic 
syms x n k y t T 
%% weibull parameters 
r01=.1; r02=.01; r12=r01+r02; 
syms r1 r2 r_12 B1 B2 B_12 
assume (r1>0);assume(r2>0);assume(r_12>0);assume(B1>0) 
;assume(B2>0);assume(B_12>0); 
B01=1.3;B02=1.3;B12=1.3; 
p01=symfun((r01.^B01).*B01.*(t.^(B01-1)).*exp(-(r01.*t).^B01),[t]); 
p02=symfun((r02.^B02).*B02.*(t.^(B02-1)).*exp(-(r02.*t).^B02),[t]); 
p12=symfun((r12.^B12).*B12.*(t.^(B12-1)).*exp(-(r12.*t).^B12),[t]); 
cF01=symfun(exp(-(r01.*t).^B01),[t]);cF02=symfun(exp(-
(r02.*t).^B02),[t]); 
cF12=symfun(exp(-(r12.*t).^B12),[t]); 
%% 
m=201; 
dt=.1;tm=@(q)dt.*q; 
Tm=tm(m)-dt; 
%% 
h01=symfun(p01(x).*cF02(x),[x]); 
h02=symfun(p02(x).*cF01(x),[x]); 
h12=symfun(p12(x),[x]); 
%  
W00=symfun(cF01(x).*cF02(x),[x]); % these w..'s check out 
W11=symfun(cF12(x),[x]); 
W22=1; 
%% 
H=[0 h01 h02;0 0 h12;0 0 0];  
W=[W00 0 0;0 W11 0;0 0 W22]; 
% 
H_0=double(H(0));          % for beta>=1 
N=(eye(3)-(dt/2).*H_0); M=double(inv(N)); 
phi(:,:,1)=double(W(0)) % initialize phi(:,:,1)=phi(t=0),then 
phi(:,:,2)=phi(t1), etc.. 
%% 
for i = 2:m 
  sum=zeros(3); 
  for k=1:i-1     
    y=i-k; 
    sumfun=symfun(H(tm(x))*phi(:,:,y),[x]); 
    count=double(sumfun(k)); 
    sum=double(count+sum); 
  end 
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  P=symfun((M*(W(tm(x))+dt.*sum-(dt/2).*H(tm(x))*phi(:,:,1))),[x]);  
  phi(:,:,i) = P(i-1); 
  i 
  toc 
end 
 
E.2 Semi-Markov “Warm” Standby Case 
clear all 
tic 
syms x n k y t T 
%% weibull parameters 
r01=.1; r02=.1; r03=.01; r13=.11; r23=.11; 
syms r1 r2 r3 r_13 r_23 B1 B2 B3 B_13 B_23 
assume (r1>0);assume(r2>0);assume (r3>0);assume(r_13>0);assume 
(r_23>0); 
assume(B1>0);assume(B2>0);assume(B3>0);assume(B_13>0);assume(B_23>0); 
B01=1.3;B02=1.3;B03=1.3;B13=1.3;B23=1.3; 
p01=symfun((r01.^B01).*B01.*(t.^(B01-1)).*exp(-(r01.*t).^B01),[t]); 
p02=symfun((r02.^B02).*B02.*(t.^(B02-1)).*exp(-(r02.*t).^B02),[t]); 
p03=symfun((r03.^B03).*B03.*(t.^(B03-1)).*exp(-(r03.*t).^B03),[t]); 
p13=symfun((r13.^B13).*B13.*(t.^(B13-1)).*exp(-(r13.*t).^B13),[t]); 
p23=symfun((r23.^B23).*B23.*(t.^(B23-1)).*exp(-(r23.*t).^B23),[t]); 
cF01=symfun(exp(-(r01.*t).^B01),[t]);cF02=symfun(exp(-
(r02.*t).^B02),[t]); 
cF03=symfun(exp(-(r03.*t).^B03),[t]); 
cF13=symfun(exp(-(r13.*t).^B13),[t]);cF23=symfun(exp(-
(r23.*t).^B23),[t]); 
%% 
m=201; 
dt=.1;tm=@(q)dt.*q; 
Tm=tm(m)-dt; 
%% 
h01=symfun(p01(x).*cF02(x).*cF03(x),[x]); 
h02=symfun(p02(x).*cF01(x).*cF03(x),[x]); 
h03=symfun(p03(x).*cF01(x).*cF02(x),[x]); 
h13=symfun(p13(x),[x]); 
h23=symfun(p23(x),[x]); 
%  
W00=symfun(cF01(x).*cF02(x).*cF03(x),[x]); 
W11=symfun(cF13(x),[x]); 
W22=symfun(cF23(x),[x]); 
W33=1; 
%% 
H=[0 h01 h02 h03;0 0 0 h13;0 0 0 h23;0 0 0 0];  
W=[W00 0 0 0;0 W11 0 0;0 0 W22 0;0 0 0 W33]; 
% 
H_0=double(H(0));          % for beta>=1 
N=(eye(4)-(dt/2).*H_0); M=double(inv(N)); 
phi(:,:,1)=double(W(0)); 
%% 
for i = 2:m 
  sum=zeros(4); 
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  for k=1:i-1     
    y=i-k; 
    sumfun=symfun(H(tm(x))*phi(:,:,y),[x]); 
    count=double(sumfun(k)); 
    sum=double(count+sum); 
  end 
  P=symfun((M*(W(tm(x))+dt.*sum-(dt/2).*H(tm(x))*phi(:,:,1))),[x]); 
  phi(:,:,i) = P(i-1); 
  i 
  toc 
end 
 
E.3 NRI Cold Standby Case 
%% assume externally-caused CCF only 
tic 
clear all 
syms z y w t r B 
assume (r>0); assume(B>0); 
m=200;dt=.1; 
ymax = @(z) z; 
%% Weibull parameters 
r01=.1; r03=.01; r_=r01+r03; 
B01=1.3;B02=1.3;B12=1.3; 
r1=@(u)(r01.^B01).*B01.*u.^(B01-1); rcc=@(u)(r03.^B02).*B02.*u.^(B02-
1); 
r13=@(u)(r_.^B12).*B12.*u.^(B12-1); 
total=@(u)(r1(u)+rcc(u)); % cold 
%% 
total_sym=symfun(total(y),[y]); 
total_int=matlabFunction(int(total_sym,0,y)) 
r_2_sym=symfun(r13(w),[w]); 
r_2_int=matlabFunction(int(r_2_sym(w),y,z))  
%% 
for i=1:m+1 
  j=i.*dt 
FTR_FTR=@(z,y)(r1(y).*exp(-total_int(y)).*r13(z-y).*exp(-
r_2_int(y,z))); 
P_FTR_FTR(i)=integral2(FTR_FTR,0,j-dt,0,ymax); 
% 
CCFTR = @(z)((rcc(z).*exp(-total_int(z)))); 
FTR_CCF(i) = integral(CCFTR,0,j-dt); 
% 
P_CSBO(i)=P_FTR_FTR(i)+FTR_CCF(i); 
toc 
end 
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E.4 NRI Hot Standby Case 
%% assume externally-caused CCF only 
tic 
clear all 
syms z y w t r B 
assume (r>0); assume(B>0); 
m=200;dt=.1; 
ymax = @(z) z; 
%% Weibull parameters 
r01=.1; r03=.01; r_=r01+r03; 
B01=1.3;B02=1.3;B12=1.3; 
r1=@(u)(r01.^B01).*B01.*u.^(B01-1); rcc=@(u)(r03.^B02).*B02.*u.^(B02-
1); 
r13=@(u)(r_.^B12).*B12.*u.^(B12-1); 
total=@(u)(2.*r1(u)+rcc(u));  
%% 
total_sym=symfun(total(y),[y]); 
total_int=matlabFunction(int(total_sym,0,y)) 
r_2_sym=symfun(r13(w),[w]); 
r_2_int=matlabFunction(int(r_2_sym(w),y,z)) 
for i=1:m+1 
  j=i.*dt 
FTR_FTR=@(z,y)(r1(y).*exp(-total_int(y)).*r13(z).*exp(-r_2_int(y,z))); 
P_FTR_FTR(i)=2.*integral2(FTR_FTR,0,j-dt,0,ymax);  
% 
CCFTR = @(z)((rcc(z).*exp(-total_int(z)))); 
FTR_CCF(i) = integral(CCFTR,0,j-dt); 
% 
P_CSBO(i)=P_FTR_FTR(i)+FTR_CCF(i); 
toc 
end 
 
